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SUMMARY
For efficiency and flexibility purposes, fundational software systems such as operating
systems and web servers are implemented in unsafe programming languages, and system
designers often prioritize performance over security. As a result, these systems inherently
suffer from a variety of vulnerabilities and insecure designs that have been exploited by
adversaries to launch critical system attacks. System attacks constitute a major threat to our
cyber world; their two typical goals are to leak sensitive data in victim systems (i.e., data
leaks) and to control victim systems (i.e., control attacks).
This thesis aims at defeating both data leaks and control attacks by preventing informa-
tion leaks. We identified that, in modern systems, preventing information leaks is a general
approach to defeating both attacks. Since modern systems widely deploy randomization-
based defense mechanisms such as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [145]
and StackGuard [44], leaking a randomized value to bypass these defense mechanisms
has become a prerequisite for control attacks. Therefore, preventing information leaks can
defeat not only data leaks but also control attacks.
To prevent information leaks, we empirically analyzed the root causes of reported
information leaks in software systems and then proposed three ways: (1) eliminating
information-leak vulnerabilities, (2) retrofitting system designs against information leaks,
and (3) protecting sensitive data from information leaks. While the first two ways aim to fix
root causes of information leaks, the third way acts as the second line of defense against
information leaks. For each way, we have developed multiple tools. Specifically, we first
developed two techniques to eliminate the most common information-leak vulnerabilities
in OS kernels: UNISAN [117] eliminates information leaks caused by uninitialized-data
xiv
reads, and POINTSAN [121] eliminates uninitialized-pointer uses. We then developed
RUNTIMEASLR [116] to prevent information leaks caused by the insecure process forking
design in daemon servers. At last, we developed ASLR-GUARD [118] to stop code-pointer
leaks and thus defeat code-reuse attacks, and BUDDY [122] to generally detect memory
disclosures with replicated execution. While automatically and reliably securing complex





Our ubiquitous computer devices are actuated by software systems such as operating sys-
tems (OS) and web servers. Since these systems are a foundation of computer devices,
their efficiency is particularly important, and they often require direct accesses to hardware
resources such as memory. As such, system designers often prioritize performance and
flexibility over security, and fundational software systems are implemented in unsafe pro-
gramming languages (e.g., C/C++). As a result, these systems inherently suffer from a
variety of insecure designs and vulnerabilities. For example, according to the U.S. National
Vulnerability Database, more than 1,800 vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel alone have been
reported. System attacks exploiting insecure designs and vulnerabilities have become a
critical threat. The past several years have continuously witnessed critical attacks targeting
systems belonging to individuals, enterprises, and even government agencies. A single
system attack may cause billions of loss. In general, system attacks have two typical goals:
to control victim systems (i.e., control attacks) and to leak the sensitive data in victim
systems (i.e., data leaks). It is pressing to protect our systems from data leaks and control
attacks.
1.2 Thesis Overview
This thesis work aims to defeat both data leaks and control attacks by preventing information
leaks. Since in modern software systems, randomization-based defense mechanisms such
as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [145] and StackGuard [44] are widely
deployed, leaking a randomized value to bypass these defense mechanisms has become a
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Table 1: A summary of causes of reported information leaks in computer devices.
Category Type Example Defense/mitigation example
Vulnerabilities Memory error Uninitialized-data read UNISAN [117], POINTSAN [121]
(implementation Logic error Missing check Model checking techniques
errors) Hardware error Row hammer [93] G-CATT [24]
Design flaws
Specification issue Uninitialized padding UNISAN [117]
Organization issue Refork-on-crash [116] RUNTIMEASLR [116]
Mechanism issue Deduplication+COW [22] HexPADS [147]
Side channels
Cache AnC [73] CacheBar [195]
Timing Loop timing [157] ASLR-GUARD [118]
Differential fault Crashing [20] RUNTIMEASLR [116]
prerequisite for control attacks. By preventing information leaks, we ensure that the pre-
requisite is unsatisfiable to control attacks, and thus we can defeat them. More importantly,
unlike traditional control attack defense mechanisms such as control-flow integrity [2] that
typically require extensive runtime checks, information-leak prevention can be achieved in
more efficient ways. It is intuitive that preventing information leaks also defeats data leaks.
Therefore, preventing information leaks can be a general and efficient approach to defeating
both data leaks and control attacks.
To prevent information leaks, we first empirically analyzed the causes of reported
information leaks in systems, and summarize them in Table 1. The main causes include
information-leak vulnerabilities (i.e., implementation errors), design flaws, and side channels.
Based on our cause analysis of information leaks, we propose to prevent information leaks in
three ways: (1) eliminating information-leak vulnerabilities, (2) retrofitting system designs
against information leaks, and (3) protecting sensitive data from information leaks. The
first two ways aim at fixing root causes of information leaks—vulnerabilities and insecure
designs in system code. Since completely fixing some information leaks such as the ones
caused by side channels is hard, the third way tries to protect certain sensitive data even in
the presence of information leaks, which acts as the second line of defense.
The following three sections introduce our research approaches for each way of prevent-
ing information leaks. We have developed multiple practical systems, which automatically
2
prevent information leaks in complex systems while preserving their reliability and effi-
ciency.
1.2.1 Eliminating Information-Leak Vulnerabilities
One root cause of information leaks is that system code has information-leak vulnerabilities.
Attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities to leak sensitive data or to leak randomized
value to break defense mechanisms. Hence, an intuitive way to prevent information leaks
is to eliminate information-leak vulnerabilities, and thereby we propose two techniques,
UNISAN and POINTSAN, to eliminate the most common information-leak vulnerabilities in
OS kernels. While UNISAN completely eliminates information leaks caused by uninitialized
data reads, POINTSAN eliminates the ones caused by uninitialized pointer dereferencing in
a practical manner.
1.2.1.1 UNISAN: Eliminating Uninitialized Data Leaks
OS kernels are the de facto trusted computing base for most computer systems, which
contain lots of sensitive data such as cryptographic keys and file caches. On the other
hand, OS kernels enforce defense mechanisms such as ASLR and StackGuard to mitigate
various attacks (e.g., code-reuse attack and privilege-escalation attack). The effectiveness
of these mechanisms relies on the confidentiality of the randomized pointers and canaries.
Unfortunately, OS kernels have many information-leak vulnerabilities. In practical, sensitive
data in OS kernels can be leaked, and defense mechanisms are often broken because the
randomized pointers and canaries can be leaked. Therefore, it is important to eliminate
information-leak vulnerabilities in OS kernels.
Our study reveals that most (about 60%) kernel information leaks are caused by unini-
tialized data reads—kernel space is shared by all processes; reading an uninitialized variable
may read data of other processes. We propose UNISAN, a novel, compiler-based approach
to eliminating all information leaks caused by uninitialized reads in OS kernels. UNISAN
achieves this goal by using byte-level, flow-sensitive, context-sensitive, and field-sensitive
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initialization analysis and reachability analysis that check whether an allocated object has
been fully initialized when it leaves kernel space; if not, UNISAN automatically instruments
the kernel code to zero-initialize the object when it is allocated. UNISAN’s analyses are
conservative to avoid false negatives and are robust by preserving the semantics of OS
kernels. Since UNISAN zero-initializes only a small portion of allocations, it imposes
negligible performance overhead to the secured kernels.
1.2.1.2 POINTSAN: Eliminating Uninitialized Pointer Uses
A common type of memory error in OS kernels is using uninitialized pointers (uninitialized
use). Uninitialized uses not only cause undefined behaviors but also impose a severe
security risk if an attacker takes control of the uninitialized pointers—an attacker can exploit
an uninitialized pointer use to achieve arbitrary read (i.e., information leak), write, and
execution. Our study shows that uninitialized pointers can be reliably controlled by attackers.
Therefore, uninitialized-use vulnerabilities can be readily exploited.
To prevent the exploitation of uninitialized pointer uses, we propose POINTSAN, a
compiler-based mitigation that initializes potentially unsafe pointer-type fields. Our mit-
igation is inspired by the observation that uninitialized-use exploits typically control an
uninitialized pointer to achieve arbitrary read/write/execution. By zero-initializing pointer-
type fields in an allocated object, we can prevent an adversary from controlling these
pointers. Since the memory page at the address zero is not accessable in modern OS kernels,
zero-initialization becomes a safe prevention operation. More specifically, we perform
an intra-procedural analysis that identifies potentially uninitialized pointer-type fields and
instrumentation that zero-initializes the identified pointer-type fields. POINTSAN imposes
almost no performance overhead to the secured kernels.
1.2.2 Retrofitting System Designs Against Information Leaks
System designers often prioritize performance and flexibility over security; hence, many
system designs are insecure, which is another root cause of information leaks. Our second
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way to prevent information leaks is redesigning insecure system mechanisms. A well-known
insecure system design causing information leaks is the ASLR-violating worker process
forking scheme in daemon servers (e.g., web servers). To prevent information leaks caused
by such an insecure design, we propose the runtime re-randomization mechanism.
1.2.2.1 RUNTIMEASLR: Re-Randomizing Memory Layout at Runtime
Existing techniques for memory randomization such as the widely deployed ASLR perform
a single, per-process randomization that is applied before or at a process’ load-time. The
efficacy of such upfront randomizations crucially relies on the assumption that an attacker
has only one chance to guess the randomized address, and that this attack succeeds only
with a very low probability. Recent research results have shown that this assumption is
not valid in many scenarios, e.g., daemon servers fork child processes that inherent the
state—and if applicable: the randomization—of their parents, and thereby create clones
with the same memory layout. This enables the so-called clone-probing attacks where an
adversary repeatedly probes different clones in order to increase its knowledge about their
shared memory layout.
We propose RUNTIMEASLR—the first approach that prevents clone-probing attacks
without altering the intended semantics of child process forking. The work makes the
following three contributions. First, we propose a semantics-preserving and runtime-based
approach for preventing clone-probing attacks by re-randomizing the address space of every
child after fork() at runtime while keeping the parent’s state. We achieve this by devising
a novel, automated pointer tracking policy generation process that has to be run just once,
followed by a pointer tracking mechanism that is only applied to the parent process. Second,
we propose a systematic and holistic pointer tracking mechanism that correctly identifies
pointers inside memory space. This mechanism constitutes the central technical building
block of our approach. Third, we provide an open-source implementation of our approach
based on Intel’s Pin on an x86-64 Linux platform, which supports COTS server binaries
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directly. Although it takes a longer time for RUNTIMEASLR to start server programs,
RUNTIMEASLR imposes almost no runtime performance overhead to the worker processes
that provide actual web services.
1.2.3 Protecting Sensitive Data from Information Leaks
It is unfortunate that we could not fix all information-leak vulnerabilities or insecure system
designs because of the complexity of systems and the continuously introduced system
features. For example, we cannot even identify all side channels that may leak information,
thus cannot prevent all information leaks. As a response to this problem, we instead strive
to protect certain sensitive data in the presence of information leaks. Towards this goal, we
propose preventing code-pointer leaks to defeat code-reuse attacks [164], and a replicated
execution-based framework to detect memory disclosures.
1.2.3.1 ASLR-GUARD: Stopping Code-Pointer Leaks
A general prerequisite for a code-reuse attack is that the attacker needs to locate code
gadgets that perform the desired operations and then direct the control flow of a vulnerable
application to those gadgets. ASLR attempts to stop code-reuse attacks by making the first
part of the prerequisite unsatisfiable. However, research in recent years has shown that
this protection is often defeated by commonly existing information leaks, which provides
attackers clues about the whereabouts of certain code gadgets.
We propose ASLR-GUARD, a novel mechanism that completely prevents the leaks of
code pointers. The main idea behind ASLR-GUARD is to provide a secure storage for code
pointers and encode the code pointers when they are treated as data. ASLR-GUARD can
either prevent code pointer leaks or render their leaks harmless. That is, ASLR-GUARD
makes it impossible to overwrite code pointers with values that point to or will hijack the
control flow to a desired address when the code pointers are dereferenced. ASLR-GUARD
completely stops code-pointer leaks and can resist against recent sophisticated code-reuse
attacks. Further, ASLR-GUARD imposes almost no runtime overhead (< 1%) to the secured
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programs. Therefore, ASLR-GUARD is very practical and can be applied to secure many
applications.
1.2.3.2 BUDDY: Detecting Memory Disclosures with Replicated Execution
Memory disclosure is an attack primitive that has been used to bypass widely deployed
security mechanisms such as ASLR (e.g., the JIT-ROP attack [167]) and to leak sensitive
data such as private keys (e.g., the HeartBleed attack [62]). The most common way to
disclose memory is exploiting memory errors such as out-of-bound read, use-after-free, and
uninitialized use. Since preventing these memory errors is hard, and the number of reported
memory errors is still increasing, memory disclosure has become a common but hard-to-stop
security threat.
We propose a new framework, BUDDY, to comprehensively detect memory disclosures
with replicated execution. The intuition behind BUDDY is that, by seamlessly maintaining
two running instances of a program and diversifying only the sensitive data, we can detect
any leaks of such data, as doing so will result in the two instances outputting different values.
BUDDY detects memory disclosures without the need of performing the error-prone and
expensive data-flow tracking. Further, BUDDY’s approach can support COTS binaries. We
propose multiple diversification schemes for both data and memory layout, and to design an
efficient replicated execution engine. By applying BUDDY to poplar programs, including
Apache web server, Nginx web server, PHP server, OpenSSL, Lighttpd, and the SPEC
benchmarks, we extensively evaluated its reliability, security, and performance.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
In summary, this thesis makes the following contributions to securing software systems.
• General defense against system attacks. We identify that, in modern systems,
preventing information leaks can be a general and efficient approach to defeating both
data leaks and control attacks.
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• Study of information leaks. We study information leaks in computer systems and
provide insights into their causes and how to prevent them.
• Discovery of new threats. We identify a fundamental security problem in compilers,
which causes common information leaks. We also revisit the security impact of using
uninitialized pointers.
• Three ways to prevent information leaks. We propose general ways to eliminate
root causes of information leaks and to protect sensitive data, even in the presence of
information leaks.
• Novel defense mechanisms and open source. We design multiple automated and
practical defense mechanisms to eliminate, detect, and prevent information leaks.




The most common cause of information leaks is that software systems have a significant
number of vulnerabilities such as buffer over-read, use-after-free, and uninitialized read.
According to the U.S. National Vulnerability Database [57], the number of information-leak
is increasing. In particular, information-leak vulnerabilities have become more prevalent
than other types of vulnerabilities such as buffer overflow in the Linux kernel. Attackers
have exploited information-leak vulnerabilities to leak sensitive data or leak randomized
value to break defense mechanisms such as ASLR. Hence, an intuitive and effective way
to prevent information leaks is to eliminate information-leak vulnerabilities. Towards this
goal, we have studied information-leak vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel and found that
more than half of them are caused by uninitialized uses including uninitialized data read and
uninitialized pointer dereferencing. While buffer over-read and use-after-free vulnerabilities
are well studied, practical uninitialized use prevention is largely an uncharted territory. In this
section, we propose two techniques, UNISAN and POINTSAN, to eliminate information-leak
vulnerabilities caused by uninitialized uses in OS kernels. UNISAN completely eliminates
the ones caused by uninitialized data reads; POINTSAN first revisits the security impact of
uninitialized pointer dereferencing and then eliminates it in a practical manner.
2.1 UNISAN: Eliminating Uninitialized Data Leaks
As the de facto trusted computing base (TCB) of computer systems, the operating system
(OS) kernel has always been a prime target for attackers. By compromising the kernel,
attackers can escalate their privilege to steal sensitive data in the system and control the
whole computer. There are three main approaches to launching privilege escalation attacks:
(1) direct code injection attacks; (2) ret2usr attacks [91]; and (3) code reuse attacks [164].
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DEP (Data Execution Prevention) protection has been deployed to defeat traditional code
injection attacks. Intel and ARM have recently introduced new hardware features (e.g.,
SMEP and PXN) to prevent ret2usr attacks [89]. As such, code reuse attacks are becoming
more prevalent. A general direction to defeat code reuse attacks is randomization, e.g.,
kernel address space layout randomization (kASLR) [42] and StackGuard [44] have been
adopted by the latest kernels. kASLR aims to prevent attackers from knowing where the
code gadgets are, and StackGuard [44] aims to prevent attackers from corrupting return
addresses.
By design, the effectiveness of kASLR and StackGuard completely relies on the con-
fidentiality of the randomness—leaking any randomized pointer or the stack canary will
render these mechanisms useless. Unfortunately, information-leak vulnerabilities are com-
mon in OS kernels. For example, Krause recently found 21 information leaks in the Linux
kernel [95]. According to CVE Details [57], kernel information-leak vulnerabilities have not
only become more prevalent than buffer overflow vulnerabilities, but the number of kernel
information leaks is also increasing with continuously introduced new features. Moreover,
the leaked kernel memory may also contain other sensitive data, such as cryptographic keys
and file caches. For these reasons, preventing kernel information leak is a pressing security
problem.
There are four main causes of information leaks: uninitialized data read, buffer over-read,
use-after-free and logic errors (e.g., missing privilege check). Among these root causes,
uninitialized read is the most common one. According to a Linux kernel vulnerabilities
survey [33], 37 information-leak vulnerabilities were reported from January 2010 to March
2011, 28 of which were caused by uninitialized data read. Similarly, we analyzed the causes
of the kernel information leaks reported between January 2013 and May 2015. Our study
also revealed that about 60% kernel information leaks are caused by uninitialized data read
(Figure 1). However, while many memory-safety techniques [129, 131, 132, 160] have been








Figure 1: The root causes of kernel information leaks reported between January 2013 and May 2016:
uninitialized data read, spacial buffer over-read + use-after-free, and others. Most leaks are caused
by uninitialized data read.
data leaks is still an open problem.
Preventing uninitialized data leaks is challenging for three reasons. First, since data
write and read are frequent in programs, detecting uninitialized data reads by tracking
these operations will always introduce unacceptable performance overhead. For example,
MemorySanitizer [172] and kmemcheck [138] check every memory read and write to detect
uninitialized data reads, thus incurring a performance overhead of more than three times.
Second, uninitialized data reads are actually quite common in programs. Specifically,
compilers often introduce padding bytes in data structures to improve performance. These
padding bytes are usually uninitialized, but as long as the uninitialized data is not used
(e.g., dereferenced as pointer or leaked), its access does not cause any problem. Since the
padding is introduced by the compiler, developers are usually not aware of the potential data
leaks—they need to be convinced such problems exist before they will fix the programs
(see §2.1.1 for more details). Third, uninitialized data leaks often occur across multiple
procedure boundaries—the uninitialized data is always passed to leaking functions (e.g.,
copy_to_user); hence intra-procedure analysis based detections (e.g., -Wuninitialized
provided by compilers) cannot catch uninitialized data leaks.
In addition to tracking every data read and write, researchers have attempted an alternate
approach—force initializing. For example, PaX’s STACKLEAK plugin [175] clears the used
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kernel stack when the control is transferred back to user space, which effectively prevents
data leaks between syscalls. However, STACKLEAK cannot prevent the leaking of uninitialized
data generated during the same syscall. Also, this can introduce a significant performance
overhead (see Table 5). Split kernel [96] instead clears stack frame whenever it is allocated
(i.e., a function is called). Split kernel provides stronger security, but its performance
overhead is even more significant. Peiró et al. [148] proposed using model checking to
detect kernel stack allocations that have never been memset or assigned. However, this
approach has obvious limitations. For example, since it neither tracks the propagation
of uninitialized data nor handles partial initialization, it has high false negative and false
positive rates. Moreover, none of these approaches can handle kernel heap leaks.
In this work, we propose a novel mechanism, UNISAN (Uninitialized Data Leak San-
itizer), to prevent kernel leaks caused by uninitialized data reads. Similar to STACKLEAK,
UNISAN is an automated compiler-based approach; that is, it does not require manual
modifications to the source code and can transparently eliminate leaks caused by data struc-
ture padding or improper initialization. At the same time, UNISAN also overcomes all the
aforementioned limitations of previous force-initialization approaches. More specifically,
UNISAN leverages an inter-procedural static analysis to check (1) whether an allocated
object ever leaves kernel space, and (2) whether the allocated object is fully initialized
along all possible execution paths to the leak point. The analysis is conservative—as long
as there is one byte of an allocated object that cannot be proved to have been initialized in
any possible execution path before leaving the kernel space, the corresponding allocation
is considered unsafe; hence UNISAN has no false negatives. It also handles both stack
and heap allocations. At the same time, to improve the precision and thus minimize false
positives, UNISAN’s analysis is fine-grained, which tracks each byte of an allocated object
in a flow-sensitive and context-sensitive manner. Once UNISAN detects an unsafe allocation,
it then instruments the kernel to zero the uninitialized portion of the objects allocated by
them. In this way, UNISAN can completely prevent kernel information leaks caused by
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uninitialized reads. Note that by being conservative, UNISAN may still have false positives;
however, zero-initializing allocated objects that will never be leaked will not break the
semantics of the kernel, but will just introduce unnecessary performance overhead. Because
UNISAN’s instrumentation is semantic-preserving, robustness is guaranteed.
We have implemented UNISAN based on the LLVM compiler [112]. UNISAN consists
of two components. The first is the unsafe allocation detector, which conservatively reports
all potentially unsafe allocations. The second is the unsafe allocation initializer, which zeros
the uninitialized memory by inserting zero-initialization, memset, or changing the allocation
flags.
We have applied UNISAN to the latest mainline Linux and Android kernels to evaluate
the effectiveness and efficiency of UNISAN in preventing kernel leaks. For effectiveness
evaluation, we first tested UNISAN over 43 recently discovered kernel information-leak vul-
nerabilities resulting from uninitialized reads. UNISAN successfully detected and prevented
all these known vulnerabilities. Moreover, the unsafe allocation detector of UNISAN has
identified many new uninitialized data leak vulnerabilities in the latest Linux kernel and
Android kernel, 19 of which have been confirmed by the Linux maintainers and Google.
We also measured UNISAN’s performance impacts on kernel operations, server pro-
grams, and user-space programs using multiple benchmarks, including LMbench [125],
ApacheBench, Android benchmarks, and the SPEC CPU Benchmarks. The evaluation
results show that UNISAN incurs a negligible performance overhead (less than 1% in most
cases) and is thus much more efficient than existing solutions (e.g., STACKLEAK).
We believe that since UNISAN is robust, effective, and efficient, it is ready to be
adopted in practice to prevent uninitialized data leaks. In summary, we make the following
contributions:
• Survey of kernel information leaks: We studied all the kernel information-leak
vulnerabilities reported between January 2013 and May 2016. We analyzed their root
causes and corresponding defenses. We also discussed with kernel developers about
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how to prevent information leaks caused by data structure padding.
• Development of new protection mechanism: We designed and implemented UNISAN,
an automated, compiler-based scheme, to eliminate kernel information leaks caused
by uninitialized data reads, which is the main cause of kernel leaks. UNISAN has
been successfully applied to the latest mainline Linux and Android kernels (yet not
limited to kernels). UNISAN is a practical, ready-to-use security protection scheme,
and has been open-sourced for broader adoption.
• Discoveries of new vulnerabilities: During our evaluation, UNISAN discovered
many previously unknown information-leak vulnerabilities in the latest Linux and
Android kernels, 19 of which have been confirmed by Linux maintainers and Google.
2.1.1 An Analysis of Kernel Information Leaks
In this section, we provide a background on kernel information leaks, including their
security implications and root causes. We then discuss uninitialized data reads and how such
vulnerabilities should be fixed from developers’ perspectives.
2.1.1.1 Kernel Information Leaks
Kernel information-leak vulnerabilities can cause severe security consequences. First, with
the deployment of kASLR [42] and stack canary [44], a general prerequisite for many attacks
(e.g., code reuse attack) is learning the randomized addresses and canary, which can be
accomplished by exploiting kernel information-leak vulnerabilities. Further, as the TCB of
the whole system, the OS kernel also has access to many other types of sensitive information,
such as encryption keys, file cache, and remaining data of terminated processes, etc. For
performance reasons, memory pages allocated to store such information may not be cleared
when they are released to the kernel. As a result, kernel information-leak vulnerabilities
also allow attackers to access such sensitive information. For example, [185] showed that an
uninitialized data leak is used to leak the entropy source for srandom. In short, it is critical
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to prevent kernel information leaks.
Kernel information leaks are also very common and have various causes. According to a
previous study [33] of Linux kernel vulnerabilities discovered between January 2010 and
March 2011, kernel information leak was ranked the second most common vulnerability,
which is even more common than buffer overflow vulnerability. Specifically, of the total
of 37 leak vulnerabilities, 28 were caused by uninitialized reads, 7 were caused by buffer
over-read, and two by other miscellaneous causes.
Since the aforementioned study [33] is already five-year old, we conducted another
study of kernel information-leak vulnerabilities reported between January 2013 and May
2016 [57], which contained 103 leaks in total. The result is shown in Figure 1. The majority
of kernel leaks are caused by uninitialized reads. Buffer over-read is also a common cause,
in which the size of reading is not properly checked. Use-after-free bugs may be exploited
to leak the data of newly allocated objects or manipulate the size and address of the read.
Other causes include missing permission check, race condition, or other logic errors. Since
uninitialized read is the most common cause of kernel leaks, our work focuses on preventing
uninitialized data leaks.
2.1.1.2 Uninitialized Data Leaks
An uninitialized data leak occurs when an allocated stack or heap object is not properly
initialized when being copied to the outside world (e.g., to user space, network, or file
systems). If the memory occupied by the object is used to store sensitive data (e.g., ad-
dresses), attackers can exploit this to leak such information. Note that using uninitialized
memory is a type of memory-safety error and can lead to undefined behavior. For this reason,
compiler features such as the -Wuninitialized option in GCC generate warnings when
variables are used without proper initialization. However, such compiler features employ
only an intra-procedure analysis and cannot handle many common cases (e.g., reading the
uninitialized data through its pointer). Most uninitialized data leaks happen across multiple
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function boundaries (e.g., calling copy_to_user in Linux), so they can be identified only
using inter-procedural analysis. Also, data can propagate through various channels (e.g.,
network or file systems). In short, existing compiler checks are not effective in finding unini-
tialized data leaks in large-scale, sophisticated programs such as the Linux kernel. Moreover,
uninitialized data reads may not be harmful if they are not dereferenced or leaked; reporting
all of them will burden or even annoy developers. The following examples demonstrate the
common causes of uninitialized data leaks and why existing compiler features cannot detect
them.
Missing Element Initialization. The simplest and most common case of an uninitial-
ized data leak is when the developers fail to properly initialize all fields of an object or
memory of a buffer. Figure 2 shows a real kernel leak vulnerability in the x25 mod-
ule. Specifically, the object dte_facilities is supposed to be properly initialized in
x25_negotiate_facilities. However, six fields are still not initialized. The object is
then propagated to the external heap object makex25 and finally leaked to userland in an-
other function x25_ioctl. As we can see, detecting such leaks would require sophisticated
inter-procedural data-flow analysis, which is not available during normal compilation.
Figure 3 shows another real kernel leak vulnerability caused by program design and
developers. The 6-bytes buffer mac_addr is allocated on stack. It is supposed to be initialized
in the dump_station function before it is sent out. However, since dump_station is an inter-
face function that has different implementations for different protocols written by different
programmers, it is hard to ensure the object is consistently initialized. Specifically, this
buffer is not initialized in the implementation of the wilc1000 module. As this uninitialized
data is actually never used by the kernel, it is simply copied outside the kernel boundary;
from the perspective of compiler, these cases are not errors. Moreover, dump_station is a
function pointer (i.e., dereferenced by an indirect call), tracking which requires a complete
call graph that is not provided by current compiler features.
Data Structure Padding. Besides developer mistakes, a more interesting source of
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1 /* File: net/x25/af_x25.c */
2 int x25_rx_call_request(struct sk_buff *skb,
3 struct x25_neigh *nb,
4 unsigned int lci) {
5 ⋆ struct x25_dte_facilities dte_facilities;
6 /* some fields of dte_facilities are not initialized */
7 ! x25_negotiate_facilities(..., &dte_facilities);
8 ...




13 static int x25_ioctl(struct socket *sock,
14 unsigned int cmd,
15 unsigned long arg) {
16 ...
17 /* leak uninitialized fields of dte_facilities */




Figure 2: New kernel leak in the x25 subsystem—six fields of dte_facilities are not initialized and
leaked in another function x25_ioctl. ⋆ denotes memory allocation, ! marks incorrect initialization,
⊙ notes a leaking point.
1 /* File: net/wireless/nl80211.c */
2 static int nl80211_dump_station(struct sk_buff *skb,
3 struct netlink_callback *cb) {
4 ⋆ u8 mac_addr[ETH_ALEN]; /* ETH_ALEN = 6 */
5 ...
6 ! err = rdev->ops->dump_station(\
7 &rdev->wiphy,
8 wdev->netdev, sta_idx, mac_addr, &sinfo);
9 /* mac_addr is uninitialized but sent out via nla_put()
10 * inside nl80211_send_station() */
11 ⊙ if (nl80211_send_station(skb, NL80211_CMD_NEW_STATION,
12 NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
13 cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, NLM_F_MULTI,
14 rdev, wdev->netdev, mac_addr,




Figure 3: New kernel leak in the wireless subsystem—the whole 6-bytes array mac_addr is not
initialized but sent out. ⋆ denotes memory allocation, ! marks incorrect initialization, and ⊙ notes a
leaking point.
uninitialized data leaks is compiler-added data structure padding. In particular, when modern
processors access a memory address, they usually do this at the machine word granularity
(e.g. 4-bytes on a 32-bits systems) or larger. So if the target address is not aligned, the
processor may have to access the memory multiple times to perform shifting and calculating
to complete an operation, which can significantly degrade the performance [151]. Moreover,
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1 /* File: drivers/usb/core/devio.c */
2 struct usbdevfs_connectinfo {
3 unsigned int devnum;
4 unsigned char slow;
5 /* 3-bytes padding inserted for alignment */
6 };
7 static int proc_connectinfo(struct usb_dev_state *ps,
8 void __user *arg) {
9 ⋆ struct usbdevfs_connectinfo ci = {
10 .devnum = ps->dev->devnum,
11 .slow = ps->dev->speed == USB_SPEED_LOW
12 };
13
14 /* sizeof(ci) == 8, but only 5 bytes are initialized */




Figure 4: New kernel leak caused by compiler padding. Object ci contains 3-bytes padding at the
end, which is copied to userland. Note that ⋆ denotes memory allocation and partial initiation, and ⊙
notes a leakage point.
different instructions or architectures could also have their own alignment requirements.
For instance, SSE instructions on the x86 architecture require the operands to be 16-bytes
aligned, and ARM processors always require memory operands to be 2-bytes or 4-bytes
aligned. For these reasons, compilers usually add padding within a data structure so that
fields are properly aligned.
The problem is that as these padding bytes are not visible at the programming language
level, and they are not initialized even when all fields have been properly initialized in the
code written by developers and hence may lead to information leaks. Figure 4 illustrates
a kernel leak in the USB module caused by data structure padding. In this case, although
developers have explicitly initialized all fields of the stack object ci, because of its last
3-byte padding, information can still be leaked when copy_to_user is invoked to copy the
whole object to user space. To detect such leaks, byte-level analysis is required; object-level
or even field-level (i.e., field-sensitive) analyses are still not fine-grained enough to catch
such leaks.
To summarize, leaking padding bytes is a serious problem for three reasons. First, it





















Figure 5: Overview of UNISAN’s workflow. UNISAN takes as input the LLVM IR (i.e., bitcode
files) and automatically generates secured IR as output. This is done in two phases: unsafe allocation
detection and zero initialization.
even more prevalent when porting programs from 32-bits to 64-bits platforms. Second,
inter-procedural and byte-level analysis is required to detect such leaks. Third, it is often not
visible to developers. Padding bytes can be leaked even developers have correctly initialized
all fields.
After we submitted patches for these vulnerabilities, the compiler-injected padding issue
was discussed extensively by the Linux community and became a major concern to the Linux
kernel developers because, from the developers’ perspective, they have properly initialized
the data structures and this type of leak is hardly visible even to skilled programmers. On
the other hand, from the compilers’ perspective, they have the benefit of not proactively
initializing such padding regions to achieve better performance, because this design decision
can be independently made by each compiler according to the C/C++ specification. However,
considering its severity, prevalence and more importantly, its non-trivial nature to developers,
we, as well as many kernel maintainers, urge the incorporation of UNISAN’s approach to
solve this problem at compiler level, perhaps as an extra option to compilers.
2.1.2 Overview of UNISAN
In this work, we focus on preventing kernel information leaks caused by uninitialized data
reads. UNISAN achieves this goal via a two-phase process (Figure 5). In the first phase,
UNISAN analyzes the kernel and conservatively identifies all potential unsafe allocations
whose objects may leave the kernel space without having been fully initialized. Then in
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the second phase, UNISAN instruments the kernel to automatically initialize (zero out) the
detected unsafe allocations.
2.1.2.1 Problem Scope
The protection target of UNISAN is OS kernels. Since UNISAN performs analysis over
source code, we assume that the source code of the kernel is available. We assume the
attackers do not have the kernel privilege (e.g., through loading a malicious kernel driver),
but they can be either local or remote. The goal of the attackers is to leak sensitive data
(e.g., addresses, cryptographic keys, file content) in the kernel space to the external world
(e.g., userland and network). After gathering the information, the attacker can launch more
attacks, such as privilege escalation and phishing.
As discussed in §2.1.1, kernel information leaks have multiple root causes: uninitialized
data read, buffer over-read, use-after-free, data race, logical errors, etc. In this work, we
focus on uninitialized data read because a majority of kernel leaks are caused by this
particular type of vulnerabilities and there is no practical solution yet; whereas other types
of vulnerabilities can be addressed by existing techniques and are thus out-of-scope. For
instance, buffer over-read and use-after-free bugs can be prevented by memory safety
techniques [129, 131, 132, 160]. Data race can be detected by [64]. Logical errors (e.g.,
missing permission check) are relatively rare and can be identified by semantic checking
techniques [13, 126].
2.1.2.2 The UNISAN Approach
There are multiple candidate solutions for preventing uninitialized data leaks. The first is
zeroing the memory when it is deallocated. Since we cannot know when the deallocated
memory will be allocated and used in the future, we have to conservatively zero all deal-
located stack and heap objects, which can introduce a significant performance overhead.
More importantly, deallocation is not always paired with allocation, such as the case of
memory leak, thus introducing false negatives. The second is dynamically tracking the
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status of every byte in the object, so that we can know exactly if any uninitialized bytes
are leaving the kernel space. MemorySanitizer [172] and kmemcheck [138] are based on
this approach. However, while they are effective and able to detect general uninitialized
data uses, their 3x performance overhead is too high to be used for runtime prevention. The
third is selectively zeroing the allocated memory that is detected as unsafe by static analysis.
After assessing the effectiveness and performance of these approaches, we chose the third
approach—initializing only the unsafe allocations.
Figure 5 illustrates the approach of UNISAN. Specifically, UNISAN takes as input the
LLVM IR (i.e., bitcode files) compiled from the kernel source code, upon which the analysis
and instrumentation are performed. Given a stack or heap allocation, UNISAN leverages
static data-flow (taint) analysis to check whether this allocation can reach the pre-defined
sinks, such as copy_to_usr and sock_sendmsg. Along the propagation path, UNISAN also
tracks the initialization status of each byte of the allocation. If any byte of the allocation
reaches the sink without having been initialized in any possible execution path, UNISAN
considers it unsafe. After collecting all unsafe allocations, UNISAN instruments the IR
with initialization code right after them. For stack allocation, UNISAN inserts a memset or
zero-initiailzation to initialize it. For heap allocation, UNISAN adds the __GFP_ZERO flag to
the allocation functions (e.g., kmalloc). Finally, by assembling and linking the instrumented
bitcode files, UNISAN generates the secured kernel image.
2.1.3 Design
In this section, we present the design of UNISAN. We first describe the design of unsafe
allocation detector, including how we generate the complete call graph, perform reachability
analysis, and track the initialization status of allocations. Then we describe how unsafe









Figure 6: Unsafe allocation detector incorporates a reachability analysis and an initialization analysis
to check whether any byte of the allocation is uninitialized when leaves the kernel space.
2.1.3.1 Detecting Unsafe Allocations
Our unsafe allocation detection is essentially a static taint analysis that incorporates two
orthogonal analyses: object initialization analysis and sink reachability analysis, as shown
in Figure 6. The initialization analysis checks which bytes of the object will be initialized
along the paths from allocation to sinks, i.e., which bytes will be assigned with other values.
The sink reachability analysis checks which bytes of the object will leave the kernel space
along the paths from allocation to sinks, i.e., being passed to sinks. The initialization
analysis and reachability analysis are then integrated to detect unsafe bytes—a byte is unsafe
if it is uninitialized when it leaves kernel space.
The workflow of the detection is as follows. Given the bitcode files of the target program,
it first builds a complete and global call graph. Then it parallelly performs the reachability
analysis and initialization analysis for each allocation to detect the unsafe bytes. Our analysis
is flow-sensitive in that the order of the uses of the allocation is maintained with a dedicated
user-graph (that will be elaborated in Figure 2.1.3.1); context-sensitive in that function calls
are followed with callsite-specific context; and field-sensitive in that it performs fine-grained
tracking for each byte of the allocation. However, to avoid the path explosion problem and
make our analysis scalable to the whole kernel, our analysis is path-insensitive.
Defining Sources and Sinks. Both the reachability analysis and initialization analysis
track the “taint” status of the allocated bytes from the allocation site to the sink functions. As
the first step, we need to pre-define the sources (i.e., allocations) and sinks (i.e., data-leaking
functions).
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For stack, all objects are allocated by AllocaInst (i.e., an instruction to allocate memory
on the stack). By handling this instruction, we are able to find all tracking sources on stack.
Heap objects can be allocated in many ways. In our current implementation, we include
only the standard allocator from SLAB, namely, kmalloc and kmem_cache_alloc. These
heap allocators accept a flag parameter. If the flag contains __GFP_ZERO bit, the allocated
memory will be initialized with zero. In UNISAN, we track only heap allocations without
the __GFP_ZERO flag. Please note that although UNISAN currently does not include custom
allocators, it can be easily extended to support them once developers denote the function
name and allocation flags (i.e., create the source signature).
Under the threat model of UNISAN, any function that may send kernel data to userland,
network, or file is classified as a sink function. In UNISAN, we use two policies to generally
define the sinks. We first empirically define a list of known sink functions, based on
our study of previous kernel leaks. For example, copy_to_user copies data to userland;
sock_sendmsg sends data to network, and vfs_write writes data to files. Although there
are various implementations for file writing (for different file systems) and message sending
(for different protocols), vfs_write and sock_sendmsg are the uniformed interfaces, so we
can generally catch the sink functions by annotating these functions.
Clearly, there are more sink functions that are not covered by the first step. To eliminate
false negatives introduced by an incomplete sink list, we utilized three conservative rules to
generally cover additional sinks. These rules are defined based on the fact that under our
recursive tracking algorithm (Figure 7), for any data to leave kernel space, it will always be
stored to a non-kernel-stack location (or non-AllocaInst to be specific), so once we cannot
determine that the destination of an store operation is on kernel stack, we treat it as a sink.
• Rule 1: A StoreInst (i.e., an instruction for storing to memory) is a sink if the
destination is not allocated by an AllocaInst in kernel;
• Rule 2: A CallInst (i.e., an instruction for calling a function) is a sink if the called
value is inline assembly that is not in the whitelist (Figure 2.1.3.1);
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1 /* Unsafe allocation detection algorithm */
2 UnsafeAllocDetection(Module) {
3 for (Alloc in Module) {
4 /* user relationships are maintained */
5 MergedUnsafeBytes = Array();
6 UserGraph = BuildUserGraph(Alloc);






13 RecursiveTrackUsers(Alloc, NextUsers, MergedUnsafeBytes) {
14 /* terminate if all bytes have been inited or sinked */
15 if (AllInitied(Alloc) || AllSunk(Alloc))
16 return;
17 UnsafeBytes = Array();
18 for (User in NextUsers) {
19 /* Next users of User are recursively tracked */
20 if (IsLoadInst(User))
21 RecursiveTrackLoad(User, UnsafeBytes);
22 else if (IsStoreInst(User))
23 RecursiveTrackStore(User, UnsafeBytes);
24 else if (IsCallInst(User))
25 RecursiveTrackCall(User, UnsafeBytes);
26 else if (IsGetElementPtr(User))
27 RecursiveTrackGEP(User, UnsafeBytes);
28 ...
29 /* Unrecognized cases */
30 else
31 /* assume remaining uninitialized bytes unsafe */
32 UnsafeBytes += GetUninitializedBytes(Alloc);
33 /* Conservatively merge (union) all unsafe bytes */
34 MergedUnsafeBytes += UnsafeBytes;
35 }
36 }
Figure 7: The pseudo-code of the recursive tracking algorithm for the unsafe allocation detection.
• Rule 3: A CallInst is a sink if the called function’s body is empty (i.e., not compiled
into LLVM IR).
Building Global Call-Graph. Since UNISAN’s analysis is inter-procedural, global call
graph is required. To eliminate false negatives, UNISAN must conservatively identify all
potential targets of indirect calls. To this end, we first collect the address-taken functions,
and use the type-analysis-based approach [135, 177] to find the targets of indirect calls.
That is, as long as the type of the arguments of an address-taken function matches with the
callsite of the indirect call, we assume it is a valid target. Note that we also assume universal
pointers (e.g., char *, void *) and an 8-bytes integer can match with any type.
Recursive Detection Algorithm. With the global call-graph, we conduct the unsafe
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%i = alloca i32
store i32 0, i32* %i
call @put_user(i32* %i, 
i8* %u)
int *i;
if (p == NULL)
    i = 0;
put_user(&i, u);
source code user-graph
Figure 8: A simple user-graph example.
allocation detection. The algorithm of the detection is shown in Figure 7. In short, given an
allocation in a module, we first build its user-graph (that will be elaborated in Figure 2.1.3.1).
After that, we recursively keep track of which bytes of the allocated object have been
initialized and which bytes have reached sink functions, by traversing the user-graph.
Different users are handled properly. If there are any corner cases that are not recognized
before, we conservatively assume the bytes being tracked are unsafe. All unsafe bytes in
different paths are concatenated together. That is, a byte is assumed unsafe as long as it is
unsafe in any possible path.
Building User-Graph. In LLVM IR, a user of a value is an instruction or expression
that takes the value as an operand. The unsafe allocation detection is designed to be flow-
sensitive, which requires considering the order of users. Given the being tracked value (e.g.,
the allocated value), LLVM framework only tells us all the users but not the relationships
(e.g., sequential and parallel relationships) among them. To maintain the relationships of the
users, we build the user-graph for the tracked value. Figure 8 shows a simple user-graph
example. Instructions that do not use the tracked value will not show up in the graph. More
specifically, we first put all the users in the corresponding basic blocks. Users in the same
basic block are always in a sequential order. Then we use the DominatorTree pass of LLVM
to understand the relationships among the involved basic blocks. With this information, we
chain all the users together into a user graph. When an alias of the tracked value is generated
(e.g., by the CastInst and GetElementPtr instructions), all the users of the alias will be
seamlessly merged into the user-graph as well.
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Fine-Grained Status Tracking. UNISAN performs unsafe allocation detection in a fine-
grained manner (i.e., byte-level analysis). There are several advantages of performing the
analysis at byte granularity. First, due to the compiler’s padding, initializing all fields of
an object does not guarantee that all bytes are initialized (Figure 4). Therefore, byte-level
analysis is necessary to detect the uninitialized padding bytes. Second, union is widely
used in kernel data structures and byte-level tracking can help resolve the issue introduced
by field alias. Finally, byte-level detection can precisely filter out safe bytes, so that the
instrumentation module can selectively initialize only the unsafe ones, thus further reducing
the runtime performance overhead.
To perform the byte-level analysis, we use a buffer to record the initialization and sinking
status of every byte in a tracked allocation. Whenever an object is allocated, a buffer of
the same size is created. Currently, we only use two bits of the corresponding byte in the
buffer to represent the initialization and sinking status of each byte in the original object.
To keep track of which bytes are being accessed, at every GEPOperator (an instruction or
expression for type-safe pointer arithmetic to access elements of arrays and structs) node in
LLVM IR, we calculate the offset (into the base of the object) and the size of the obtained
element. In our current design, we do not perform range analysis, so if any of the indices of
the GEPOperator node are not constants, we cannot statically calculate the resulting element.
In this case, we conservatively treat all bytes of the allocation as uninitialized and pause the
initialization analysis—as long as the reachability analysis determines that the allocation can
leave the kernel space, we assume it is unsafe. Since non-constant indices are not common
in GEPOperator node, our byte-level analysis works well in most cases.
Eliminating False Negatives. As a prevention tool, UNISAN aims to eliminate potential
false negatives. Clearly, aggressively initializing all stack and heap allocations can guarantee
no false negative; however, such a naive approach will introduce unnecessary performance
overhead, since most allocations will either never leave kernel space or be properly initialized.
To make UNISAN more efficient, our principle is to eliminate as many false positives as
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possible while ensuring no false negative; and whenever we encounter an undecidable
problem or an unhandled corner case, we always sacrifice the detection accuracy and assume
the tracked allocation is unsafe. In this subsection, we summarize cases that may introduce
false negatives and describe how we handle them.
Complete call graph. LLVM’s built-in call graph pass does not find callees of indirect
calls. As described in Figure 2.1.3.1, we adopt a conservative type-analysis to find indirect
call targets to build a complete and global call graph.
Conservative path merging. There are often many paths from the allocation site to the
sink points. And in different paths, the allocated object can be initialized differently. In
LLVM IR, the most common cases that can introduce multiple paths include: (1) load and
store instructions. These instructions copy the tracked value to somewhere else, creating a
new data-flow; (2) indirect call instructions; (3) return instructions; (4) branch instructions.
To ensure that no leaks will be missed, UNISAN always tracks each path independently and
merges the tracking results (when tracking of a path returns) by calculating the union of all
unsafe bytes; in other words, a byte is deemed unsafe as long as it is unsafe in one path.
Propagation to alias. Our reachability and initialization analyses are performed in a
forward manner (i.e., from source to sink). Whenever an alias of the tracked value is created
(e.g., by CastInst or GetElementPtr instructions), we further track the alias by merging
its users into the user-graph of the current tracked value. Therefore, we do not need alias
analysis for this case. However, when the tracked value is stored to another value, we need a
backward slicing analysis to find the possible aliases of the store-to value, which is difficult
for some cases (e.g., global variable). To handle this, we employ the simple basic alias
analysis [111]. Additionally, we enforce two conservative policies to eliminate potential
false negatives: (1) if we find that the aliases are pointing to a non-stack object (e.g., global
variable or heap object), whose data-flow is hard to follow, we assume the tracked value
is unsafe; (2) if we find the aliases is a returned value of a function call or a parameter of
current function, we also assume the tracked value is unsafe.
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Inline assembly. To improve performance, kernel developers commonly write inline
assembly. Since inline assembly is not compiled into LLVM IR, our detection cannot be
directly applied. To handle inline assembly, we manually whitelisted some safe inline
assembly that will not leak the tracked value or store the tracked value to other places. All
other inline assembly functions are conservatively treated as sinks.
2.1.3.2 Instrumenting Unsafe Allocations
After identifying all unsafe allocations, the initializer module of UNISAN further instruments
the kernel to initialize the identified unsafe allocations by zeroing the unsafe bytes. In
particular, the initialization code is inserted right after the allocation (e.g., the stack Alloca
and kmalloc). Since the detection module reports unsafe allocation at the byte-level, in
many cases, we do not have to initialize the whole allocated object but only the unsafe
bytes. In particular, for stack allocation, we use StoreInst to zero the unsafe bytes if they
have a continuous size of less than or equal to 8; otherwise, memset is used for zeroing the
bytes. Heap allocation is also initialized in a similar way except that the __GFP_ZERO flag
is passed to the heap allocator to initialize the memory if all bytes are unsafe. With the
initialization, all possible uninitialized leaks cannot disclose any meaningful entropy from
the kernel space, and thus can be prevented.
2.1.4 Implementation
In this section, we present the implementation details that readers may be interested in.
UNISAN is built on the LLVM compiler infrastructure with version 3.7.1. The unsafe
allocation detector is implemented as two analysis module passes. One is for building the
complete call graph iteratively and maintaining all necessary global context information
(e.g., defined functions); the other performs the initialization and reachability analyses based
on the built call graph. The unsafe allocation initializer is implemented as a transformation
function pass, invoked after the detection pass. Both passes are inserted after all optimization
passes. To compile the kernel into LLVM IR, we leverage the LLVMLinux project [113].
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Because llvm-link has a symbol renaming problem, instead of merging all bitcode files
into a single module, we adopt the iterative algorithm from KINT [186] to process individual




2.1.4.1 Bookkeeping of the Analysis
For each tracked allocation, we use a dedicated data structure to record its tracking results
along the propagation paths. This data structure mainly includes the initialization and
sinking information of each byte. The tracking history is also included to avoid repeatedly
tracking a user—we do not need to track a user multiple times if the status of the tracked
value is not changed.
As mentioned in Figure 2.1.3.1, UNISAN maintains the user-graph for the tracked value.
The users in the graph may access different elements of the tracked value. To know which
part of the tracked value is being initialized or sunk during the tracking, element information
is also kept in each node of the user-graph. Moreover, we maintain reference hierarchy
for pointers. The reference hierarchy is to understand if a pointer is directly or indirectly
(recursively) pointing to the tracked allocation. To better understand it, let us see this
example: store i8* %A, i8** %B stores value A to the memory pointed to by B but not B
itself. To differentiate whether the storing operation is targeting the tracked allocation or
its reference, the referencing relationship between them is required, and thus we maintain
the reference hierarchy. Our reference hierarchy is straightforward: the “indirectness” is
decreased by one by LoadInst; but increased by one by StoreInst. To tackle the alias problem,
if StoreInst stores to non-stack memory, we assume it is sinking and stop tracking. Certainly,
point-to analyses can achieve the same goal, but they are heavyweight—analyzing the kernel
may take many hours.
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The initialization status is updated when the tracked value is assigned another value
by StoreInst, while the sinking status is updated when the tracked value is stored to a
non-stack value in StoreInst or it is passed to sink functions in CallInst.
2.1.4.2 Tracking Different Users
Analyses are carried out by traversing the user-graph. UNISAN handles different kinds of
users accordingly. After handling a user, the next users of the current user will be further
tracked. In this section, we detail how the handling of each type of user is implemented.
LoadInst. LoadInst loads the data pointed to by the tracked value to the target value. We
independently track both values and merge (i.e., the union operation) the unsafe bytes when
both tracking processes return. Since LoadInst is essentially dereferencing the tracked
value that is a pointer, we also increase the reference hierarchy by one in the tracking of the
target value.
StoreInst. StoreInst stores the tracked value to the memory pointed to by the target value.
Let us see store i8* %A, i8** %B again. When the tracked value is A (i.e., it is the value
operand), we first use the conservative basic alias analysis (Figure 2.1.3.1) to find the aliases
of B. If not all aliases can be found or some aliases are from non-stack memory, we assume
A is sunk and update its sinking status; otherwise, we further track aliases independently and
merge all unsafe bytes. Since the target value is a reference of the stored value, the reference
hierarchy is decreased by one in the tracking of aliases. When the tracked value is B, we
first consult the reference hierarchy (§2.1.4.1) to see if B is the tracked allocation (but not
its reference); if yes, we record that the corresponding bytes of the tracked allocation are
initialized.
CallInst. When the tracked value is passed to callees via argument, we recursively track
the arguments in callees independently and merge all unsafe bytes. Inline assembly is
conservatively handled as shown in Figure 2.1.3.1. If the called function is a sink, we record
that the corresponding bytes are sunk.
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GEPOperator. GEPOperator statements get the pointer of an element of the tracked value,
which essentially creates an alias of the tracked value. The offset of the target element into
the base of the tracked value and its size are calculated and maintained in the user-graph. The
users of the target element are merged into the user-graph of the tracked value. The element
information is the key to implement the byte-level analyses; however, when the indices
of GEPOperator are not constants, we will not be able to obtain the element information.
In this case, we stop the initialization analysis and only continue the reachability analysis,
since we cannot statically decide which bytes will be initialized.
ReturnInst. ReturnInst is an instruction that returns a value from a function. We first
use the global call-graph to find all CallInsts that call the current function containing the
ReturnInst. Then these CallInsts are independently tracked, and unsafe bytes are merged.
CastInst, SelectInst, and PHINode. The definitions of these statements can be found
at [1]. These cases are generating alias of the tracked values. We find their users and merge
the users to the user-graph of the tracked value.
CmpInst, SwitchInst, BranchInst. The definitions of these statements can be found at [1].
We skip the handling for these cases, since they do not operate the tracked value.
Others. Any other cases are conservatively treated as sinks, so all uninitialized bytes in the
tracked value are assumed to be unsafe.
2.1.4.3 Modeling Basic Functions
Similar to traditional static program analyses, we also modeled some basic functions.
Specifically, we modeled string-related functions that typically use loops to process strings,
to improve the efficiency of tracking. Moreover, we modeled some frequently used LLVM
intrinsic functions (e.g., llvm.memset) that do not have function bodies in LLVM IR. In




Dynamic allocations create objects with a dynamic size. They are common (about 40%,
according to our study) in heap. In general, we do not perform initialization analysis
for dynamic allocations, because we cannot determine which bytes are being accessed at
compiling time. As a result, we conservatively consider the whole allocation as uninitialized
and only perform reachability analysis. With one exception, during the initialization analysis
we will record the size value (in LLVM IR) of the dynamic allocation; if the allocation is
later initialized by a basic function (e.g., memset) using the same size value as recorded, we
consider that it is fully initialized and safe. In the instrumentation module, extra instructions
are inserted to compute the size at runtime for dynamic allocations on stack, which is then
passed to memset to initialize the memory. For dynamic allocation on heap, we utilize the
__GFP_ZERO flag for initialization.
2.1.5 Evaluation
We systematically evaluated UNISAN to answer the following questions:
• The accuracy of UNISAN, i.e., to what extent can UNISAN filter out safe allocations?
• The effectiveness of UNISAN, i.e., whether it can prevent known and detect previously
unknown uninitialized data leaks?
• The efficiency of UNISAN, i.e., what is the performance overhead of the secured
kernel?
Experimental setup. We applied UNISAN to both x86_64 and AArch64 kernels. For
x86_64, we used the latest mainline Linux (with version 4.6.0-Blurry Fish Butt) with
patches from the LLVMLinux projects [113]. x86_64 kernels were tested in a desktop
machine equipped with an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-1620 v2 @ 3.70GHz processor and
32GB RAM. The OS is the 64-bits Ubuntu 14.04. For AArch64, we used the latest Android
kernel (with version tegra-flounder-3.10-n-preview-2) from the Android Open Source
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Table 2: Measurement results for detection accuracy of UNISAN.
Arch Module Static Dyn. Static Dyn. Unsafe Unsafe Static Unsafe
Alloca Alloca Malloc Malloc Alloca Malloc Bytes Bytes
x86_64 2,152 17,854 24 1,768 1,161 1,493 386 3,588K 863K
AArch64 2,030 15,596 32 1,790 1,233 1,485 451 11,525K 3,351K
Project, with patches from [169]. The Android kernels were tested in the Nexus 9 device
that has a duo-core ARMv8 processor and 2GB RAM. We used the default configurations
for both kernels.
2.1.5.1 Accuracy of Unsafe Allocation Detector
We first conducted the statistical analysis on the accuracy of the unsafe allocation detector—
how many allocations are reported as unsafe. The results are shown in Table 2. In particular,
there are around 2k modules (i.e., bitcode files) enabled by the default kernel configuration.
It is worth noting that LLVM’s optimizations aggressively inline functions and significantly
opt-out most allocations—there were 156,065 functions and 413,546 static stack allocations
before the optimizations. UNISAN is accurate in detecting unsafe stack allocations: only
8.4% and 9.5% stack allocations are detected as unsafe for x86_64 and AArch64, respec-
tively. Since dynamic allocation is common for a heap object, UNISAN’s detection rate is
higher for heap allocations—13.2% for x86_64 and 14.9% for AArch64. UNISAN performs
byte-level detection, so we also report the total number of statically allocated bytes and the
detected unsafe bytes. These statistic results show that UNISAN can filter out most safe
allocations to avoid unnecessary initialization.
To understand how initialization analysis and reachability analysis individually help in
filtering out safe allocations, we further counted the number of unsafe allocations when we
disable one of them. Specifically, in x86_64, if we disable the initialization analysis, there
are 3,380 unsafe stack allocations. If we disable the reachability analysis (i.e., assuming all
function calls as sinks), there are 14,094 unsafe stack allocations. In AArch64, the numbers
are 2,961 and 11,209, respectively.
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2.1.5.2 Effectiveness of Preventing Leaks
Preventing known leaks. Conservative policies (Figure 2.1.3.1) have been enforced to
eliminate potential false negatives of UNISAN. To confirm that UNISAN does not miss
uninitialized data leaks in practice, we selected 43 recent kernel uninitialized data leaks
reported after 2013. All these leaks have been assigned with CVE identifiers. Please note
that some leaks are not included because the corresponding code is not enabled by the
default kernel configuration or a very similar leak has already been included. The patches of
these vulnerabilities are temporarily reverted for testing. The results of the experiment are
shown in Table 3. UNISAN successfully detected and prevented all these leaks without any
false negative; hence the effectiveness in preventing existing leaks is confirmed.
Detecting previously unknown vulnerabilities. UNISAN is designed as a prevention tool
that can automatically detect and fix all uninitialized data leaks at the LLVM IR level; no
manual effort is required. However, to confirm that UNISAN can truly prevent new leaks and
estimate the false positives due to our conservative policies, we manually review the unsafe
allocations reported by the unsafe allocation detector. As shown in Table 2, UNISAN de-
tected about 1,500 possible unsafe stack allocations and 300 possible unsafe heap allocations.
Due to limited time and labor, we randomly chose 300 detected unsafe stack allocations and
50 unsafe heap allocations. In summary, we have verified 19 new uninitialized data leaks in
the latest Linux kernel and Android kernel. All of these vulnerabilities are from stack, more
details can be found in Table 4. All of them have been confirmed by the Linux kernel team
and Android security team. Since UNISAN has not been adopted by them yet, we have to
manually write the corresponding patches in source code.
2.1.5.3 Efficiency of the Secured Kernels
UNISAN carries out flow-sensitive, context-sensitive, and field-sensitive analyses to ac-
curately detect the unsafe allocations, so that the performance overhead is controlled by
minimizing the number of initializations. To quantify this benefit, we conducted a series of
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Table 3: Tested known uninitialized data leaks. P: compiler padding; M: missing element initializa-
tion.
CVE Mem. Sink Leak Cause UNISAN
Bytes
CVE-2015-5697 heap user <4096 M ✓
CVE-2015-7884 stack user 4 M ✓
CVE-2015-7885 stack user < 28 M ✓
CVE-2014-1444 stack user 2 P ✓
CVE-2014-1445 stack user 2 P ✓
CVE-2014-1446 stack user 4 M ✓
CVE-2014-1690 stack sock < 16 M ✓
CVE-2014-1739 stack user 192 M ✓
CVE-2013-4515 stack user 10 M ✓
CVE-2013-3235 stack user 12 M ✓
CVE-2013-3234 stack user 12 P+M ✓
CVE-2013-3233 stack user 12 M ✓
CVE-2013-3232 stack user 6 P+M ✓
CVE-2013-3230 stack user 4 M ✓
CVE-2013-3223 stack user 1 P ✓
CVE-2013-2636 stack sock < 20 M ✓
CVE-2013-2636 stack sock 4 P+M ✓
CVE-2013-2636 stack sock 3 P ✓
CVE-2013-2636 stack sock 18 M ✓
CVE-2013-2635 stack sock 32 M ✓
CVE-2013-2634 stack sock 32 M ✓
CVE-2013-2634 stack sock 34 M ✓
CVE-2013-2634 stack sock 8 M ✓
CVE-2013-2634 stack sock 20 P+M ✓
CVE-2013-2634 stack sock 32 M ✓
CVE-2013-2634 stack sock 18 M ✓
CVE-2013-2547 stack sock < 64 M ✓
CVE-2013-2547 stack sock 8 M ✓
CVE-2013-2237 heap sock 1 M ✓
CVE-2013-2234 heap sock 2 M ✓
CVE-2013-2148 stack user 1 M ✓
CVE-2013-2141 stack user 4 M ✓
CVE-2012-6549 stack user 2 M ✓
CVE-2012-6548 stack user 2 M ✓
CVE-2012-6547 stack sock 4 M ✓
CVE-2012-6546 stack user 2 P ✓
CVE-2012-6545 stack sock 1 P ✓
CVE-2012-6544 stack sock 2 M ✓
CVE-2012-6543 stack sock 2 M ✓
CVE-2012-6541 stack user 4 P ✓
CVE-2012-6540 stack user 12 M ✓
CVE-2012-6539 stack user 4 P ✓
CVE-2012-6537 stack user 4 P ✓
extensive performance evaluations. In particular, we first used the LMBench [125] micro
benchmark to evaluate the performance on core system operations (e.g., syscalls latency).
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Table 4: List of new kernel uninitialized data leak vulnerabilities discovered by UNISAN. S: patch
submitted; ✓: patch applied. P: compiler padding; M: missing element initialization; A: Android; L:
Linux.
# Sub- Mem. Sink Leak Cause Kernel Patch CVE
System Bytes
1 net/core stack sock 4 P A&L ✓ CVE-2016-4486
2 usb stack user 3 P A&L ✓ CVE-2016-4482
3 net/wireless stack sock 6 M A&L ✓ AndroidID-28620350
4 net/llc stack user 1 P A&L ✓ CVE-2016-4485
5 sound stack user 8 P A&L ✓ CVE-2016-4569
6 sound stack user 8 P A&L ✓ CVE-2016-4578
7 sound stack user 8 P A&L ✓ CVE-2016-4578
8 net/x25 stack user 8 M A&L ✓ CVE-2016-4569
9 net/tipc stack sock <60 M A&L ✓ CVE-2016-5243
10 net/rds stack sock 1 M A&L ✓ CVE-2016-5244
11 net/mac80211 stack sock 26 M A S AndroidID-28620568
12 net/wireless stack sock <116 M&P A S AndroidID-28619338
13 net/wireless stack sock 1 M A S AndroidID-28620324
14 net/netfilter stack sock 2 M A S AndroidID-28673002
15 net/netfilter stack sock 2 M A S AndroidID-28672819
16 net/netfilter stack sock 1 M A S AndroidID-28616963
17 media stack user <192 M&P A S AndroidID-28616963
18 media stack user 10 M&P A S AndroidID-28616963
19 media stack user 28 M&P A S AndroidID-28616963
We then used Android Benchmarks and the SPEC Benchmarks as the macro benchmarks to
evaluate the performance impacts on user space programs for the protected Android kernel
and Linux kernel, respectively. To measure the performance impacts on I/O intensive server
programs, we further used ApacheBench to test the performance of Apache web server. All
these evaluations consist of three groups: (1) native mode, in which UNISAN is not applied;
(2) blind mode, in which all stack allocations and heap allocations without the __GFP_ZERO
flag are initialized without checking whether or not they are safe; and (3) UNISAN mode, in
which UNISAN is applied. In the three groups of evaluations, the kernel was replaced with
the corresponding one. Note that, we did not further break down the performance overhead
introduced by stack and heap, because the overall overhead is already negligible.
System Operations. In order to measure how UNISAN affects the performance of core
operating system services, we used LMBench [125] as the micro benchmark. Specifically,
we focus on the latency of syscalls (e.g., null, write, open/close, sigaction, etc.) and
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Table 5: Evaluation results with LMBench. Time is in microsecond.
Linux (x86_64) Android (AArch64)
Native Blind (%) UniS. (%) Native Blind (%) UniS. (%)
null syscall 0.04 0.04 (0.0%) 0.04 (0.0%) 0.42 0.42 (0.0%) 0.42 (0.0%)
stat 0.37 0.40 (8.1%) 0.38 (2.7%) 1.33 1.43 (7.5%) 1.37 (3.0%)
open/close 1.20 1.22 (1.7%) 1.15 (-4.2%) 6.09 6.27 (3.0%) 6.07 (-0.3%)
select TCP 2.44 2.48 (1.6%) 2.44 (0.0%) 9.67 10.67 (10.3%) 9.80 (1.3%)
signal install 0.11 0.11 (0.0%) 0.11 (0.0%) 0.58 0.58 (0.0%) 0.57 (-1.7%)
signal handle 0.58 0.71 (22.4%) 0.60 (3.4%) 1.79 1.98 (10.6%) 1.85 (3.4%)
fork+exit 156 157 (0.6%) 156 (0.0%) 851 892 (4.8%) 861 (1.2%)
fork+exec 452 464 (2.7%) 455 (0.7%) 2687 2737 (1.9%) 2742 (2.0%)
prot fault 0.295 0.317 (7.5%) 0.316 (7.1%) 1.37 1.47 (7.3%) 1.35 (-1.5%)
pipe(latency) 9.673 10.21 (5.6%) 9.909 (2.4%) 8.850 8.898 (0.5%) 8.882 (0.4%)
TCP(latency) 91.8 99.5 (8.4%) 97.3 (6.0%) – – – – –
pipe(bandw) 3,321 3,250 (2.1%) 3,315 (0.2%) 838 728 (13.1%) 804 (4.1%)
TCP(bandw) 2,331 2,264 (2.9%) 2,333 (-0.1%) – – – – –
impact on bandwidth (e.g., pipe). We ran each experiment 10 times, and the results are
shown in Table 5. The last two rows are measuring bandwidth, which is the bigger the better.
We do not have numbers for TCP case in Android kernel because we cannot establish TCP
sockets to our Nexus 9. In the blind mode, the performance overhead could be up to 22%
(the signal handle case). There are also some cases (e.g., select and pipe) where its overhead
is more than 10%. Such a performance overhead is significant for the OS kernel—the
foundation of computer systems. In contrast, UNISAN has a much lower performance
overhead than the blind mode; its maximum overhead is 7.1% in the protection fault case.
We also notice that UNISAN’s performance overhead is negligible (< 1%) in many cases.
On average, the performance overhead of UNISAN is less than 1.5% for both the Linux and
Android kernels.
User-Space Programs. For x86_64, we used the standard SPEC CPU 2006 benchmark
suite to test the performance impacts of UNISAN on user space programs. The benchmark
programs were compiled with the common options (-pie -fPIC -O2) and each benchmark
was run 10 times. The results are shown in Table 6. Specifically, the performance overhead
introduced by UNISAN is only 0.54%, which is negligible. The performance overhead of
the blind mode is higher than UNISAN, which is 1.92%. Note that the moderate blind-mode
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Table 6: User-space (x86_64) performance evaluation results with the SPEC benchmarks. Time is in
second, the smaller the better.
Programs Native Blind (%) UNISAN (%)
perlbench 3.61 3.61 (0.0%) 3.59(-0.6%)
bzip2 4.74 4.78 (0.8%) 4.78 (0.8%)
gcc 0.968 0.970 (0.2%) 0.966(-0.2%)
mcf 2.73 2.76 (1.1%) 2.74 (0.4%)
gobmk 14.0 14.0 (0.0%) 14.0 (0.0%)
hmmer 2.07 2.03 (-1.9%) 2.04(-1.4%)
sjeng 3.27 3.30 (0.9%) 3.33 (1.8%)
libquantum 0.0387 0.0397 (2.6%) 0.0395 (2.1%)
h264ref 9.26 9.32 (0.6%) 9.28 (0.2%)
omnetpp 0.362 0.364 (0.6%) 0.362 (0.0%)
astar 7.81 7.92 (1.4%) 7.92 (1.4%)
xalancbmk 0.0758 0.0779 (2.8%) 0.0738(-2.6%)
milc 4.57 4.76 (4.2%) 4.76 (4.2%)
namd 8.85 8.86 (0.1%) 8.83(-0.2%)
dealII 10.5 10.6 (1.0%) 10.6 (1.0%)
soplex 0.0166 0.0186 (12.0%) 0.0170 (2.4%)
povray 0.427 0.439 (2.8%) 0.426(-0.2%)
lbm 1.68 1.69 (0.6%) 1.69 (0.6%)
sphinx 1.19 1.28 (7.6%) 1.20 (0.8%)
Geo-mean (seconds) 1.92% 0.54%
Table 7: User-space (AArch64) performance evaluation results with multiple android benchmarks.
The scores are the higher the better.
Benchmark Native Blind (%) UNISAN (%)
AnTuTu 94998 92900 (2.2%) 94735 (0.3%)
Vellamo-Browser 4776 4711 (1.4%) 4729 (1.0%)
Vellamo-Metal 2766 2777 (-0.4%) 2776 (-0.4%)
Vellomo-Multicore 2610 2499 (4.3%) 2600 (0.4%)
overhead over SPEC benchmarks is when the user-space is not protected; when we also
applied the blind mode to the user-space code, the overhead becomes 10% (7% from stack
and 3% from heap).
For AArch64, we instead used the dedicated benchmarks for Android: AnTuTu (includ-
ing 3DBench) and Vellamo. They are typical Android benchmarks to test a variety of cases
(e.g., video streaming, web browsing, photo editing, etc.). Each testing was repeated five
times for deriving the average numbers. The evaluation results are shown in Table 7. Again,
UNISAN’s performance overhead is negligible (<1%) and is lower than blind mode.
Server Programs. We used ApacheBench to test the performance impacts of UNISAN on
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the latency and bandwidth of the server program—Apache web server. The ApacheBench
ran in the laptop connected to our desktop machine with an one Gigabit cable. We used
Apache with its default configurations. We first used a 1KB file to evaluate the latency when
the concurrency (i.e., simultaneous connections) was set to be 1, 50, 100, 150, 200, and 250.
Then we used files with different sizes (100B, 1KB, 10KB, 100KB, and 1MB) to measure the
bandwidth (i.e., throughput) of the web server. In the bandwidth evaluation, the concurrency
was set to be 32; the network I/O was not saturated except when the file size was 1MB. The
request for each experiment was repeated 10,000 times. The evaluation results show that the
blind mode incurs an average slowdown of 0.7% in the concurrency experiment and 0.9%
in the bandwidth experiment. In contrast, UNISAN imposes an unobservable slowdown
(<0.1%) in both experiments. These results confirm that UNISAN incurs almost no overhead
to the server programs that are I/O intensive.
2.1.5.4 Miscellaneous
Scalability. UNISAN is scalable, which can analyze complex programs like the OS kernel.
To better understand its scalability, we also measure the time for it to protect the kernels. In
our physical machine, UNISAN finished the protection of kernels within 117 seconds for
x86_64 and 170 seconds for AArch64.
Binary size. UNISAN inserts small initializers (e.g., zero-initialization) for unsafe alloca-
tions. To confirm that it does not significantly increase the binary size, we measured the size
of the installed boot images. The results showed that UNISAN increases the size of Linux
boot image from 7,417KB to 7,445KB (0.38%) and the one of Android from 6.348KB to
6.366KB (0.27%). Both are negligible.
2.1.6 Discussion
Custom heap allocator. In the current implementation, UNISAN only tracks typical
heap allocators (kmalloc and kmen_cache_alloc). To handle custom heap allocations (e.g.,
alloc_skb), UNISAN can use the specifications of allocators provided by developers. In
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fact, for user space programs, LLVM already provides an API isMallocLikeFn to test
whether a value is a call to a function that allocates uninitialized memory based on heuristics.
We plan to also use heuristics to infer “malloc-like” functions in OS kernels.
Source code requirement. Source code is required. In case that some kernel drivers are
close-sourced, we have to carefully identify all possible calls that target these drivers and
assume all such calls as sinks. Failures in identifying such calls will result in incompleteness
of call-graph and thus false negatives.
Security impacts of zero-initialization. Some systems use uninitialized memory as the
source of randomness. For example, the SSLeay implementation of OpenSSL uses unini-
tialized buffer as entropy source to generate random number (see ssleay_rand_bytes()).
Zero-initialization will clearly reduce the entropy of such a source of randomness; however,
we argue that using such a source of randomness is insecure and should be avoided—reading
uninitialized data is classified as memory error.
False positives. In many cases, UNISAN eliminates false negatives by sacrificing accuracy
(i.e., increasing the false positive rate). There is still room to reduce the false positives.
For example, point-to analysis [76] can help find indirect call targets, and dynamic taint
analysis [154] can help handle cases like inline assembly. Considering that false positives
do not affect program semantics but just introduce more performance overhead and that
UNISAN is already efficient, we leave these optimizations for future work.
More kernel modules. In our experiments, we included only modules enabled by the
default kernel configurations. Since the current Linux kernel has around 20,000 modules
total, a majority of them have not been included in our evaluation. Unfortunately, due to
some GCC-specific features, some modules are still not compilable by LLVM and require
extra engineering effort to patch. Since UNISAN is a proof-of-concept research project, we
believe supporting these additional modules is out-of-scope. We may be able to rely on the
open source community to provide the required patches (e.g., the LLVMLinux project [113])
or port UNISAN to GCC.
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Beyond kernels. UNISAN’s detection and instrumentation work on the LLVM IR level,
and thus it can be naturally extended to protect user space programs. Specifically, to support
user space program, IR of libraries should also be included, and sources (for heap) and
sinks should be re-defined. As a future work, we will use UNISAN to detect and prevent
information leaks in security- and privacy- sensitive programs (e.g., OpenSSL).
2.1.7 Related work
Kernel leak detection and prevention. The most related works are Peiró’s model check-
ing based kernel stack leak detection [148], PaX STACKLEAK plugin [175], and Split
kernel [96].
Peiró’s model checking is essentially a simple taint tracking from stack allocation to
copy_to_user. If there is no assignment or memset between the allocation and copy_to_user,
a leak is reported. Such an approach has some limitations: it does not track targets of indirect
calls, different sinks, the propagation of uninitialized data, or handle partial initialization, so
many leak cases will be missed. In UNISAN, we accurately track each byte of an allocation
and eliminate false negatives thoroughly.
STACKLEAK simply clears the used kernel stack when the control is transferred back to the
user space. Such an approach cannot prevent leaks that disclose data generated in the current
syscall. Split kernel [96] instead clears the stack frame whenever a function is called. Both
approaches impose significant performance overhead (see Table 5) because they need to
frequently zero-out blocks of memory. Compared with UniSan, these approaches provide a
broader security, as they also prevent other uninitialized data uses (e.g., uninitialized pointer
dereferencing).
None of above approaches can protect heap allocations. To the best of our knowledge,
UNISAN is the first approach that prevents both stack and heap uninitialized data leaks
efficiently.
Detecting uninitialized memory accesses. Traditional uninitialized data read detection
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and undefined behavior [185] detection’s can also detect uninitialized data leaks.
Both LLVM and gcc provide the -Wuninitialized option to detect uninitialized data
use. First, they only perform intra-procedure analysis; however, all the uninitialized data
leaks propagate data across function boundary (e.g., calling copy_to_user); hence they
cannot detect such leaks. Second, their analysis does not handle many common cases. For
example, reading the uninitialized data through its pointer cannot be caught.
Some dynamic tracking techniques [25, 138, 162] have been proposed to detect unini-
tialized data reads. These techniques rely on dynamic instrumentation platforms (e.g.,
Valgrind [134] and DynamoRIO [25]) to instrument the binary and analyze memory access
patterns dynamically. These tools can report uninitialized data use without false positives;
however, their performance overhead (>10x) is too high for them to be adopted as prevention
tools.
Differently, MemorySanitizer [172] relies on compile time instrumentation and shadow
memory to detect uninitialized data use at run-time. Its performance is much better than
dynamic instrumentation based tools; however, it still imposes a 3-4x performance overhead.
Usher [191] proposes value-flow analysis to reduce the number of tracked allocations to
reduce the performance overhead of MemorySanitizer to 2-2.5x.
Memory safety and model checking. Many memory safety techniques [129, 131, 132,
160] have been proposed to prevent spacial memory errors (e.g., out-of-bound read) and use-
after-free bugs, and model checking techniques [13, 126] can detect semantic errors caused
by developers. These tools are effective to detect or prevent kernel leaks caused by spacial
memory errors, use-after-free, or semantic errors, and thus are orthogonal to UNISAN.
DieHard [16] probabilistically detects uninitialized memory uses for heap but not stack.
Cling [4] constrains memory allocation to allow address space reuse only among objects of
the same type, which can mitigate exploits of temporal memory errors (e.g., use-after-free
and uninitialized uses). StackArmor [37] is a sophisticated stack protection that also prevents
uninitialized reads in binaries. Since StackArmor uses stack layout randomization to prevent
42
inter-procedural uninitialized reads, such a protection is probabilistic. Type systems [58, 74]
can prevent dangling pointer and uninitialized pointer dereferencing, and out-of-bound
accesses; however uninitialized data leaks are not covered.
Protections using zero-initialization. Zero-initialization has been leveraged to achieve
protections in previous works. Secure deallocation [39] zero-initializes the deallocated
memory to reduce the lifetime of data, thus reducing the risk of data exposure. Lacuna [61]
allows users to run programs in “private sessions”. After a session is over, all memory
of its execution is erased. In general, zeroing-upon-deallocation has two issues: (1) deal-
locations are not always available (e.g., deallocation is missing in the case of memory
leak); (2) it is hard to selectively zero deallocations for efficiency, as discussed in §2.1.2.2.
StackArmor [37] only zero-initializes intra-procedural allocations (i.e., not be passed to
other functions) that cannot be proven to be secure against uninitialized reads.
2.2 POINTSAN: Eliminating Uninitialized Pointer Uses
In programming languages such as C and C++, programmers decide whether to initialize
a variable with a deterministic value when it is allocated. C enthusiasts often argue that
if programmers know that the code will later set a proper value anyway, initialization on
allocations is an unnecessary use of precious CPU cycles. This argument makes sense
from a functional point of view since such an unnecessary use of CPU cycles can cause
a significant runtime overhead if it occurs up to millions of times per second, as it does
in programs such as in OS kernels. However, manually keeping track of all possible code
paths to ensure proper initialization is an error-prone task. Even worse, automatic detection
of uninitialized use, such as the warning of compilers, is inaccurate for several reasons.
First, inter-procedural tracking often leads to false positives and false negatives because
of problems such as aliasing. Second, whether an uninitialized-use warning is justified is
highly subjective: While some programmers may prefer a warning in every possible case,
others might consider a warning unnecessary if it would not cause an observable error or is
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likely a false positive.
Uninitialized data represents arbitrary values that were coincidentally stored in the
memory. If the uninitialized data is used for a memory read, such as the case in which an
uninitialized data pointer is dereferenced, the whole memory region can be read, causing
information leaks. Despite their potentially dangerous consequences, uninitialized-use bugs
are very seldom classified as security vulnerabilities [67, 185], which arguably originates
from the perception that it is hard for an attacker to control the memory layout in order to
make dereferencing exploitable. In particular, widely used systems such as OpenSSL explic-
itly use uninitialized data for the generation of entropy (see function ssleay_rand_bytes()
in the SSLeay implementation) and hence ground their security on the assumption that
such data is impossible to control or predict. On the other hand, our study revealed that in
2015 and 2016 alone, although 16 uninitialized-use vulnerabilities have been patched in
the Linux Kernel, only one was reported for a Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures ID
(CVE). In fact, since 2004, only eight uninitialized-use vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel
have been reported for a CVE. From a security point of view, uninitialized use or more
precisely, temporal memory errors should be included as a prevention target in state-of-
the-art memory protection mechanisms. However, advanced security mechanisms such as
SoftBound+CETS [131, 132] and WatchdogLite [129]), which claim full memory safety, do
not currently cover uninitialized uses.
In this work, we first show that uninitialized pointers can be reliably controlled by
attackers without the need of an additional memory-corruption vulnerability or special
assumptions. Therefore, an uninitialized-pointer use vulnerabilities can be reliably exploited
to achieve arbitrary memory read (i.e., causing information leaks), write, and code execution.
In particular, we show that almost the whole kernel stack is controllable to a local attacker
by either executing syscalls based on how they leave the stack after they return or exhaust-
ing memory and guiding stack allocation. We first survey existing reported and patched
uninitialized-use vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel and then propose the reliable targeted
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stack-spraying technique to write and retain arbitrary data on the kernel stack. The core of
the fully automated targeted stack spraying includes a deterministic stack spraying technique
and a reliable exhaustive memory spraying technique. The deterministic stack spraying
technique consists of three components: a tailored symbolic execution engine that explores
paths and outputs the concrete parameters to trigger the paths; a guided fuzzer that takes as
input information generated by the symbolic execution engine to verify that stack control
is indeed achieved; and a coordinator that safely and efficiently parallelizes the symbolic
execution engine and the fuzzer. The exhausting memory spraying technique complements
deterministic stack spraying by strategically consuming a huge region of memory to guide
stack allocations and preparing malicious data in the memory pages that will be used by the
guided stack allocations. Combining both approaches allows us to reliably control almost
the whole kernel stack.
We further propose POINTSAN, a mitigation that defeats uninitialized-use exploits.
POINTSAN is inspired by the observation that uninitialized-use exploits usually control an
uninitialized pointer to achieve arbitrary read/write/execution. By zero-initializing pointer-
type fields in an allocated object, we can prevent an adversary from controlling these pointers.
Since memory page at the address zero is not accessable in Linux, zero-initialization becomes
a safe prevention operation. More specifically, we perform an intra-procedural analysis for
the Linux kernel source code. We realize both the analysis that identifies unsafe pointer-type
fields and the instrumentation that zero-initializes the identified pointer-type fields based
on the LLVM compiler Infrastructure. We evaluated the performance and relibiblity of
POINTSAN using LMBench and the SPEC benchmarks. Both the LMBench and SPEC
benchmark results confirm that POINTSAN is very efficient and reliable (no single error was
observed during the evaluation).
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2.2.1 Uninitialized Uses and the Kernel Stack
2.2.1.1 Uninitialized Uses in OS Kernels
In this section, we present uninitialized-use issues in OS kernels. We first investigate how
widespread uninitialized-use vulnerabilities actually are in the Linux kernel and how aware
people are of this problem. To this end, we have manually analyzed the reported CVE
entries that lead to privilege escalation attacks in the Linux kernel since 2004 [57], and the
commit log of the Linux kernel git repository [180], which dates back to 2005. To reduce the
huge number of commits to a manageable size, we mostly concentrated on the commit log
messages between the years 2015 and 2016. For the CVEs, we find that eight out of 199 (4%)
privilege escalation vulnerabilities reported since 2004 are caused by the use of uninitialized
objects or pointers. For Linux kernel commit messages, we first identified candidates of
uninitialized use by inspecting the commit messages using keywords such as uninitialized
pointer dereference and undefined pointer, which resulted in 52 candidate commits from
2015 and 2016, 28 of which were subsequently filtered out by our manual analysis because
they are not exploitable (e.g., NULL pointer dereference bugs). Out of the remaining 24
cases, eight are uninitialized pointer-based reads, which can lead to information leaks, and
16 are uninitialized pointer-based writes or function calls. We further inspected these 16
write/call cases and found that 11 cases (69%) are from the stack while only five cases are
from the heap. These findings not only show that uninitialized-use vulnerabilities are quite
common in the Linux kernel but also indicate that these vulnerabilities are not considered
particularly security-relevant or even not reported at all. Moreover, our findings confirm that
most uninitialized variables are from the stack rather than the heap, which is a significant
difference from use-after-free vulnerabilities.
2.2.1.2 Kernel Stack Management
Since most uninitialized variables are from stack, our primary focus lies on vulnerabilities
caused by uninitialized uses of stack variables and pointers in the Linux kernel, and thus
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understanding how Linux manages its kernel stacks and which features it offers in this
regard is important. In Linux, every thread has its own kernel stack allocated in the kernel
memory space with the maximum size of the stack depending on the specific Linux version.
In general, the stack is 4KB or 8KB for a 32-bit OS (x86) and 8KB or 16KB for a 64-bit
OS (x86-64), which is quite small compared to the default stack size soft limit of 8MB for
Linux user space stacks. The special data structure struct thread_info, whose size is
104-byte in our system, is saved at the stack top (low address). The fundamental goal behind
limiting the kernel stack size is to limit overall memory consumption when a large number
of threads is running in the kernel in parallel, and each thread has its own kernel stack.
Because of the limited stack size, storing large variables on the kernel stack and creating
long call chains in the kernel space is discouraged. To ensure that the stack depth is shallow
enough to avoid a stack overflow, Linux provides the checkstack.pl tool for static analysis
of the stack. Although the small size of the Linux kernel stack improves the success rate of a
stack-spraying attack, the shallow stack depth (or the lack of loops and recursions) limits the
spraying range. Besides normal thread stacks, Linux also has other specialized stack types.
For example, while debug stacks are used for hardware (interrupt1) and software (INT3)
debug interrupts, interrupt stacks are used for external hardware interrupts or for processing
software interrupts. Since these stacks do not accept user-controlled data, we do not take
them into account and instead focus on normal per-thread kernel stacks that are used when
syscalls are issued.
2.2.1.3 Stack Usage of Syscalls
The more frequently a stack region is used, the more likely an uninitialized variable will
reside in this region. Therefore, taking control over frequently used memory regions
increases the success rate of an uninitialized-use attack. We hence analyze stack usage of
syscalls to understand which portions of the kernel stack are most frequently used.
To profile stack usage of syscalls, we use kprobes to intercept syscall enters and returns,
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90% syscalls use <1,260 bytes
Stack Usage of Syscalls in the Linux Kernel
Figure 9: The profile for stack usage of syscalls in the Linux kernel. The total size of the kernel
stack is 16KB. 90% syscalls use less than 1,260 bytes aligned to the stack base. The average stack
usage is less than 1,000 bytes.
and scan the stack memory to check maximum stack usage of these syscalls. Specifically,
upon syscall enter, we zero out the stack memory and continue the normal execution; upon
syscall return, we scan the stack memory from stack top (i.e., the lowest stack address)
until we find the first non-zero byte. We conservatively treat the offset of the first non-zero
byte into stack base (i.e., the value of stack pointer upon syscall entry) as the maximum
stack usage of the syscall. We use the Trinity fuzzer to invoke all syscalls to obtain stack
usage for all syscalls. Because Trinity usually takes a long time to explore a syscall or
even just does not terminate, we set five-second timeout for fuzzing each syscall. Figure 9
summarizes the maximum stack usage for all syscalls. In particular, we find that (1) the
average stack usage of syscalls is less than 1,000 bytes (aligned to the stack base at high
address) and (2) 90% syscalls use only the highest 1,260 bytes on the stack. It is important
to note that the stack usage represents the maximum stack region a syscall uses. Assuming
stack objects are uniformly distributed in stack regions used by syscalls, we find that the
average location of stack objects is 510 bytes into the stack base and more than 90% stack
objects are allocated in the highest 960-byte stack region. Therefore, the highest 1KB stack
region is frequently used and thus is the primary target of our spraying.
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2.2.2 The Exploitability of Uninitialized Uses
The main challenge in exploiting uninitialized uses is to control data in the uninitialized
memory. By planting malicious pointers in the target memory, an uninitialized pointer
dereference can be turned into arbitrary memory read—causing information leaks, write,
or code execution. However, unlike heap spraying, in which the number and the size of
allocated heap objects are user-controlled, stack spraying has the additional problem of stack
objects usually being static and fixed in size. The placement of the Linux thread_info
structure, at the stack top, requires the stack size to be limited; otherwise, stack buffer
overflows may occur. In addition, kernel space is shared by all threads. Not limiting the size
of stack will easily exhaust memory. Therefore, Linux kernel developers are encouraged
to use the script (scripts/checkstack.pl) to statically analyze stack usage. The script in
particular checks the stack usage (in bytes) of each function so that developers can find
functions that use too much stack memory. Because of these features—the limited stack size,
the static and fixed-size stack objects, and the stack usage check, a targeted stack-spraying
attack is significantly more difficult than a heap-spraying attack.
To enable a targeted stack-spraying attack in the kernel space, we need to prepare
malicious data in a specific location of the kernel stack in the presence of aforementioned
difficulties. Specifically, the location itself needs to be chosen in such a way that the
uninitialized memory will overlap the prepared data. In general, we can store malicious data
in such a location in two ways: (1) finding an execution path that prepares data overlapping
that of the vulnerability and (2) finding a way to guide the kernel to allocate stacks on the
memory pages with prepared data. The first method is deterministic: Once such a path and
its triggering inputs are found, we can deterministically write arbitrary data at the specified
location. Since the data is saved at the target location by normal execution paths, this
method is stealthy and hard to detect. By contrast, the second method affects the stack
allocation of another process/thread by exhausting memory, which can be reliable but not
fully deterministic. This method can achieve broad control because the overlapping is at page
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level. However, since the creation of a new process/thread executes kernel functions that use
the kernel stack, a portion (near the stack base) of the prepared data will be overwritten. As
a result, the second method loses control of the stack region at high address. As mentioned
in §2.2.1.3, our primary spraying target is the highest 1KB stack region. To control this
region, we have to use the first method. For these reasons, we combine both methods so that
attackers can achieve reliable or even deterministic control over a broad stack region. In this
section, we present an overview of both methods.
2.2.2.1 Deterministic Stack Spraying
We design the deterministic stack spraying technique, which finds an execution path that pre-
pares data overlapping that of an uninitialized variable. The main challenge of deterministic
stack spraying is to find a syscall with specific parameters that will trigger an overlapping
execution path. An overview of the technique used for the attack is shown in Figure 10.
The technique consists of three components: a symbolic execution engine, a guided fuzzer,
and a coordinator that handles communication between the symbolic execution engine
and the guided fuzzer. The goal of the symbolic execution engine is to explore as many
execution paths as possible to find one that saves user-controlled data on that stack, which
will overlap an uninitialized variable. However, symbolic execution is prone to the path
explosion problem because of that the number of feasible paths in a program can be infinite
when the program contains unbounded loop iterations. A possible solution for this problem
is to use heuristics for either path-finding or concretizing the loop condition. To achieve high
coverage in path exploration, we follow the second method: During symbolic execution,
we concretize the loop conditions and at the same time, identify loops and their symbolic
conditions, and then let the fuzzer selectively explore these loops. To verify whether a
syscall can actually save arbitrary data on the kernel stack, our guided fuzzer replaces the
non-controlling parameters (that are confirmed not to affect execution paths during symbolic
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Figure 10: Overview of the architecture of our deterministic stack spraying technique, which
automatically analyzes all syscalls and outputs results, including which range of the stack we can
control and how to control it.
execution and scan the kernel stack to check which ranges of the stack memory have been
polluted by magic code. These ranges are those we can control.
2.2.2.2 Exhaustive Memory Spraying
The exhaustive memory spraying technique guides the stack allocation of a new process
or thread so that the memory pages used by the stack overlap those with prepared data.
The main challenge of such a technique is to improve the reliability of the overlapping.
To overcome this challenge, we design a strategy that reliably controls the memory of the
kernel stack. Specifically, our exhaustive memory spraying technique includes two steps: (1)
occupying the majority of memory in the target machine and (2) polluting all the available
remaining memory with malicious data (for uninitialized variables). Memory occupation
forces the kernel to use the remaining memory, which is small, for the newly allocated
kernel stacks. Because the remaining memory is small, the pollution operation can be done
quickly and effectively. Once we ensure that almost all available memory is polluted by
malicious data, the memory of the newly allocated stacks will contain the malicious data.
Note that in the kernel space, the kernel does not zero out the allocated memory pages, so
the malicious data will not be cleared.
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2.2.2.3 Evaluation of Exploitability
We have implemented targeted stack-spraying and evaluated its effectiveness with regard to
exploiting uninitialized-use vulnerabilities by measuring the control coverage we achieved.
We present the total stack ranges that we can control with deterministic stack spraying and
exhaustive memory spraying, the distribution of controlled regions, and the time spraying
takes. In particular, we investigate the following questions:
• Stack spraying coverage. What is the overall range of the kernel stack can we
control with our two spraying techniques?
• Coverage distribution and frequency. In deterministic stack spraying, how is the
control coverage distributed over the kernel stack? And how frequently can we control
a specific stack region?
• Spraying reliability. In exhaustive memory spraying, how reliably can we control
memory?
• Spraying efficiency. How long does it take for our spraying techniques to achieve
memory control?
Experimental Setup. We obtained the symbolic execution engine S2E from the master
branch of its git repository1, which uses QEMU 1.0.50 and clang 3.2. Our guided fuzzer
is based on Trinity version 1.7pre. Both the symbolic execution and guided fuzzer run
on virtual machines with Debian 8.5.0 (64-bit) on Linux kernel version 3.16. Syscalls
that do not have parameters (e.g., getpid) and therefore cannot take user-controlled data
are ignored. Also, non-x86/x86_64 syscalls are ignored. Out of 313 syscalls available
in the kernel source, we selected 229 for the evaluation. The stack of the Debian system
is 16K-byte. The stack has two regions that are at fixed locations and cannot be sprayed:
1https://github.com/dslab-epfl/s2e.git as of August 2016
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Coverage of Exhaustive Memory Spraying
Figure 11: The cumulative distribution (CDF) of coverage achieved by exhaustive memory spraying.
Its average control rate is about 90%. The memory (1,700 bytes on average) near the stack base
cannot be controlled.
the lowest 104 bytes reserved for thread_info and the highest 160 bytes reserved for OS
operations such as context switches. In all evaluations, the magic code is set to be 4-byte
string "UBIE".
Stack Spraying Coverage. We evaluated the coverage for deterministic stack spraying
and exhaustive memory spraying separately and then measured their combined coverage. In
both scenarios, we used 229 pre-selected syscalls for the evaluation.
In deterministic stack spraying, we found that only 34 syscalls do not allow us to take
control of any stack region. After manual inspection, we concluded that this is because these
syscalls do not admit any parameters that will be stored on the stack. Table 8 summarizes
the amount of bytes that can be controlled by the top 10 syscalls. In the highest 1KB stack
region, which is frequently used (§2.2.1.3), deterministic stack spraying covers 315 bytes
using all available syscalls. Hence, 32% of the frequently used region of the kernel stack
can be manipulated using deterministic stack spraying.
Stack memory after the highest 1KB is subjected to exhaustive memory spraying. As
mentioned in §2.2.2, a portion of the prepared malicious data in the kernel stack of a victim
process by exhaustive memory spraying is likely to be overwritten because of some kernel
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operations (e.g., setting up a new process) in the victim process. To evaluate which areas are
overwritten, we enabled exhaustive memory spraying and ran the Trinity fuzzer to invoke
syscalls. We then used kprobes to intercept syscall entry points and check which regions
have been polluted by magic code (indicating that they were successfully sprayed). Figure 11
shows the results: Besides a small overwritten region near stack base, the remaining region
can be fully controlled. The size of the uncontrollable region varies. On average, the highest
1,722 bytes at the stack base are overwritten, and in some cases, this region can be as small
as 1,200 bytes. Overall, while losing control of this region, exhaustive memory spraying
retains control of all other stack memory, achieving an average coverage rate of 89%.
Deterministic stack spraying and exhaustive memory spraying work as two complemen-
tary techniques: While exhaustive memory spraying retains the majority of the memory, it
cannot control the frequently used stack region. Deterministic stack spraying complements
it by controlling 32% memory of the frequently used stack region. Overall, by combining
both spraying techniques, targeted stack-spraying reliably controls more than 91% of the
kernel stack.
Coverage Distribution and Frequency. We further investigated how the control coverage
is distributed over the kernel stack when using deterministic stack spraying. Figure 12
presents the distribution. We found that the coverage ranges from 200 to 800 bytes. More
importantly, the control with deterministic stack spraying is highly concentrated: Some
regions can be controlled by more than 100 syscalls. We believe these regions are most
likely used by stack objects, and uninitialized variables likely reside in these regions, so
controlling these regions is critical to exploit uninitialized uses from the kernel stack. Table 8
presents top 10 syscalls with high coverage. Syscalls vmsplice, uname, and fcntl have the
highest individual coverage. We further investigated which regions of the stack are uniquely
controlled by a syscall. Table 9 contains all syscalls that uniquely control a region. Overall,
only 80 bytes are uniquely controllable by a single syscall. Other covered bytes can be
controlled with multiple syscalls, thus their sprayers are more reliable.
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Table 8: Top 10 syscalls with the highest control coverage in the kernel stack.











Table 9: Syscalls that uniquely control a stack region. Unique coverage is represented by the number
of uniquely controlled bytes.











Reliability of Exhaustive Memory Spraying. We investigated the reliability of exhaustive
memory spraying by measuring how likely the kernel uses the sprayed memory for the
kernel stack, i.e. whether the allocated stack memory overlaps the one with prepared data.
Specifically, we enable the exhaustive memory spraying and run the Trinity fuzzer to
invoke syscalls. Then we count the number of times (i.e., probes) a syscall has been invoked
until we find that the kernel stack for the syscall is sprayed. After running all syscalls with
Trinity, we found that in most cases, the kernel uses the sprayed memory as stack in the
first or second probe. The average number of probes we achieve overlapping is 1.8. The
worse case is less than 10 probes. Such results show that the exhaustive memory spraying
technique is very effective and thus can reliably control the uninitialized memory.
Efficiency of Spraying. In deterministic stack spraying, both the symbolic execution and
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Statistics of Deterministic Stack Spraying
Figure 12: The coverage, distribution, and frequency of stack control achieved by the deterministic
stack spraying technique.
the guided fuzzing are time-consuming processes. In many cases, they do not terminate even
after running for a few hours. To handle this problem, we have set a timeout for this analysis:
If the analysis for a syscall does not generate new coverage within a pre-set timeout, we
forcibly terminate the analysis for this syscall and continue to analyze next one. After
experimenting with various timeouts, we ultimately set the timeout to 30 minutes. We found
that the vast majority of syscalls can be thoroughly analyzed within this time-frame, with
only 12 syscalls not finishing in time. To improve the spraying efficiency, we empirically
prioritize three types of syscalls: (1) syscalls that set configurations or write data. Such
syscalls (e.g., pwritev) are very likely to save data on kernel stack; (2) syscalls that contain
loops. Such syscalls usually affect a large region of theÂůkernel stack; and (3) syscalls that
contain (multiple) pointer-typeÂůparameters. With such a syscall ranking, we were able to
control more than 200 bytes in the frequently used region within a few minutes. Compared
to deterministic stack spraying, exhaustive memory spraying is much more efficient. The
time memory occupying takes depends on the size of the available memory. In our case, the
memory is 512MB, and the time for occupying the memory is less than 2 seconds. Since
memory pollution writes data into a small memory region, its time is unobservable.
Case Study. The targeted stack-spraying technique provides a conceptual approach for
exploiting a given uninitialized-use vulnerabilities by preparing malicious data at a target
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stack location. For the sake of illustration, we exemplify the applicability of our approach
by adapting Cook’s exploit [41].
To the best of our knowledge, Cook’s exploit is the only one that exploited an uninitialized-
use vulnerability (CVE-2010-2963) in the Linux kernel stack. Figure 13 shows how the code
is subject to the uninitialized use. The pointer data in object karg.vc is not initialized but
dereferenced in function copy_from_user(). Cook exploited this vulnerability by tuning
the cmd argument to let the union struct adopt the type of struct video_tuner, causing
karg.vt to be written with user-controlled data. For such a spraying attack to succeed, at
least four requirements must be satisfied: (1) The object having the uninitialized pointer
must be contained by a union struct; (2) another type in the union struct has to have a
non-pointer field that overlaps with the uninitialized pointer because users are not allowed
to specify pointers pointing to kernel space; 3) this non-pointer field can be overwritten with
user-controlled data; and 4) the user-controlled data will not be cleared. An execution path
satisfying all these requirements is uncommon in practice, and finding such a path manually
is unrealistic in most cases.
In this case study, we show that our targeted stack-spraying technique can automatically
find many execution paths that are able to prepare a malicious pointer on the kernel stack,
thus controlling the uninitialized pointer kp->data. To reproduce Cook’s exploit, we
installed version 2.6.27.58 of the Linux kernel in 64-bit Ubuntu 14.04; the kernel source
code in file compat_ioctl32.c was reverted to contain the vulnerability described in CVE-
2010-2963. Determined by the operating system, the size of the kernel stack is 8KB instead
of 16KB in this case study. To benefit from our targeted stack-spraying technique, we
need to find out the location of the uninitialized pointer in the stack. To get the pointer
location, we used kprobes to hook the function do_video_ioctl. The handler provided
by kprobes enables us to find the location of the stack pointer when do_video_ioctl is
called. Using this information, we computed the offset of the uninitialized pointer kp->data
from the stack base, which is 396. After knowing this offset, we employed our deterministic
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1 static long do_video_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2 unsigned long arg) {
3 union {
4 struct video_tuner vt;
5 struct video_code vc;
6 } karg;
7 ...
8 /* karg.vc contains an uninitialized pointer */
9 err = get_microcode32(&karg.vc, up);
10 ...
11 }
12 int get_microcode32(struct video_code *kp,
13 struct video_code32 __user *up) {
14 ...
15 /* uninitialized pointer is dereferenced */
16 copy_from_user(kp->data, up->data, up->datasize))
17 ...
18 }
Figure 13: The uninitialized-use vulnerability used in Cook’s exploit.
stack spraying technique to find syscalls that can prepare a 8-byte malicious pointer at this
offset. Altogether, we were able to find 27 such syscalls with corresponding parameters.
Independent of the chosen syscall, we could prepare a malicious pointer at the target offset,
resulting in an arbitrary write.
This case study shows how to use the proposed deterministic stack spraying technique
to find syscalls that can control a specific location on stack. It also confirms that control of
the stack can be achieved generally and automatically, and, in the presence of a suitable
uninitialized-use vulnerability, a successful exploit can be built reliably and readily.
2.2.3 Defeating Uninitialized-Use Exploits
We showed that uninitialized-use vulnerabilities can be readily and reliably exploited using
our targeted stack-spraying technique. While use-after-free and buffer overflow problems
have been extensively studied, which has resulted in various protection techniques (e.g.,
memory safety), the uninitialized-use problem has rarely received attention. Our findings
show that uninitialized use constitutes a severe attack vector that calls for practical defense
mechanisms; however, to date no practical defense mechanisms exist. As such, we designed
and implemented an efficient and practical mitigation that counters uninitialized uses. Our
mitigation is inspired by the observation that uninitialized-use exploits usually control an
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uninitialized pointer to achieve arbitrary read/write/execution. By zero-initializing pointer-
type fields in an allocated object, we can prevent an adversary from controlling these pointers.
Since memory page at the address zero is not accessable in Linux2, zero-initialization
becomes a safe prevention operation. More specifically, we perform an intra-procedural
analysis for the Linux kernel source code. We realize both the analysis that identifies unsafe
pointer-type fields and the instrumentation that zero-initializes the identified pointer-type
fields based on the LLVM compiler Infrastructure [112].
2.2.3.1 Identifying Unsafe Pointer-Type Fields
Our analysis is carried out on the LLVM IR, so type information is preserved. In most cases,
we can differentiate pointer-type fields from other fields based on type information. We start
our analysis from allocation sites (i.e., AllocaInst instructions in LLVM IR). The first step
is to identify all pointer-type fields by recursively (a field could be a struct or an array type)
traversing each field in the allocated object. Since integer values might be used as a pointer,
we also treat the 8-byte-integer type as a pointer type.
To initialize identified pointer-type fields, we could conservatively zero out them upon
allocations. This strategy, however, will overly initialize many already initialized point-
ers and therefore introduce unnecessary performance overhead. To reduce initialization
overhead while still ensuring security, we designed an intra-procedural program analysis
that checks the following two conditions: (1) the pointer field is not properly initialized in
the function; and (2) the pointer is sinking (e.g., being used or passed to other functions).
Only those pointer-type fields satisfying both conditions require zero-initialization. More
specifically, once all pointer-type fields are identified, we perform taint analysis to keep
track of the initialization status and sinking status of the pointer-type fields in the following
conservative ways:
2Since the Linux kernel with version 2.6.23, the /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable was introduced to
prevent unprivileged users from creating new memory mappings below the minimum address
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• When a pointer-type field is explicitly assigned by other values (i.e., it is the store-
to target in a memory storing instruction (StoreInst)), we record that this field is
initialized.
• When a pointer-type field that is not fully initialized is passed to other functions
as a parameter or stored to memory, we report it as unsafe, which thus requires
initialization.
• When a pointer-type field that is not fully initialized is dereferenced (i.e., used as the
pointer argument in memory loading instruction (LoadInst), StoreInst, or function
call instruction (CallInst), we treat it as unsafe as well.
The basic alias analysis [111] provided by LLVM is adopted to tackle the alias problem,
so accessing pointer-type fields via their aliases is also tracked. Since our analysis is
intra-procedural, such a basic alias analysis suffices for the purpose of efficiently detecting
pointer-type fields that lack proper initialization. With this conservative taint analysis, we
managed to reduce the number of to-be-initialized bytes from 105,960 to 66,846.
2.2.3.2 Implementation
Both the analysis pass and the instrumentation pass are implemented with LLVM. Both
passes are inserted after all optimization passes. To use the mitigation, users only need
to specify the option (i.e., -fsanitize=init-pointer) when compiling the kernel source
code. To compile Linux kernel source code with LLVM, we applied the patches provided by
the LLVMLinux project [113]. The zero-initialization code is inserted right after allocation
sites. In LLVM IR, inline assembly is invoked by a CallInst, which is treated as a sink in
our analysis, so the common inline assembly in Linux kernel is not an issue.
2.2.3.3 Evaluating Pointer Initialization
To confirm that our mitigation is practical, we applied it to the latest Linux vanilla kernel
(x86_64, version 4.7) and evaluated its performance. The testing is performed in the virtual
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Table 10: LMBench results. Time is in microsecond.
System call Baseline W/ defense Overhead(%)
null syscall 0.04 0.04 (0.0%)
stat 0.42 0.40 (-4.8%)
open/close 1.20 1.14 (-5.0%)
select TCP 2.44 2.62 (7.4%)
signal install 0.11 0.11 (0.0%)
signal handle 0.60 0.64 (6.7%)
fork+exit 163 157 (-3.7%)
fork+exec 447 460 (2.9%)
prot fault 0.327 0.356 (8.9%)
pipe 8.906 9.058 (1.7%)
TCP 25.6 27.5 (7.4%)
Average 1.95%
machine with the secured kernel. The host machine is equipped with an Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7-2760QM CPU @ 2.40GHz processor and 10GB of RAM; the running OS is 64-bit
Ubuntu 14.04 with Linux kernel version 3.13.0-55. The virtual machine (VirtualBox) was
configured to have a 4-core processor and 4GB RAM; its OS is also 64-bit Ubuntu 14.04.
We used the default configuration to compile the kernel code.
Performance with system services. We used LMbench [125] as the micro benchmark
to test the runtime slowdown in system services. The selected system services are mainly
syscalls, which conform to typical kernel performance evaluations (e.g., [91]). The eval-
uation results are shown in Table 10. The average performance overhead is only 2%, and
in most cases, the performance overhead is less than 5%. These numbers confirm that our
zero-initialization-based mitigation for kernel stack is efficient.
Performance with user programs. We further used the SPEC CPU 2006 benchmarks as
a macro-benchmark to test the performance impacts of our mitigation over the user-space
programs. We ran the test 10 times and adopted the average number. Table 11 shows the
evaluation results. Our zero-initialization-based mitigation imposes almost no performance
overhead (0.47%) to the SPEC benchmarks on average.
Both the LMbench and SPEC benchmark results confirm that our mitigation is very
efficient and reliable (no single error was observed during the evaluation).
61
Table 11: User space (x86_64) performance evaluation results with the SPEC benchmarks. Time is
in second, the smaller the better.
Programs Baseline W/ defense Overhead(%)
perlbench 3.62 3.62 (0.0%)
bzip2 4.74 4.75 (0.2%)
gcc 0.945 0.945 (0.0%)
mcf 2.71 2.68 (-1.1%)
gobmk 13.9 13.9 (0.0%)
hmmer 2.02 2.03 (0.5%)
sjeng 3.28 3.30 (0.6%)
libquantum 0.0365 0.0365 (0.0%)
h264ref 9.35 9.40 (0.5%)
omnetpp 0.342 0.349 (2.0%)
astar 7.77 7.74 (-0.4%)
xalancbmk 0.0611 0.0611 (0.0%)
milc 4.47 4.51 (0.9%)
namd 8.84 8.85 (0.1%)
dealII 10.5 10.6 (1.0%)
soplex 0.0201 0.0201 (0.0%)
povray 0.407 0.417 (2.5%)
lbm 1.66 1.68 (1.2%)
sphinx 1.16 1.17 (0.9%)
Average 0.47%
2.2.4 Discussion
Exploitability of uninitialized-use vulnerabilities. Not all uninitialized-use vulnerabili-
ties are exploitable. First, in order to benefit from targeted stack-spraying, the execution path
that triggers an uninitialized-use vulnerability must not overwrite the prepared malicious
data. Otherwise, the targeted stack-spraying technique will lose control of the uninitialized
memory thus cannot exploit this uninitialized-use vulnerability. To verify if the prepared
data persists until triggering the uninitialized-use vulnerability, attackers can obtain the
address of the instruction using the uninitialized memory and use kprobes to intercept the
instruction to verify if the prepared data persists. Second, our current deterministic stack
spraying does not consider the case in which the preparation of the malicious data occurs
in the same syscall that also triggers the uninitialized-use vulnerability. We ensure only
that the prepared malicious data persists until the entry point of the syscall triggering the
uninitialized-use vulnerability.
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Improving mitigation and other defenses. As mentioned in §2.2.3, we can efficiently
mitigate uninitialized-use exploits by zero-initializing all pointer-type fields for which the
compiler cannot prove that they are properly initialized before reaching a sink (i.e., they are
used). This lightweight approach works for most cases. However, false negatives cannot be
fully excluded: If a pointer is modified by (or depends on) an uninitialized non-pointer value,
zero-initializing this pointer cannot effectively prevent the exploits because the resulting
pointer is still controllable by attackers if they can control the non-pointer value. Therefore,
one possible improvement for our proposed defense is to zero-initialize non-pointer values
as well. Two approaches that already offer a broader defense in this respect are PaX’s
STACKLEAK [175] and split kernel [97] (see §2.2.5 for details). Both approaches provide
strong security to prevent uninitialized-use exploits, but come at the cost of a significant
runtime overhead [117]. As such, a sophisticated inter-procedural and field-sensitive analysis
is necessary to filter out safe allocations. We leave this challenging problem for future work.
Another defense direction is to defeat targeted stack-spraying. A mitigation against the
deterministic stack spraying technique is to randomly adjust the stack base upon syscall entry
so that the malicious data prepared in the previous syscall may not overlap the uninitialized
variable in the vulnerable syscall. Since the kernel stack has only 8KB or 16KB, the
entropy of such a randomization is limited. To detect the exhaustive memory spraying
technique, systems can monitor a large amount of process creations or large memory
allocations. However, this spraying technique can be stealthy by reducing the amount of
process creations and the size of memory allocations, and probing more times.
2.2.5 Related work
2.2.5.1 Memory Spraying
Memory spraying is a popular means to memory-corruption attacks. By far the most popular
memory spraying techniques is heap spraying, an attack that was first described by SkyLined
in 2004 [150]. Heap spraying attacks fill large portions of the victim’s heap memory with
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malicious code (e.g., NOP sleds), thus increasing the chance of hitting malicious code for
hijacking the control flow [60, 63]. Although the heap spraying technique itself has been
countered by the introduction of Data Execution Prevention (DEP), the evolution of heap
spraying—JIT spraying—has become a popular concept for enabling a variety of web-
based attacks [170]. JIT spraying exploits the predictability of the JIT compiler to create
predictable code fragments that can be used to hijack control-flow [170, 188]. Since these
fragments reside in an executable code cache, mitigation techniques like DEP or W ⊕X
can be bypassed [170, 188]. Existing defenses against heap/JIT spraying attacks either try to
detect the attack by searching for large amounts of NOP sleds and shell code [60, 63, 150]
or randomizes the memory layout and register assignments [47, 60, 188]. Recently, memory
spraying has also been used to exploit the "Rowhammer" vulnerability in DRAM devices
where repeated access to a certain row of memory causes bit flips in adjacent memory
rows [22, 156].
In contrast to all these existing spraying techniques, our targeted stack-spraying target
the stack instead of the heap. More importantly, our stack spraying technique is deterministic
and stealthy (thus is hard to detect), and our exhaustive memory spraying technique is highly
reliable.
2.2.5.2 Kernel Exploits and Automated Exploits
Since the kernel is often a part of the trusted computing base of a system, avoiding ex-
ploitable kernel vulnerabilities is critical for the security of a system [34]. Nonetheless,
despite the efforts of kernel developers to find and eliminate these vulnerabilities, new
such vulnerabilities are still frequently detected. As of the thesis writing, a total of 1,888
vulnerabilities have been reported in the Linux kernel alone, and 348 have been reported in
2017 [141]. With Linux kernel vulnerabilities being on the rise, corresponding exploitation
techniques have caught the interests of attackers. One recent approach exploits use-after-free
vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel by leveraging its memory recycling mechanism [190],
64
while another one circumvents existing defenses by manipulating the kernel page table [103].
Although many vulnerabilities and their corresponding exploits are still discovered
manually, automatic detection and exploit generation is becoming increasingly popular, as is
evidenced by the DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge (DARPA CGC) [171]. In this challenge,
teams are required to build automated vulnerability scanning engines, which they then use
to compete in a Capture The Flag tournament. One of the tools specifically developed for
this challenge is Fuzzbomb [128], which combines static analysis with symbolic execution
and fuzzing to detect vulnerabilities in programs. The combination of symbolic execution
and fuzzing is also used for the Driller tool [173], which has also been tested on 126 of
the DARPA CGC binaries. Driller, like our approach, uses symbolic execution to guide its
fuzzing engine in case it fails to generate input to satisfy complex checks in the code. This
combination is also used together with static and dynamic program analysis to automatically
generate exploits for a wide variety of applications [176]. Similar to these approaches, we
also use a combination of symbolic execution and fuzzing to discover execution paths that
can achieve targeted spraying in the Linux kernel.
2.2.5.3 Uninitialized Use Exploits
Despite the fact that uninitialized-use bugs are seldom considered to be security-critical, a
number of exploits for these vulnerabilities have become known in recent years. Flake [67]
used a manual approach towards exploiting uninitialized local variables on the user-space
stack, while Cook [41] used an unchecked copy_from_user() call with an uninitialized
variable to exploit the Linux kernel and gain root privileges. Jurczyk in turn exploited CVE-
2011-2018, a stack-based uninitialized-variable reference vulnerability in the Windows
kernel, which allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code with system privileges [85]. Last
but not least, Chen exploited an heap-based uninitialized-use vulnerability in Microsoft’s
Internet Explorer (CVE-2015-1745) using fuzzing [32]. Unlike these ad-hoc attacks, our
targeted stack-spraying is general and automated.
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2.2.5.4 Uninitialized Use Detection and Prevention
Researchers have proposed some detection mechanisms for uninitialized uses; however, only
few defenses against uninitialized uses have been proposed. For detection, tools such as
kmemcheck [138], Dr.Memory [25], and Valgrind [162] leverage dynamic instrumentation
and analysis to track memory accesses while compiler-based approaches like MemorySani-
tizer [172] and Usher [191] insert tracking code to find uninitialized uses at runtime. For
defense mechanisms, Kurmus and Zippel [97] proposed a technique for preventing exploits
of memory-corruption vulnerabilities. Their approach relies on single-split kernels where
system calls of untrusted processes can only access a hardened kernel version while trusted
processes can access the unmodified kernel. A solution that is specifically targeted towards
uninitialized-use vulnerabilities is offered by the PaX team, known for the invention of
ASLR. Their GCC compiler plugins, STACKLEAK and STRUCTLEAK, clear the kernel
stack on kernel-to-user transitions and initialize all local variables that might be copied to
user space, which effectively prevents uninitialized uses of kernel memory [175]. A key
difference of our efficient defense against uninitialized uses is that instead of initializing
all local variables, we specifically initialize pointer-type fields that have not been properly
initialized before. While STACKLEAK and Split kernel introduce a significant performance
overhead (e.g., STACKLEAK introduces an average of 40% runtime overhead in system
operations [117]), our lightweight defense imposes almost no performance overhead.
2.2.5.5 Memory Safety Techniques
Memory-corruption errors such as dangling pointers are a long-known problem in unsafe
programming languages like C. In the last decade, researchers have proposed several
approaches to mitigate the exploits of these errors. Watchdog [130] and its successor
WatchdogLite [129] both leverage hardware supports to store and check allocation metadata
to prevent use-after-free vulnerabilities. Softbound [131] and CETS [132] are software-
based approaches that aim to prevent memory-corruption errors at compile-time. Softbound
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enforces spatial memory safety by storing base and bound information as metadata for every
pointer, while CETS enforces temporal memory safety by storing unique identifiers for each
object, which are then used to check if the object is still allocated upon pointer dereferencing.
Notably, although these memory safety techniques claim full memory safety, they currently
do not cover uninitialized use as a prevention target. In contrast to these metadata-based
approaches, DieHard [17] and its successor, DieHarder [139] both focus on randomizing the
location of heap objects to make dangling-pointer dereferencing hard to exploit. Since both
techniques focus on heap objects, they cannot detect and prevent uninitialized-use errors
on the stack. StackArmor [37] also adopts randomization to achieve the memory safety for
stack. All these randomization-based memory-safety techniques are probabilistic.
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CHAPTER III
RETROFITTING SYSTEM DESIGNS AGAINST INFORMATION
LEAKS
Software systems also have insecure designs that may cause information leaks. This is
because system designers often prioritize performance and flexibility over security. Exam-
ples of such insecure designs include the ASLR-violating profess forking mechanism [20],
timing side channel caused by deduplication and Copy-on-Write [22], and AnC (CPU
cache side channel) [73]. Unlike eliminating information-leak vulnerabilities that can be
achieved with code analysis and instrumentation, fixing insecure designs is challenging
because it requires deep understanding and redesign of system mechanisms. Our second
way to prevent information leaks is redesigning insecure system mechanisms. Since there
are no uniform patterns for insecure designs, we have to fix them case by case. In this
section, we particularly focus on the ASLR-violating profess forking mechanism in daemon
servers (e.g., web servers), which allows attackers to break ASLR efficiently. We propose
the runtime re-randomization mechanism to ensure that the forked processes have their own
randomized memory layout.
3.1 RUNTIMEASLR: Re-Randomizing Memory Layout at Runtime
In the arms race of remote code execution, the introduction of non-executable memory has
relocated the battlefield: attackers are now forced to identify and suitably reuse existing
code snippets, while protective technologies aim at hiding the exact memory location of
these code snippets by means of various forms of memory randomization. As a result, a
variety of different memory randomization techniques have been proposed that strive to
impede, or ideally to prevent, the precise localization or prediction where specific code
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resides [12, 21, 71, 92, 105, 189]. Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [144, 146]
currently stands out as the most widely adopted, efficient such kind of technique.
All existing techniques for memory randomization including ASLR are conceptually
designed to perform a single, once-and-for-all randomization before or at the process’ load-
time. The efficacy of such upfront randomization techniques hence crucially relies on the
assumption that an attacker has only one chance to guess the randomized address of a
process to launch attack, and that this attack succeeds only with a very low probability.
The underlying justification for this assumption is typically that an unsuccessful probing of
the attacker will cause the process to crash, so that it has to be restarted and hence will be
randomized again. Technically, the assumption is that each attacker’s guess corresponds to
an independent Bernoulli trial.
In reality, however, this assumption is not valid in many scenarios: daemon servers (e.g.,
Apache or Nginx web servers, and OpenSSH) fork() child processes at runtime which
then inherit the randomization of their parents, and thereby creating clones with the same
memory layout. Consequently, if a child crashes after unsuccessful probing, a clone with
the same address space layout is created again. Therefore, an unsuccessful probing does not
require an attacker to start from scratch, instead he can reuse the knowledge gained in his
previous probings. In the following, we refer to such attacks as clone-probing attacks.
A fundamental limitation with existing ASLR implementations is that they are only
performed at load-time. That is, any process that is created without going through loading
will not be randomized. For example, all forked child processes always share exactly
the same address space layout. As a result, clone-probing attacks enable an adversary to
bypass current memory randomization techniques by brute-force exploration of possibilities.
Moreover, practical scenarios often exhibit side-channel information that can be used to
drastically reduce the search space. In these cases, the consequences are far worse, as
impressively demonstrated by recent sophisticated attacks against memory randomization.
For instance, Blind ROP [20] exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability to overwrite return
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pointers only by one byte each time, and thereby reducing the search space to mere 256
possibilities since the remaining bytes of the return pointer are left unmodified. After a
successful return, i.e., if the program does not crash or exhibit unexpected behavior, the first
byte of a valid pointer has been correctly discovered. The technique is then used repeatedly
to discover remaining bytes. On average, the probing of a byte is successful after 128 tries.
This approach hence reduces the brute-force complexity from 264 to 256 · 8 = 2, 048 tries
(for 64-bit systems). A successful clone-probing attack can hence be leveraged to bypass
ASLR, which is a general prerequisite for further, more severe attacks, including code reuse
attacks, privilege-escalation by resetting uid, and sensitive data leaks.
The root cause of clone-probing attacks is that the forked child processes are not re-
randomized. Starting a process from its entry point by calling execve() in the child after
fork() [20], however, alters the intended semantics of child forking: fork is intentionally
designed to inherit the parent’s state (variables, stack, allocated objects etc.), whereas
execve() starts another, fresh instance of a program so that the execution starts at the
program’s entry point without inheriting any information from its parent. It is possible
to make the forked child process independent from the parent process so that execve()
can be used to easily re-randomize the child process; however, the child process will not
be able to benefit from the semantic-preserving and resource-sharing (e.g., sharing file
descriptors and network connections) fork(), and the target server program has to be
carefully restructured and rewritten to make the child process not depend on any resource or
data of its parent process. For example, the complicated dependencies (e.g., on program
structure, file descriptors, shared memory, and global variables) made us give up rewriting
Nginx (about 140KLOC) to use execve(). As a result, we aim to propose a practical (e.g.,
negligible performance overhead) and easy-to-use (e.g., supporting COTS binary directly
without modifying source code) re-randomization mechanism to prevent clone-probing
attacks in a semantic-preserving manner.























Figure 14: The RUNTIMEASLR approach for re-randomization after fork(). Pointer tracker tracks
all pointers for patching after re-randomization. For example, after the re-randomization, since T is
moved to T’, P is patched to P’.
prevents clone-probing attacks, by consistently re-randomizing the address space of children
after fork() at runtime while keeping the parent’s state. More specifically, the work makes
the following contributions: (1) a semantics-preserving and runtime-based approach for
preventing clone-probing attacks; (2) a systematic and holistic pointer tracking mechanism
as our approach’s central technical building block; and (3) an open-source implementation
of our approach and a corresponding evaluation on Nginx web server.
The RUNTIMEASLR approach. Contemporary implementations of the fork system call
simply clone the parent’s address space in order to create a child that inherits the same state.
Cloning is cheap in terms of complexity and benefits from inherited open file descriptors
and network connections. Instead, RUNTIMEASLR re-randomizes the address space of
children after fork() at runtime while inheriting their parent’s state, as shown in Figure 14.
This consistent re-randomization imposes formidable challenges since the state of a program
typically incorporates references to a variety of objects, including code, data, stack and
allocated objects on the heap. A successful randomization in particular has to ensure smooth
continued execution at the new address; hence, it has to relocate code, data and all references
consistently at runtime. RUNTIMEASLR meets this challenges by first conducting a pointer
tracking policy generation process that has to be run once, followed by a novel pointer
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tracking mechanism that is only applied to the parent process. By treating a pointer as a
tainted value, the pointer tracking problem is naturally transformed into a taint tracking
problem: the initial pointers prepared by OS are used as taint sources, pointer tracking
is done using taint propagation, and the necessary propagation policy is automatically
created. To generate a pointer tracking policy, instead of manually identifying which CPU
instructions typically carry on tainted pointers and which ones remove taints [40, 53, 163],
we opted for an automatic approach: the policy generation process executes the target
program and sufficient sample programs using Intel’s Pin instrumentation tool and inspects
the semantics of each executed instruction with regard to pointer creation, manipulation or
deletion. The result is a policy that describes exactly which instructions deal with pointers
in memory and registers.
Pointer tracking mechanism. We use the generated policy to track pointers during run-
time. Whenever the parent forks a child, RUNTIMEASLR performs address space re-
randomization in the cloned child process and patches pointers according to the tracked
pointers of the parent process. As a result, the child processes have mutually different ad-
dress space layouts without facing any instrumentation overhead. Hence, RUNTIMEASLR
imposes no overhead to the services provided by the worker processes of daemon servers.
Effectiveness requires us to correctly identify all pointers inside all dynamically allocated
structures, such as stack, heap, .bss or even uncharted mmap’ed memory. To this end,
RUNTIMEASLR first identifies all pointer sources, which we classify into three categories.
First, initial pointers prepared by the OS (e.g., the stack pointer rsp) because their location
is deterministic and fixed; second, program counters (e.g., rip); and third, return values
of certain syscalls (e.g., mmap, mremap, and brk). In an ASLR-enabled program, no static
pointer is allowed, thus any other pointer must be directly or indirectly derived from these
pointer sources. In order to address taint propagation that occurs in the kernel, we identify
all syscalls that may propagate pointers and that adapt memory mappings. Our findings show
that only a limited number of pointer-propagating syscalls need to be taken into account, and
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that the memory-related syscalls (e.g., mmap, munmap, and mprotect) can be hooked in order
to track changes in memory maps. With taint policies and appropriate syscall modeling in
place, pointer tracking is realized by consistently updating hash tables storing taints.
Implementation and evaluation. We have implemented RUNTIMEASLR based on Intel’s Pin
on an x86-64 Linux platform. RUNTIMEASLR is implemented as a combination of three
tools: a taint policy generator, a pointer tracker, and a randomizer. The taint policy generator
and the pointer tracker are implemented as two Pintools; the randomizer is implemented as
a shared library that is dynamically loaded by the pointer tracker in the child process. Note
that, the current implementation of RUNTIMEASLR is dedicated to server programs that
pre-fork worker processes at beginning. For other programs that do not adopt the pre-fork
scheme, different implementation approaches (e.g., compiler-based code instrumentation)
may be preferred instead of dynamic code instrumentation. More details will be discussed
in §3.1.7. To evaluate the effectiveness of RUNTIMEASLR, we applied it to the Nginx web
server because it is one of the most popular web servers and has been an attractive attack
target in the past [20, 23, 62, 65, 114]. Our evaluation shows that RUNTIMEASLR identifies
all pointers, effectively prevents clone-probing attacks. Due to the dynamic instrumentation
based, heavy-weight pointer tracking, it takes a longer time for RUNTIMEASLR to start
the server programs (e.g., 35 seconds for starting Nginx web server), however, the one-
time overhead is amortized over the long run-time, and more importantly, RUNTIMEASLR
imposes no performance overhead to the provided services after the worker processes are
pre-forked.
3.1.1 Overview of RUNTIMEASLR
RUNTIMEASLR aims to prevent clone-probing attacks by re-randomizing the address space
of a process at runtime. More specifically, RUNTIMEASLR protects daemon servers that
fork multiple child (worker) processes for responding to users’ requests.
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3.1.1.1 Threat Model
The attacker’s goal is to launch attacks against a daemon server with ASLR enabled, e.g.,
code re-use attack like return-oriented programming, privilege-escalation by overwriting
the uid, or stealing sensitive data stored at a certain address. We assume the daemon
server consists of a daemon process and multiple worker processes forked by the daemon
process. For the sake of robustness, if a worker process is crashed, a new worker process is
created by the daemon process with fork. This model is widely adopted by daemon servers,
e.g., Apache web server, Nginx web server, and OpenSSH. Bypassing ASLR is a general
prerequisite of these attacks, as they usually need to access the code or data (at a particular
address) in the process memory. To bypass ASLR, the attacker can mount a clone-probing
attack to iteratively recover the address space layout, which is shared among all children of
the daemon process.
We assume that the operating system running the daemon server realizes the standard
protection mechanisms, e.g., W ⊕X and ASLR, and the daemon server is compiled with
-PIE or -fPIC, i.e. the server is compiled to benefit from ASLR. However, the daemon
binary may not be diversified, and hence the attacker may have exactly the same copy of it.
As a result, attackers can perform both static and dynamic analyses on the daemon program,
e.g., scanning it for vulnerabilities. We assume there exists at least one exploitable buffer
overflow vulnerability, i.e., a buffer can be overwritten arbitrarily long including return
pointers and frame pointers.
RUNTIMEASLR focuses on preventing clone-probing attacks that indirectly infer the
address space layout by repeatedly probing worker processes of daemon servers. Other
programs that do not adopt the pre-fork scheme usually do not suffer from the clone-probing
attacks, and thus are out of scope. Direct leaks, e.g., a leaked pointer in a malformatted
printf or a memory disclosure vulnerability [159], are out of scope for this work, but have
been covered in existing work [11, 48, 50, 119]. Physical attacks, e.g., cold boot attacks, are




























Figure 15: An overview of RUNTIMEASLR’s architecture. It consists of three components: taint
policy generation, pointer tracking, and address space re-randomization. Program binaries include
the binary of the target program.
also out of scope.
3.1.1.2 The RUNTIMEASLR Approach
To defeat clone-probing attacks, one can either reload the child process or re-randomize the
address space of the child process by patching all pointers. As reloading the process will not
inherit any state or semantics from the parent process, it would constitute a great loss as a
programming paradigm. Moreover, reloading requires the existing server programs to be
thoroughly restructured and rewritten to make the child process not depend on any resource
or data of parent process. Therefore, RUNTIMEASLR instead keeps the semantics of its
parent process and re-randomizes the address space at runtime.
Since we want RUNTIMEASLR to be a practical tool, it is designed to use user mode
on-the-fly translation of programs and hence does not require any source code or OS
modifications. Since daemon servers usually respond to a multitude of requests at the same
time, performance is also a primary goal of RUNTIMEASLR. Those two goals are brought
together by dynamic program instrumentation using Intel’s Pin Tool: it allows to monitor
and modify arbitrary programs on-the-fly and can be detached after randomization in order
not to impose any performance overhead.
The high-level overview of RUNTIMEASLR is depicted in Figure 15. We first provide
an overview of its three main components. Then, technical details will be given in the
subsequent sections.
Taint Policy Generation. The first phase of RUNTIMEASLR– taint policy generation –
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automatically generates pointer tracking policies by inspecting lots of input programs. The
generated policy grows with every input program by “learning” more behaviors of Intel
x86-64 instructions. At some point, all possible usages of instructions have been seen and
the policy does not grow any further. The generated policy file can then be used in the second
phase, pointer tracking, to accurately track pointers of arbitrary programs. Although the
identification of pointers is not a new topic, existing approaches lack a systematic approach
that can vouch that the used tainting policy is sound. Additionally, prior approaches often
aimed at catching out-of-bounds access, which is a slightly different problem as it also needs
to know the size of the object pointed to by the pointer [40, 53, 88, 98, 131, 133, 163]. These
approaches either rely on type-based analysis, or on heuristic-based taint analysis to identify
pointers. Type-based analysis can only identify pointers with pointer-type. However, integers
that are also used as pointers, such as base addresses, cannot be identified. Heuristics, on
the other hand, do not provide any sound guarantee, since they might incorrectly track
identified pointers or fail to identify some pointers in the first place. For example, previous
approaches [40, 163] that work on instruction-level tracking only specified a handful of
operations (e.g., assignment, addition, subtraction, and bitwise-AND) to carry on taints
if the input was tainted. However, as we show in Table 13, there are not only many
more instructions that either carry on a taint or remove a taint, but many of them come
as a surprise and can only be discovered by a systematic approach rather than empirical
heuristics. For example, the CPUID and RDTSC instructions modify general purpose registers,
thereby potentially overwriting stored pointers.
To tackle this problem, we propose an automated taint policy generation mechanism
that automatically discovers all kinds of instructions that have direct or indirect effect on
stored pointers. The basic concept for creating a pointer tracking policy is to inspect all
instructions with respect to whether they create, update, or remove a taint. To this end, we
check if an instruction writes to a register or to a memory location and whether that written
value constitutes a pointer. Then a pointer is determined based on whether its value points
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inside any currently mapped memory. This approach does not miss any pointers, i.e., there
are no false negatives as long as they point into valid memory. However, this approach might
coincidentally identify a random integer value as a valid pointer (false positive). For a 64-bit
address space such false positive probability is very low since mapped memory segments are
sparse in relation to the huge address space. Nevertheless, we further reduce that probability
by running the program multiple times with ASLR enabled, and then compare the results.
Correctly identified pointers occur in all runs, whereas false positives do not. We use this
technique to automatically create a policy that identifies all instructions that will generate or
remove a pointer.
Pointer Tracking. In the second step, the generated policy is used to perform pointer
tracking. Pointer tracking itself consists of three parts: (1) it collects all initial pointers
prepared by OS; (2) it performs taint tracking for pointers based on the taint policies
generated by the first component; (3) since RUNTIMEASLR is explicitly designed to
not modify the OS, some syscalls are modeled for taint propagation. The output of this
component is the list of all pointers in the process.
Address Space Re-randomization. Using the tracked pointer list, the third component of
RUNTIMEASLR– address space re-randomization – then performs module-level memory
remapping for all currently mapped memory segments in the child process. As Pin is no
longer necessary in the child process, the detachment of Pin is immediately performed after
fork, and then the re-randomization is triggered as a callback of Pin detachment. After the
re-randomization, the dangling pointers are corrected using the list of identified pointers.
As a last step, the control is transferred back to the native child process code. Since Pin
is already detached, there is no performance overhead in the child processes associated to
dynamic instrumentation (see §3.1.6 for performance results).
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3.1.2 Automated Taint Policy Generation for Pointers
As alluded to earlier, the existing approaches for taint tracking on binary code are not com-
plete. To tackle this challenging problem, we propose a novel pointer tracking mechanism
that accurately identifies pointers (tainting) and tracks pointers throughout their life-cycle
(taint propagation). In general, taint analysis can be categorized into static taint analysis
and dynamic taint analysis. In theory, static taint analysis can identify all pointers without
false negatives. However, false positives may be unavoidable [59] because of higher level
compound type definitions such as structs and unions, which are not necessarily pointers.
As a building block for re-randomization, however, we must neither allow any false positives
nor false negatives. Otherwise, an overlooked pointer (false negative) will reference an out-
dated memory location and will most likely cause a program crash due to an illegal memory
access. Similarly, tagging innocent integer values as pointers (false positive) changes data
when patching the believed-to-be pointer resulting in erratic program behavior.
Given the limitations of static taint analysis and the strict requirements of our runtime
re-randomization, we choose to leverage dynamic taint analysis to identify pointers. Dy-
namic taint analysis, however, needs a policy that describes which instructions of an entire
instruction set architecture (ISA) modify a pointer, either directly or through side effects, and
how the pointer is modified. This is possible by studying the 1,513-pages Intel instruction
set architecture manual [84] and hoping that one did not overlook a side effect of an obscure
instruction. Alternatively, we opted for an automatic learning process that creates annota-
tions for each observed instruction of the ISA by monitoring what each instruction does
during runtime. This is possible by leveraging dynamic instrumentation based on Intel’s
Pin, which makes the execution of each instruction tangible. By carefully inspecting how
and which memory and registers an instruction with different operands modifies, a policy is
generated that describes how each instruction either creates a taint, removes a taint, does not
modify a taint, or even propagates a taint to another register or into memory. This policy
grows with every taught program and it eventually can be used in the second phase, the
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Pointer Tracking phase, to actually track which parts of memory or registers store pointers.
The latter part is described in the next section.
Workflow. The sample programs used for generating the taint policies also contain the
target program. We use Pintool to hook each instruction that writes to at least one register or
one memory address (Pin provides an API to iterate all operands, including the implicit ones,
e.g., operand EAX in RDTSC). Then, Pintool provides us with the metadata information for
that particular instruction. This includes the opcode, count of operands, types of operands
(register, memory, or immediate), widths of operands, read/write flags of operands, and data
of operands (e.g., register number or immediate value). For conditional instructions (e.g.,
cmovnz), we further include the flag bits in register rflags. As an additional step, we hook
syscalls to identify the ones that create pointers, e.g. mmap(). Also, memory-related syscalls
such as mmap() are monitored for the requested memory range they allocate because our
algorithm needs to know which memory is currently valid and which is not, for pointer
verification.
The actual policy generation executes each instruction and compares the state of all
registers and accessed memory before execution to after the execution of each instruction.
This way, side effects of an instruction can be detected even though the register was not
specified as an operand. For example, RDTSC reads the CPU’s internal Time Stamp Counter
(TSC) into EAX:EDX, thereby overwriting what was stored in RAX and RDX. This can be
detected by checking each register for being a pointer using multi-run pointer verification
(3.1.2.1). If an executed instruction modifies “pointer”-ness of a register or memory location,
it is reported as a new policy for that instruction. This policy includes a description whether
a pointer was created, removed or copied somewhere else.
Example. The instruction mov RDI, RSP (in Intel syntax) is always the first instruction that
gets executed in every program. We first extract the opcode (that is 384 in Pin), the types,
widths, and read/write flags of its operands. The operands are two 64-bit registers with the
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Figure 16: The work-flow of multi-run pointer verification. For each policy, the metadata indicates
which registers/memory is written to. Only pointers that point to the same relative address throughout
multiple runs are kept.
of those operands (RDI or RSP) is a pointer using multi-run pointer verification (3.1.2.1). In
this case, RSP is a pointer, while RDI is still zero after initialization of the program. After
executing the instruction, the operands are checked again for “pointer”-ness. In this case,
RDI becomes a pointer after execution. Therefore, we generate a pointer tracking policy
as follows. Given an instruction with opcode = 384 and exactly two 64 bit registers as
operands, the first operand will be tainted after execution if the second operand was before
execution.
3.1.2.1 Realizing multi-run pointer verification
To ensure that only actual pointers are tracked, it is crucial that the pointer detection
does not mistakenly classify an integer as a pointer, simply because its numerical value
coincidentally represents a valid, mapped memory address. To address this problem, we
propose multi-run pointer verification to check if a value indeed constitutes a real pointer.
The idea of multi-run pointer verification is inspired by the fact that in a 64-bit address
space, the mapped memory is sparsely allocated, and it is unlikely for a random data to
point into mapped memory. So by checking if a value points into mapped memory, we can
determine a pointer with a high probability. To further decrease the false positive rate, we
execute the program multiple times at different load addresses (with ASLR-enabled). The
workflow of multi-run pointer verification is shown in Figure 16. In the first run, we output
discovered policies with metadata, including the relative location (relative address into the
base address of corresponding loaded module) of the targets of generated pointers. For each
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of the next runs, only the intersection of policies is kept, which identifies those pointers
whose targets have the same relative locations.
The probability that a non-pointer value passes this check and is hence classified as a valid
pointer is extremely low. On 64-bit x86 machines, Linux reserves the lower 47 bits for user
mode programs1. Pointing inside the user mode address space is thus possible if the upper
17 bits of a random 64-bit number are set to zero. Additionally, the lower 47 bits must point
into valid mapped memory that has been chosen randomly by ASLR. For the combination
of all loaded modules with a total size of b bytes, the probability for a 64-bit integer pointing
inside any loaded module is b · 2−64. For each run of the multi-run pointer verification, the
probability decreases drastically. In the next run, the probability is not only b · 2−64 to be
inside any loaded module, but the same instruction must produce an integer whose value has
the same offset into the same module to be still considered a (false positive) pointer. Hence,
only one valid address for the given randomization remains, which has a probability of only
2−64 for randomly chosen integers. For n runs, the final false positive rate is deceased to
b · 2−64·n. The running Nginx web server for example has a total of approximately 22 MB
of mapped valid memory. This would result in a false positive rate of ≈ 2−103 in a 2-runs
verification.
Multi-thread Support. In order to identify the same pointer across different runs, it is
necessary to deterministically enumerate all pointer creations in a reliable way – one way
would be the order of pointer creation, another would be the memory position of the pointer
itself. In a single-threaded program, the position of pointers and the order of their creation
are deterministic. However, multi-threaded programs might create pointers in a different
order, due to that threads share a common heap, which also influences the pointer positions
inside the heap. To overcome this problem, we also consider where pointers are stored. For
pointers that are stored on the heap, the base address of the heap object the pointer resides in
1arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h:881 of Kernel 4.1 defines
#define TASK_SIZE_MAX ((1UL « 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
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and its relative position into the base of heap object are recorded and used to uniquely refer
to that particular pointer. Since loadable sections (e.g. .data or .bss) have their objects at
fixed locations and each thread has its own stack, they are not affected by multi-threading.
3.1.3 Taint Tracking for Pointers
Using the taint policy that has been created once in the taint policy generation step, the
program can be run again with pointer tracking enabled based on the created policy. The
first step is to identify a pointer when it is created. It is crucial to identify exactly when a
pointer is created to be able to track it from its inception. Otherwise, it might have been
copied to other places already without noticing.
3.1.3.1 Pointer Sources
In ASLR-enabled programs, no static pointer (known at compile time) can exist because all
code and data are loaded at an unpredictable address. All pointers are either derived from the
current address of execution (RIP register), the stack (RSP register), the heap (call to mmap(),
mremap() or brk()) or they are injected by the OS. For example, lea RAX,[RIP+0x2007bc]
derives a pointer based on current instruction pointer (RIP), and saves it in the register RAX.
In fact, RIP and RSP are also injected by the Linux kernel before the program starts. In
chronological order, whenever a new process is loaded after calling execve(), the Linux
kernel inserts pointers into the process. As per the Linux 4.1 source, execve() first clears
all registers2 and then sets the first instruction to execute by modifying the RIP register and
setting the stack register RSP to the end of the stack. Then, initial environment variables
and program arguments are pushed to the stack before the first instruction of the newly
created process begins execution. The initial data in stack prepared by OS also contains
some pointers (e.g., entry point). As OS routinely stores these initial pointers in stack in
the same order at load-time, their relative locations are fixed, we also apply the idea of
multi-run pointer verification to accurately identify them. Once all of these pointer sources
2Macro ELF_PLAT_INIT(regs, load_addr) of file arch/x86/um/asm/elf.h
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are found and tainted, the discovered taint policy of the earlier step can then accurately
tracks other pointers derived from these pointer sources.
3.1.3.2 Syscall Modeling
The only other way to introduce new pointers is as a result of a syscall. Since we do not want
to track pointers in kernel mode, we rather use well-established method syscall modeling to
mimic the behavior of the kernel with respect to pointer tainting in user mode. Our analysis
of all side effects of syscalls has revealed that the only syscalls that modify mapped memory
and hence create new pointers are mmap, mremap and brk. Those syscalls are monitored
during execution by hooking them inside the Pintool. The return values of those syscalls are
then tainted as pointers accordingly. As a side effect, the gained knowledge about memory
mappings is used as a plausibility check that data tainted as pointers indeed points into valid,
mapped memory.
3.1.3.3 Bookkeeping
The internal bookkeeping of which register or memory location is tainted is stored in a
simple but fast hash map. Indexing the memory hash map with an address will return
taint information about that address if applicable. Untainted memory will of course not be
stored in the hash map and returns null. According to the used taint policy, each executed
instruction may propagate a taint into another register or memory location (e.g., mov or
add) or remove the taint (e.g., xor RAX, RAX). The taint policy contains tuples describing
matches based on their opcode, operand type (i.e., register, memory, or immediate), operand
size, flag bits (for conditional instructions), and whether operands are already tainted. Using
this tuple, the policy is queried on the expected action for the modified registers or memory.
If a matching policy is found, it is applied, i.e., the expected registers or memory locations
are tainted or untainted. Otherwise, no pointer propagation effect is expected and no taints
are changed.
83
3.1.4 Address Space Re-randomization
Even with the knowledge of exact pointer locations, re-randomization of a running process
is not straight-forward. In fact, we faced the following challenges:
C1: The child process also inherits the dynamic instrumentation of the Pin by fork(). For
performance reasons, Pin in child process is unnecessary, thus should be detached.
C2: Unmapping and clearing of Pintool is a chicken-and-egg problem since the instru-
mented fork() code would need to unmap itself while executing.
C3: Remapping a set of memory blocks is not an atomic process and hence during the
intermediate state of remapping, no valid stack and no valid library functions are
accessible as they are already remapped.
To overcome those challenges, we designed our re-randomization mechanism as a
separate shared library as shown in Figure 17, which is triggered by the callback of Pin’s
detaching. This way, it can (1) be attached to child process, (2) perform the re-randomization
and patch all pointers,(3) clear the Pin code/data, and finally (4) load updated registers and













Figure 17: The work-flow of re-randomization.
84
3.1.4.1 Re-randomization Granularity
The default ASLR provided by Linux OS performs randomization in process-level, which
means offsets between modules are fixed. RUNTIMEASLR chooses to perform module-
level randomization by specifying random base to mmap, which achieves a better effective
entropy [78]. However, finer-grained randomizations [12, 56, 71, 80, 92, 187] can be further
applied thanks to the tracked pointer information.
3.1.5 Implementation
RUNTIMEASLR is implemented as a combination of three tools: the taint policy gener-
ator, pointer tracker, and randomizer. The taint policy generator and pointer tracker are
implemented as two Pintools for pin-2.14-71313, while the randomizer is implemented as
a shared library that is dynamically loaded by the pointer tracker into the child process.
3.1.5.1 Policy Generator
Instruction Abstraction. In the automated policy generation phase, our Pintool learns how
x86 instructions “behave” given a certain combination of operands. For this purpose, we are
only interested in how they behave with respect to pointer creation, modification, erasure,
and propagation. Therefore, the created policy is an abstraction of instruction behavior that
is just enough to accomplish accurate taint tracking. Our experiments have shown that, in
most cases, it suffices to abstract an instruction to only its opcode, number of operands,
type of operands (immediate, register, memory), width of each operand (in bits), flag bits
(only for conditional instructions), and which operands were tainted before execution of the
instruction. For this exact combination, an entry in the policy describes how it behaves with
respect to tainted registers and memory after executing the instruction. For example, let
the observed instruction be mov RDI, RSP with two operands of 64 bit register type. The
second operand RSP is tainted, because it is a stack pointer. One specific policy entry for
this exact combination (opcode=mov, operands=register64,register64, taint=false, true)
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specifies that after execution the first operand will be tainted. This makes sense, as mov
actually copies the value of the second operand into the first operand.
Table 12: Ambiguous policies found in tested programs. An implicit instruction may have non-
deterministic taintness outputs. 1: pointer; 0: non-pointer.
# Instruction Input Output Category
1 add reg1, reg2 reg1=1 and reg2=0 reg1?=1 arithmetic
2 sub reg1, mem1 reg1=1 and mem1=0 reg1?=1 arithmetic
3 add mem1, reg1 mem1=0 and reg1=0 mem1?=1 arithmetic
4 add reg1, mem1 reg1=0 and reg2=0 reg1?=1 arithmetic
5 and reg1, imm1 reg1=1 and reg2=0 reg1?=1 bitwise
Ambiguous Policy. There are special cases for which the aforementioned tuples of operand
types, amount of operands, operand sizes and taints are not unambiguous enough to make a
statement about taints after the execution of an instruction. Table 12 lists the ambiguous
cases found in the tested programs. Case 5 is easy to understand, since a bitwise and
operation could be used to compute either the base address (i.e., a pointer) or an offset
(i.e., a non-pointer) depending on the value of the other operand. For example, assume RAX
in and RAX, 0x???????? contains a pointer and is therefore tainted. If the bitmask of the
second operand exhibits many set MSBs, e.g., and RAX, 0xfffffffffffff000, the result
will be the base address of the provided pointer in RAX. Vice versa, setting a few LSBs
(e.g., 0x0000000000000fff) calculates the offset into something. Our experiments with
real-world programs show that the only use of a bitwise and instruction with a pointer is to
either calculate the base or an offset. This confirms similar findings by [40] and [163].
Case 1 - case 4 indicate that ambiguous policies also exist for arithmetic instructions –
a pointer could be added or subtracted by an offset to generate either a new pointer (e.g.,
relocation) or a non-pointer. To understand these special cases, we performed an in-depth
analysis (on Ubuntu 14.04.2). Note that RUNTIMEASLR provides a debugging mode that
can print context information of executed instructions to ease the analysis.
Case 1. At the beginning of execution in loader, instruction add r12, rcx adds the
pointer saved in rcx with a constant 0x3800003d8, which generates a “non-pointer” (it does
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not point to mapped memory). However, we found that this non-pointer is added back to gen-
erate a new pointer with constant -6FFFFEF5×8 in instruction mov qword ptr [r12+rax×8],
rdx.
Case 2 - 4. We found that there is an instruction sub rdx, qword ptr [r12] that
destroys a pointer by subtracting it with an offset. Before execution, rdx points to the base
of vDSO, which is then subtracted by constant 0xffffffffff700000 to generate a value
pointing to unmapped memory. Interestingly, we found case 3 and case 4 are paired to case
2, which re-assemble the pointers from the destroyed one in case 4. For example, case
3 is the instruction add qword ptr [r12+0x348], rdx that adds the destroyed pointer by
constant 0xffffffffff700fbd to generate a new pointer still pointing to vDSO. We believe
the arithmetic operations in case 2, 3, and 4 are used to perform a very simple pointer
protection employed by vDSO, which is however not found in other normal programs.
Based on the analysis, we generally cope with these ambiguous instructions by the
simple range-checking approach: we check whether the result after executing the instruction
points into valid memory, if it does, it is a pointer; otherwise, it is a non-pointer. The check
only needs to be lazily performed for those ambiguous cases that are clearly marked in
the policy file. For ambiguous cases with bitwise operations, range-checking can easily
differentiate between a base address and an offset. For ambiguous ones with arithmetic
operations, no matter what unrecognizable representation a pointer is transformed into, it
will be recognized again by range-checking if it is changed back to the pointer. Therefore,
the simple range-checking approach can generally handle all these ambiguous cases in a
lazy manner.
Hidden Pointers in SSE Registers. Streaming SIMD Extensions (SSE) is an x86 in-
struction set extension that provides 128 bit registers xmm0-xmm15 and and 256 bit registers
ymm0-ymm15. In theory and good practice, 64 bit pointers of the 64 bit Intel x86 architecture
should be stored in its general purpose registers (RAX, RBX, ..., r1, r2, ...r15) or in
segment registers (FS, GS). However, our policy generation showed that these 128 bit SSE
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registers may also be used to store pointers, e.g., Nginx web server. Fortunately, those
pointers were always stored either in the first 64 of the 128 bits (upper half) or in the last
64 bit (lower half). Based on this observation, RUNTIMEASLR treats a SSE register as
a multiple of non-overlapping 64 bit general purpose integer registers. Whenever these
SSE register are used, each 64-bit of their content is checked by RUNTIMEASLR for 64 bit
pointers.
Mangled Pointers. Interestingly, the GNU standard C library (glibc) that is linked to every
C or C++ program performs pointer obfuscation for some syscalls. It is implemented as
a simple XOR operation against a random but fixed value stored relative to the segment
register FS (see Figure 18).
# d e f i n e PTR_MANGLE( r e g ) \
xor %f s : POINTER_GUARD, r e g ; \
r o l $2∗LP_SIZE +1 , r e g
# d e f i n e PTR_DEMANGLE( r e g ) \
r o r $2∗LP_SIZE +1 , r e g ; \
xor %f s : POINTER_GUARD, r e g
Figure 18: Pointer mangling and demangling in libc. The XORing key is hidden by using fs
segment register. LP_SIZE is 8 on 64 bit platform.
To cope with mangled pointers, we demangle the pointers and check if the demangled
values point inside valid mapped memory. This is possible because the XOR value is
accessible by the process itself (stored at fs:POINTER_GUIARD), but not accessible for
attackers residing outside the process. Should the demangled value reveal a pointer, the
stored taint is augmented by meta information indicating a mangling according to glibc’s
method. This meta information leaves room for future, other methods of pointer obfuscation
to be implemented. Currently, all tested programs compiled with gcc only exhibit the pointer
obfuscation using the PTR_MANGLE macro shown in Figure 18.
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3.1.5.2 Pointer Tracker
The pointer tracker itself is also implemented as a Pintool. As alluded to earlier, the only
initial pointers after process creation are RSP, RIP, and some initial pointers in stack. In
particular, we found 71 initial pointers in stack with the help of multi-run pointer verification.
As the kernel routinely loads programs in the same way, we confirmed that these initial
pointers have fixed relative locations in stack. From these initial pointers, further pointers
are derived using the generated policy, which is applied to the affected instructions specified
in the policy set. The policy set is loaded into an STL list container. We then use Pin’s
functionality to hook instructions based on their opcode, operand types and widths of
operands. The hooking is realized in Pin by inserting a call before and after each instruction
in question. Control flow is then diverted from the main executable code or library code
into Pin and thereby into our pointer tracking mechanism. The pointer tracking mechanism
fetches information about the used operands (register and/or memory), especially whether
they are tainted and their current value. After applying the policy, which results in further or
fewer taints for registers or memory, execution continues normally at the original position in
memory. Unmatched instructions will not be hooked and execute normally.
Syscall Handling. Since RUNTIMEASLR is designed as a user space tool, all syscalls are
a black box operation to RUNTIMEASLR. However, we are only interested in whether a
syscall modifies a pointer or creates a new one. We found that most syscalls actually do
not generate new pointers or propagate pointers. We manually evaluated the visible effects
of the 313 Linux syscalls in user mode. Only 15 of them generate or propagate user mode
pointers. Some representative ones are detailed as below.
• mmap creates new memory space and returns the base. We taint its return value when
it returns.
• munmap unmaps the given memory space. In this case, we untaint the corresponding
pointers that point to the unmapped memory.
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• mremapmoves an existing memory space to a new one and returns the new base address.
In this case, we update the corresponding pointers pointing to the old memory space
with the moved offset. Also we taint the returned value.
• mprotect changes the access permissions of memory. We update the tracked pointers
according to how permissions are changed. For example, if the memory is changed
from readable to non-readable, we untaint the corresponding pointers.
• brk either obtains current program break (by providing the first parameter with 0) or
changes the location of program break. In the former, we simply taint its return value;
while in the latter, if it shrinks the memory, we untaint the corresponding pointers and
also taint its return value.
• arch_prctl, etc. There are also some syscalls that may load existing pointers of
user space. For example, arch_prctl can be used to get base values in segment
register fs or gs. For these cases, we taint the obtained pointers in return value or
parameters.
Pointer Scope and Memory Deallocation. Whenever a called function returns, the local
variables of the callee are no longer valid, i.e., they have left their scope. Such local
variables may also contain pointers. Hence, it is vital to remove any associated taint of
pointers that have gone out of scope. The memory region that contains variables that have
gone out of scope is considered uninitialized memory, since reading from that memory is
non-deterministic as it depends on which function was called last. A good compiler will
catch that type of uninitialized access at compile-time and warn the developer about it.
To prevent unpredicted behaviors, we detect out-of-scope pointers when a function
returns so that they can be untainted. To this end, we hook the ret instruction and on each
return calculate the currently valid stack frame by inspecting RSP. By the x86-64 calling
convention, the stack pointer RSP must point to the top of the valid stack after returning from
a function, therefore, all data stored above RSP can be untainted.
90
The same applies to objects on the heap: after a call to free() (delete() also calls
free()), pointers stored in that now deallocated area become invalid. We therefore remove
all taints of pointers that are stored in a free’ed area. A caveat is that the call to free does
not include any information about the size of the to-be-deleted object. However, the memory
in question was once allocated using malloc with a specific size. We therefore use a map
that associates a length obtained from hooking malloc to each heap pointer. Whenever,
free() is called, we look up the size for the specified base pointer and untaint all pointers
stored in the deallocated area.
3.1.5.3 Randomizer
The randomization is done in module-level, which is better than the “process-level” random-
ization provided by Linux’ ASLR implementation. Finer-grained randomization is possible,
as we have all pointer information. However, even position-independent code assumes fixed
offsets between code and data. Finer-grained randomization may require patching these
offsets, and thus introduces more overhead. The actual remapping from an old address
(cloned from the parent) to a new random address is achieved by calling the syscall mremap
with a random base address. We obtain the cryptographically secure randomness from
/dev/random. In the current implementation, we set the default entropy to the one provided
by default Linux OS, which is 28 bits. However, we also provide a configuration switch for
the entropy so it can be set up to 48 bits (the full canonical address space on Intel x86-64
platforms). Note that when heap is remapped, we also need to adjust program break by
calling the syscall sbrk(). The protection flags and size of the new mapping are simply
taken from the old one to preserve all semantics. After remapping, we patch the pointers
accordingly (in both memory and registers).
The final step is context switching from Pin to program. The context includes not
only general registers but also SSE registers (e.g., xmm0-xmm15) and segment registers (e.g.,
fs and gs). As all pointers are patched when the address space is re-randomized, the context
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is naturally updated accordingly. Before Pin’s mappings are unmapped, the context data
is copied to the stack of the program. To load the context into the corresponding registers
(after unmapping Pin), we have to use handwritten assembly, as no library functions are
available and we cannot even use Pin’s stack and heap. Special care must be taken for
loading values from stack into SSE registers (i.e., xmm0-xmm15) as those memory addresses
must be 16-byte-aligned in order to not trigger a general protection fault (#GP). Finally,
we use an indirect jmp to transfer the control back to program and continue the original
execution of child process. At this point, Pin is completely unmapped and as the child
process is no longer instrumented, it runs with its native performance.
Recursive Forking. So far, we have described that fork’ed children are no longer
instrumented in order not to suffer from performance penalties. However, one cannot know
if child processes will or will not fork their own children. If they do, there would not be any
pointer tracking information because it was intentionally disabled for performance reasons.
To overcome this, we provided a feature that records which layer of processes of a program
typically fork their own new processes. For example, the Nginx web server first forks a
daemon process, and then that daemon process forks worker processes for each CPU core.
Therefore, we can configure which layer of children will disable their instrumentation which
will not.
3.1.6 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the correctness, effectiveness, and efficiency of RUNTIMEASLR.
To this end, we have developed the following four evaluations:
• A theoretical and practical analysis of the accuracy of identifying pointers.
• A memory snapshot analysis to compare the correctness of re-randomization with the
help of load-time randomization.
• An empirical test of real clone-probing attack prevention.
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• A performance evaluation of re-randomized child processes and microbenchmarks of
fork overhead and pointer tracking in the parent process.
Experiment setup. We applied RUNTIMEASLR to the Nginx web server, as it is one of the
most popular web servers and has been an attractive attack target [20, 23, 62, 65, 114]. We
chose Nginx in version 1.4.0, as this version contains a stack buffer overflow vulnerability
that was also exploited by Hacking Blind [20]. This way, we can later show the effectiveness
of our solution in the presence of a real vulnerability. We use Nginx web server to evaluate
the correctness, effectiveness, and performance of RUNTIMEASLR. Further, we applied
RUNTIMEASLR to SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks to evaluate the performance of the pointer
tracking component. All experiments were conducted on a Dell OptiPlex 390 equipped with
an Intel R⃝ CoreTM i3 2120 running at 3.30 GHz and 8 GiB of RAM. This particular processor
has two physical cores each of which supports Simultaneous Multithreading, which presents
itself as four cores to the operating system. For operating system, we used an unmodified
fresh install of the latest Ubuntu long-term support release 14.04.2.
3.1.6.1 Correctness
We first evaluated the correctness of RUNTIMEASLR by analyzing its accuracy in pointer
identification.
Theoretical Analysis. In this section, we present an upper bound for false positive pointer
detection. As already described in §3.1.2.1, the probability for a random integer to be
mistaken as a pointer is p = b · 2−64·n for b bytes being mapped into a process’ address space
and n-runs are performed in multi-run pointer verification. Of course, this only applies to a
single pointer identification. As every executed instruction is inspected for potential pointers,
in the worst case, every inspected instruction might introduce a new random integer that
could be mistaken for a pointer. So in the worst case, the entire mapped memory only
consists of instructions that handle 64 bit integers. Even though it is technically not possible
due to encoding, a maximum of b instructions can exist in b bytes of memory. Therefore,
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the probability of identifying at least one integer coincidentally as a pointer is
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· pi+1, where 1 < i < b − 1 and pb > 0. Therefore, this
probability can be safely simplified to:
b · p = b2 · 2−64·n
To fill in some numbers, we can assume that 100 MB of the address space are used, and
2 runs are performed in multi-run pointer verification. This yields a false positive rate of
2−76, which is negligible.
Memory analysis. Although the protected programs do work successfully, we want to
thoroughly check the correctness of RUNTIMEASLR in practice. To this end, we evaluate
the false positive and false negative rate of pointers and check if the address space is
re-randomized correctly.
False pointer checking. The goal of false pointer checking is to scan the entire
address space for 8-byte pointers and make sure that our tracking did find all (no false
negatives) and not too many (no false positives) pointers. Checking is done right before
re-randomization, when it is crucial that all pointers have been tracked correctly. To be fair,
multi-run pointer verification was used during the analysis to check false positive pointers.
For false negative pointers, we check each 8-byte value in the readable memory to see if it
points to mapped memory. We ran the Nginx web server and hooked fork() for the memory
analysis. This revealed a total of 7952 pointers were tracked with no false positives, i.e. all
tracked pointers indeed point into valid mapped memory. The analysis further revealed four
“false negatives”, i.e. some readable 8-byte values that point into valid memory had not been
tracked. However, we found that those “pointers” were located in freed heap objects and
hence were no longer valid. Since Nginx did not clear the data when freeing heap objects,
the out-of-scope pointers remained in memory.
94
Memory space consistence checking. It is of paramount importance that our forcefully
imposed re-randomization at run-time is indeed correct. To verify this, we compare the
address space right after re-randomization to legitimate address space before forking, but
at the same address. This verification process is two-fold. First, the program is run with
ASLR enabled so that it is executed at a random address. At the moment a fork() syscall is
issued, we take a memory snapshot of the entire address space, record base addresses of
mappings, and abort the program without re-randomization. Second, we run the program
again, which results in a different address, but this time let the re-randomization happen
after fork() is called. However, the re-randomization of our Pintool is instructed to use the
recorded addresses of each mapped block of memory instead of true randomness. This way,
the address space of our re-randomization should look exactly like the address space of a
properly randomized ASLR process. After that, we compare the remapped memory with
the previously dumped memory. Our results show that all mappings are exactly the same,
which indicates that all pointers are correctly patched. Please note that in the first ASLR run,
the program is run with Pin enabled because our comparison (re-randomization) will have
Pin enabled as well. Otherwise comparisons would differ in the mapped memory of Pin.
Some interesting policies. Unlike previous pointer tracking approaches (e.g., [40, 163])
that only empirically cover a handful of taint policies (e.g., assignments, addition/subtraction,
and bitwise AND), we have automatically discovered a total of 342 taint policies that operate
pointers. Table 13 lists some that we think are interesting for the reader.
3.1.6.2 Security
Address space analysis. RUNTIMEASLR performs module-level re-randomization on the
child process. RUNTIMEASLR provides mremap with cryptographically secure randomness
obtained from /dev/random. In this evaluation, we set the entropy of randomness to be
28 bits – which is the default entropy of Linux’ default ASLR. The generated random
base address is of the form 0x7f???????000, where ? bits are randomized. The security
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Table 13: Selected interesting taint policies that are hard to identify based on heuristics. 1: pointer;
0:non-pointer; mem: accessed memory; ?: ambiguous policy.
# Instruction Input Output
1 rdtsc N/A rax=0 and rdx=0
2 cpuid rax,rbx,rcx,rdx=1 rax,rbx,rcx,rdx=0
3 and rcx, rax rcx=1 and rax=0 rcx?=1
4 neg rcx rcx=1 rcx=0
5 add rcx, [rax+0x28] rcx=0 and mem=0 rcx?=1
6 mov eax, edi rax=1 and rdi=1 rax=0
7 rol rax, 0x11 rax=1 rax=0
8 lea rdx, [rip+0x21e3cc] rdx=0 rdx=1
9 shr rax, 0x2 rax=1 rax=0
10 leave rsp=1 and rbp=1 rsp=1 and rbp=1
11 movdqu xmm8, [rsi] xmm8=10 and mem=00 xmm8=00
12 pslldq xmm2, 0x5 xmm2=01 and mem=00 xmm2=00
provided by RUNTIMEASLR is the re-randomization of child processes’ address space,
which consists of two parts: (1) remapping all modules of protected program to randomized
addresses; (2) all other modules (e.g., of Pin and Pintool) are unmapped. To evaluate the
security, we run Nginx web server with RUNTIMEASLR. We configured the number of
worker processes to be 4, which is the default number suggested by Nginx and is exactly
the amount of physical CPU cores of the test machine. We then verify the re-randomized
memory mappings of each worker process by checking /proc/worker-pid/maps. We empir-
ically confirmed that the question-marked bits in 0x7f???????000 are indeed continuously
randomized. The relative addresses between different modules are also randomized, which
further improves the effective entropy [78] of default Linux ASLR. We also confirmed
that all other mappings (of Pin and Pintool) are not shown in /proc/worker-pid/maps,
and hence have been completely unmapped. Based on these results, we conclude that the
expected security is indeed achieved by RUNTIMEASLR.
3.1.6.3 Real Exploit Testing
To further verify the effectiveness of RUNTIMEASLR, we also test if RUNTIMEASLR
can defeat real clone-probing attack. Fortunately, the Hacking Blind attack (BROP) [20] is
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Figure 19: Nginx without RUNTIMEASLR.
The clone-probing attack, with the stack read-
ing technique of Hacking Blind, succeeds.
Figure 20: Nginx with RUNTIMEASLR. The
clone-probing attack is failed because memory
layout is re-randomized after crashing.
publicly available3. We downloaded the provided exploit and ran it without any change
against Nginx 1.4.0. As per BROP website, the exploit consists of several steps, including
ASLR bypassing with stack reading, locating the required gadgets, and building the ROP
shellcode. The foremost step is to efficiently bypass ASLR. The approach proposed in BROP
is so-called stack reading. As already mentioned in §3.1, it overwrites the return address on
stack byte-by-byte with a single guessed byte. As the newly forked worker process has the
same address space as the crashed one, the probing can be repeatedly performed for each
byte.
To verify the effectiveness of RUNTIMEASLR, we ran Nginx with and without RUNTIMEASLR.
The results are shown in Figure 19 and Figure 20. In the case of Nginx without RUNTIMEASLR,
stack reading can successfully bypass ASLR within two minutes. However, if RUNTIMEASLR
is enabled, we had to manually terminate the exploit after 10 hours, as it could not even guess
3 bytes. The reason why stack reading does not work under RUNTIMEASLR is apparent:




In order to test the performance of our approach, we conducted two independent experiments
to be able to measure the performances of the instrumented parent process (with heavy-
weight pointer tracking) and uninstrumented child (i.e., worker) processes.
Performance with web benchmarks. To measure the child process performance, we used
the Nginx 1.4.0 web server and measured different performance aspects. The performance
slowdown that might potentially be introduced by our RUNTIMEASLR is measured in
comparison to an unmodified system as baseline. Nginx used four worker child processes
– one pinned to each core. The client to measure network performance was running on a
second machine, which was connected to the Nginx web server over a 1000BASE-T (Gigabit
Ethernet) switch using a 10m long CAT 5e cable. We measured two dimensions, connection
concurrency performance and throughput performance to check if either of them is affected
by RUNTIMEASLR.
Connection concurrency measures the round-trip time in relation to the number n of
simultaneously connected clients, i.e., the time it takes from the beginning of a request
until the complete response has been received from the server. The more clients that are
requesting resources from the server at the same time, the longer it takes the server to send
back the entire response. To measure the connection concurrency, we used the Apache
Benchmark (ab 2.3) tool. ab lets each of the n simultaneous connections request 10,000
documents from the server as fast as possible.
Throughput in turn measures the rate of successfully received bytes per time unit. For this
purpose, we let Nginx deliver a 1 GiB4 file 100 times and averaged the download speed.
As a test bed, we used HTML documents obtained from real web sites. We mirrored
the top 10 Alexa [6] websites into our Nginx root document root directory using wget.
Performance results showed that the response times only loosely correlate to the size of the
4We use the notation of a Gibibyte (1 GiB = 1024 × 1024 × 1024 bytes) instead of a Gigabyte (1 GB
= 1, 0003 bytes)
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delivered content (see Figure 21). Since our performance slowdown evaluation is interested
in the RUNTIMEASLR performance in relation to the baseline, the document size and
content did not affect the results as the quotient of RUNTIMEASLRbaseline was unaffected. For the
remainder of the concurrency tests, we therefore picked a random top 10 web site to test

























































































Figure 21: Response time for single real-world documents retrieved from our Nginx web server
using 30 concurrent connections. Content mirrored from Alexa Top 10.
Concurrency Results: We tested the concurrency performance of the RUNTIMEASLR-
enabled Nginx with 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 concurrent clients and there was no measurable
performance overhead. Figure 22 shows the median of 10,000 response times with the
number of concurrent connections n ∈ 10, 20, 30, 40, 50. The worst measured performance
difference was for 10 simultaneous connections and is a slowdown of 0.51%, which is well
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Figure 22: Nginx response time with different concurrencies.
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The overall distribution of response times is depicted in Figure 24, which shows that the
majority of response times is ≈ 200 ms for 50 simultaneous connections and ≈ 40 ms for
10 simultaneous connections. The performance difference between RUNTIMEASLR and
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Figure 23: Nginx response time distribution with/without our pointer tracking Pin instrumentation.
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Figure 24: Nginx response time distribution with/without our pointer tracking Pin instrumentation.
Always 10 concurrent connections
Throughput Results: We also measured the average and peak throughput for a large
single file download over HTTP using only one connection at the same time. The throughput
result for 100 downloads of a 1 GiB file is shown in Table 14. The measured difference is
only 0.5% slowdown on average and a mere 0.1% slowdown for the peak throughput.
Micro benchmark of fork. In traditional UNIX systems and Linux, the fork() syscall is
tuned to be very fast. We measured the performance overhead of our instrumented fork
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Baseline 870.5 MBit/s 898.1 MBit/s
RUNTIMEASLR 866.4 MBit/s 897.2 MBit/s
to give the reader an insight of introduced delays. Table 15 shows the micro-benchmarks
for the instrumented fork() with RUNTIMEASLR. Without RUNTIMEASLR, forking is
extremely efficient, taking only 0.1 ms. RUNTIMEASLR performs Pin detaching, address
space remapping, Pin unmapping, and context switching for fork(). While unmapping
and context switching is efficient, the detaching of Pin seems to be a bottleneck. Although
percentage of performance overhead is significant, the absolute overhead is less than 150 ms.
More importantly, most daemon processes, e.g., Nginx web server and Apache web server,
only fork worker processes once and delegate work instead of creating a new process for
each work item, so the performance overhead of fork() with RUNTIMEASLR only affects
the starting time of these servers.
Table 15: Micro benchmark for fork() with RUNTIMEASLR. The original fork() takes 0.1 ms.
Worker processes are typically pre-forked once at startup.
Detach Remap Unmap & Total
Context switch fork
Fork w/ RUNTIMEASLR 109.7 ms 27.0 ms 0.8 ms 137.5 ms
3.1.6.5 Performance of Pointer Tracking
RUNTIMEASLR is mainly used to prevent clone-probing attacks targeting daemon servers.
As shown in 3.1.6.5, RUNTIMEASLR imposes no overhead to the web service itself. Here,
we also want to evaluate the performance of the pointer tracking component. We first
measure the time for Nginx web server to start. On our machine, it finishes starting within 35
seconds. We then apply RUNTIMEASLR to SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks which contains
some relatively complicated programs, e.g., gcc. Since these benchmark programs do not
adopt daemon-worker scheme, pointer tracking will be performed for all executed code. In
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Table 16: Pointer tracking on SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks. Pointer tracking is completely detached
in child processes, ensuring their efficiency.
Benchmark Original RUNTIMEASLR Overhead
(seconds) (seconds) (times)
gcc 1.13 12,783 11,312
mcf 2.64 24,708 9,359
hmmer 2.28 19,004 8,335
libquantum 0.06 1,491 24,850
xalancbmk 0.08 1,932 24,150
soplex 0.02 217 10,850
lbm 2.28 2,468 1,028
sphinx3 1.61 12,661 7,863
this evaluation, all the benchmark programs are compiled with options -pie -fPIC -O2.
Table 16 shows the results. The significantly reduced performance is not surprising, as
RUNTIMEASLR performs runtime taint analysis to accurately identify all pointers. How-
ever, pointer tracking is only performed in the parent process at startup. The child process,
the actual worker process, is not affected by pointer tracking (see 3.1.6.4). For the long-
running daemon servers, the starting overhead introduced by “one-time” pointer tracking
before fork is acceptable, but the performance of its provided service is more critical, and in
our case not affected. One may also wonder about the performance of taint policy generation,
although it is less concerned than pointer tracking, since it is performed offline. The running
time for taint policy generation against Nginx is about 30 seconds.
3.1.7 Discussion
In this section, we discuss some potential problems with RUNTIMEASLR, which might
appear in special cases.
3.1.7.1 Soundness of Taint Policy Generation
The taint policy generation mechanism of RUNTIMEASLR is not sound in general, since the
instruction abstraction may generate ambiguous policies. In Section 3.1.5.1, we performed
an in-depth analysis to understand how ambiguous policies are introduced in the tested
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programs. From that analysis, we learned that normal code emitted by compilers usually
process pointers in an universal manner; however, special programs (e.g., dynamic loader
and glibc) may process pointers specially, resulting in ambiguous policies (about 1% out of
all policies). Although the simple range-checking approach (see Section 3.1.5.1) is sufficient
to handle the ambiguous cases listed in Table 12, manual analysis may still be required
to confirm the correctness of taint policies when more ambiguous cases are reported by
RUNTIMEASLR. If the ambiguous policies cannot be handled by range-checking, one may
need to manually define the special taint policies. Alternatively, an automated approach to
handle ambiguous policies is to relax the instruction abstraction. For example, including the
effective width (or the highest order of bit) of the operands can remove ambiguous case 5
in Table 12. A trade-off needs to be made between the degree of abstraction and pointer
tracking performance – relaxing the abstraction will introduce further performance overhead
in pointer tracking.
3.1.7.2 Completeness of Taint Policy
The pointer tracking of RUNTIMEASLR consists of the offline taint policy generation and
runtime taint tracking. In our experiments, because the sample programs used for generating
taint policy include the target program, and the inputs for two runs for policy generation and
taint tracking are exactly the same, the policy set is usually complete for pointer tracking
in practice – we did not meet any missed policy in Nginx. However, we cannot guarantee
the 100% completeness of policy set, as the two runs of program for policy generation and
taint tracking are independent. For example, if the system administrator changes the Nginx
configurations at runtime (i.e., after policy generation), new code paths not covered during
policy generation may be introduced, thus may result in false negative policy. Assuming
such cases exist, we can either manually add the reported new policies – as the total number
of x86_64 instructions is limited5 – or adopt an automatic approach: if we find an instruction
5http://ref.x86asm.net/coder64.html
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generates, updates, or removes a pointer, but is not covered in existing policy set, we can
append it to the policy set at runtime.
3.1.7.3 Applicability for General Programs
A program that does not adopt the daemon-worker scheme is not vulnerable to clone-probing,
so it is not necessary to use RUNTIMEASLR. As specified in threat model in §3.1.1.1,
RUNTIMEASLR is dedicated to server programs that pre-fork worker processes processing
users’ actual requests and perform light-weight tasks (e.g., worker process management)
in daemon process, e.g., web servers. RUNTIMEASLR performs runtime taint analysis to
accurately identify all pointers in parent (daemon) processes, so the performance of parent
process is dramatically reduced. Current implementation of RUNTIMEASLR is not suitable
for server programs that perform heavy-weight tasks in parent process for performance
reasons. Regarding performance in pointer tracking, RUNTIMEASLR can be improved in
two ways: (1) static code instrumentation using a compiler or binary rewriting can help
improve the pointer tracking performance. It is worth noting that statically instrumented
code is hard to be completely detached in worker processes, which is actually the main
reason we chose to employ dynamic instrumentation; (2) as our primary goal is to make
the pointer tracking accurate, our current implementation still has room for improvements
to tweak its performance. Improving the performance of pointer tracking is a long-studied
topic [23, 87, 90], we can employ these techniques to improve the performance of pointer
tracking.
3.1.7.4 Pointer Obfuscation
Pointer tracking in RUNTIMEASLR can generally handle pointer obfuscations, as encryp-
tion and decryption are symmetric, i.e., the encrypted pointers will be recognized when they
get decrypted. However, we encounter a problem when pointer patching happens on en-
crypted or otherwise obfuscated pointers. If we do not know how the pointers are encrypted,
it is impossible to patch the encrypted pointers in memory; therefore, we assume all pointer
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obfuscations applied in the protected program must be known to RUNTIMEASLR. To better
handle this, we provide a detection to help users identify pointer obfuscations. Note that, in
the case of Nginx, we only found one such case – glibc’s mangled pointers.
3.1.8 Related Work
3.1.8.1 Pointer Tracking
The heart of runtime re-randomization is accurately tracking all pointers. Pointer tracking
has been well-studied for object bounds checking for memory safety, and pointer protection.
Existing works either employ type-based analysis or heuristics-based analysis to identify
pointers. Type-based analysis [88, 98, 131, 133] statically infers the type information of
an object (e.g., a pointer). It is efficient and easy to use; however, it suffers from a high
number of false negatives. Pointers with non-pointer type (e.g., base addresses) and the ones
prepared by the OS are not covered. Memcheck [163], Clause et al. [40], and Raksha [53]
empirically specify the pointer propagation rules to track pointers. Although they specified
very detailed rules, it is still difficult to cover all cases, due to the complexity of C/C++
programs. We propose an automatic mechanism to accurately identify all pointers (§3.1.6.1).
Some interesting cases that are not discussed in heuristics-based analysis papers are shown
in Table 13.
3.1.8.2 Re-randomization
Morula [102] is one of most related works, as it also targets the ASLR limitation with fork.
Android adopts the Zygote model that starts app by forking, so that every app shares the same
address space layout. Morula addresses this problem by simply maintaining a pool of pre-
forked but re-randomized Zygote processes (template), so that when an app is about to start,
one Zygote process is picked, and it starts execution from its entry point. Unfortunately,
in our case of daemon processes, its child processes are forked on the fly, which starts
execution from the point after fork() rather than the entry point. The semantic-preserving
requirement of re-randomization makes RUNTIMEASLR fundamentally more difficult than
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Morula. We cannot simply fork-exec the child process; rather, have to perform runtime
re-randomization. Similarly, ASR [71] performs re-randomization at load-time, so not all
semantics are preserved. Isomeron [54] and Dynamic Software Diversity [46] dynamically
choose targets for indirect branches at runtime to reduce the probability of predicting the
correct runtime address of ROP gadgets. In their proposals, clone-probing attacks are still
effective, as child processes still share the same memory layout. TASR [19] re-randomizes
code sections after a pair of socket read/write. It requires compiler support and cannot
protect data pointers.
3.1.8.3 Code and Data Diversification
Code diversification [101, 142] makes multiple copies of the code, which preserves the
semantics. An assumption of Code diversification is that the attacker cannot get the same
copy of the code. This assumption does not hold when there are memory overread vulner-
abilities in the program [168]. Data layout randomization [18, 37, 107] mitigates buffer
overrun by making the offset between the target data (e.g., return address) and overflow
point unpredictable. However, clone-probing attacks can still work under code or data
diversification, since the child processes still share their parent’s layout.
3.1.8.4 Fine-grained ASLR and Control-flow Integrity
Fine-grained ASLR [12, 56, 71, 80, 92, 187] and Control-flow Integrity [3, 55, 123, 127,
136, 193, 194] aim to make the exploit more difficult after ASLR is bypassed. Complemen-
tarily, RUNTIMEASLR aims to defend against the first step– bypassing ASLR. Therefore,
RUNTIMEASLR is orthogonal to these techniques.
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CHAPTER IV
PROTECTING SENSITIVE DATA FROM INFORMATION LEAKS
Eliminating information-leak vulnerabilities and fixing insecure designs address root causes
of information leaks. However, in practice, we are not able to completely fix these vulner-
abilities or insecure designs because of the complexity of systems and the continuously
introduced system features. For example, we cannot even identify all side channels that may
leak information, thus cannot prevent all information leaks. As a response to this problem,
we instead strive to protect certain sensitive data, even in the presence of information leaks.
Such protection is orthogonal to fixing root causes of information leaks; it acts as the
second line of defense against information leaks. Towards this goal, we have developed
ASLR-Guard, which prevents code-pointer leaks to defeat code-reuse attacks [164], and
BUDDY, which detects memory disclosures with replicated execution.
4.1 ASLR-GUARD: Stopping Code-Pointer Leaks
Since W⊕X became a de-facto security mechanism in modern operating systems, code
injection is no longer a viable general attack technique. In particular, attackers can no
longer place arbitrary shell code in the target process’ data space and hijack control to
start executing that shell code. Instead, attackers now rely on code reuse attack that hijacks
the control flow to existing code in the target process (in an unintended manner). Ever
since their first introduction, code reuse attacks have evolved from simply jumping to some
sensitive library functions (a.k.a. return-to-libc) to chaining up small snippets of existing
code (a.k.a. gadgets) with mainly returns and indirect calls/jumps to allow the attacker
to perform arbitrary computations [165]. However, there are two prerequisites for these
attacks: (1) a prior knowledge of the location of existing code gadgets, and (2) the ability to
overwrite some control data (e.g. return addresses, function pointers) with the correct values
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so as to hijack the control flow to the targeted gadgets.
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) aims to make the first prerequisite
unsatisfiable by making the addresses of code gadgets unpredictable. In theory, ASLR can
complement W⊕X and stop code reuse attacks effectively. By randomizing the location
of different code modules, and even various instructions within code modules [80, 101,
142, 187], attackers without a priori knowledge of how the randomization is done will not
know the location of the code that they want executed. As a result, attempts to launch
code reuse attacks will likely direct the hijacked control to a wrong location and cause the
attack to fail (usually with a program crash). It has been widely used in modern operating
systems, and proven to be extremely efficient. However, research in recent years has
shown that many implementations of ASLR fail to live up to its promises of stopping
code reuse attacks [20, 65, 161, 166, 174]. In some cases, the ASLR implementations
fail to provide enough entropy thus are subject to brute-force attacks [20, 65, 166]. A
more serious and fundamental problem for randomization based protection mechanisms
is information-leak vulnerabilities [161, 174], which breaks the implicit assumption that
attackers cannot learn the randomness. With information leak, the attacker usually can obtain
a “post-randomization” pointer to the location of a known module (e.g. specific function in
a particular library) [20, 65, 166]. For ASLR that works at a module-level granularity (i.e.,
it does not modify the relative location of different instructions within a module), this kind
of leak will allow an attacker to identify all target addresses within that module. Even for
instruction-level randomization, with a sufficiently powerful information-leak vulnerability,
attackers can exploit a single code address leak and repeatedly read code pages to eventually
locate all the code gadgets necessary to launch even the most sophisticated code reuse
attacks [168]. More devastating, information leak is quite prevalent and the number of
instances discovered is increasing in general, as shown in Figure 25.
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Figure 25: The number of information-leak vulnerabilities reported by CVE Details1. It is still
increasing in general.
detecting or preventing code address leak is a very challenging problem. Due to the
complexity of programs written in low level programming languages, it is even not clear
about if one can find all pointers or data that can be leveraged to infer the code address.
Moreover, code pointer and data can be inter-casted during the data propagation. And some
code pointers (e.g., return addresses) are frequently dereferenced. Therefore, it is very
challenging to correctly and efficiently protect code pointers.
In this work, we propose ASLR-GUARD, a system that completely prevents code
address leak to stop code reuse attack. The main idea is to either prevent code pointer leak
or render any leaked code pointer useless in the construction of code reuse attack, so that we
can reclaim the benefits of ASLR and prevent code reuse attacks. In particular, we propose
three techniques: (1) completely decouple code and data by remapping all code to a random
address, so a data pointer cannot be used to infer the location of code; (2) store all sensitive
code locators (Hereafter, we use the term code locator to refer to any pointer or data that
can be used to infer code address) in a secure storage, and (3) whenever a code locator is
going to be propagated to the regular memory regions, we encrypt it to prevent attackers
from exploiting the value of this code locator or using this code locator to hijack the control
flow to arbitrary addresses.
We have implemented a prototype system ASLR-GUARD, which consists of two main
components, a modified compilation toolchain that includes compiler, assembler and linker;
and a modified dynamic loader. The first component is responsible for instrumenting an
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input program (in source code) and all its libraries so that all code locators can be identified
and protected by our policies. The runtime component allows us to perform necessary
initialization of our environment. Our evaluation results show that (1) ASLR-GUARD can
thwart all the code locator leaks we have tested, even if attackers can dump all data regions;
(2) with the capability of resisting against code locator leak attacks, ASLR-GUARD can
reinforce ASLR to stop advanced code reuse attacks [20]; and (3) it incurs almost no runtime
overhead (< 1%) on the SPEC benchmark.
In summary, the contributions of this work are:
• We perform a systematic analysis to identify all sources of sensitive code locators,
and implemented a memory checking tool to verify that we did identify and protect
all code locators.
• We propose a hybrid approach that employs isolation to protect most code locators
(for better performance and security), and encrypt the remaining code locators that
are hard to isolate.
• We have implemented a prototype system, ASLR-GUARD, and our evaluation shows
that ASLR-GUARD incurs a negligible runtime overhead on the SPEC benchmark
and left no single code locator unprotected.
A point worth noting is that protecting pointer by encryption is a general approach, but
the challenge is how to achieve both security and efficiency. For example, PointGuard [43]
sacrifices security for performance by XORing all pointers using a single key. Such scheme
is not secure against chosen-plaintext attacks. Further, PointGuard is also vulnerable to
forgery attacks due to missing integrity checks. AG-RandMap overcomes these problems
by proposing a novel and efficient encryption scheme ( Figure 27). Furthermore, as we
will show in §4.1.2, our work overcomes a major technical challenge of identifying all the
code locators that need to be encrypted. Finally, our policy for handling code locators on
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stack allows us to improve both the security and, very significantly, the performance of
ASLR-GUARD.
4.1.1 Threat Model
To make sure our solution is practical, we define our threat model based on strong attack
assumptions, which are commonly used in projects related to code reuse attacks [20, 65,
166, 168]. As the trusted computing base (TCB), we assume a commodity operating system
(e.g., Linux) with standard defense mechanisms, such as non-executable stack and heap,
and ASLR. We assume attackers are remote, so they do not have physical access to the
target system, nor do they have prior control over other programs before a successful exploit.
We assume the platform uses 64-bit virtual address space, as 32-bit address space cannot
provide enough entropy and 64-bit processors are widely available.
For the target program, we assume it is distributed through an open channel (e.g.,
Internet), so attackers can have the same copy as we do. This allows them to do any
analysis on the program, such as finding vulnerabilities and recomputing all possible code
gadgets. We assume the target program has one or more vulnerabilities, including control-
flow hijacking or information-leak vulnerability, or both kinds at the same time. More
specifically, we assume the program contains at least one vulnerability that can be exploited
to grant attackers the capability to read from and write to an arbitrary memory address.
We further assume this vulnerability can be exploited repeatedly without crashing the
target program, so attackers can use the arbitrary memory read/write capability at will.
Since arbitrary memory read/write on the 64-bit virtual address space is probabilistically
impossible to achieve attacker’s goals, we assume all arbitrary memory read/write will be
based off on the memory addresses leaked from the previous vulnerability (or second-order
guess based on the leaked code locator). Finally, we assume the ultimate goal of the attackers
is to divert the control flow and execute arbitrary logic of their choice.
Although there are a few known explicit leak channels (e.g., /proc/self/maps), many
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Table 17: A summary of all code locators that can be used to infer code address. All of them are
protected by ASLR-GUARD
Category Type Applied protection
Load-time L1. Base address Encryption + Isolation
locators L2. GOTPLT entry Isolation
L3. Static/global pointer Encryption + Isolation
L4. Virtual function pointer Encryption + Isolation
Runtime R1. Return address Isolation
locators R2. GetPC Encryption
R3. GetRet Encryption
OS-injected O1. Entry point Encryption
locators O2. Signal/Exception handler Encryption
Correlated C1. Jump table entry Isolation
locators C2. Data pointer Decoupling
data/code sections
security enhanced Linux distributions such as PaX disable /proc-based pointer or layout
leaks. We assume there is no explicit leak through the platform itself.
Out-of-scope threats. Since we assume the OS as our TCB, we do not consider any attack
that tries to exploit an OS vulnerability to gain control over the target program. Given our
threat model, we focus on preventing the attacks that exploit vulnerabilities to bypass ASLR,
and then overwrite control data to hijack control-flow. Non-control-data attacks [36] (e.g.,
hijacking credential data or metadata of code locators, like object pointers) are out of our
scope. We also do not consider information exfiltration attacks.
4.1.2 Code Locator Demystified
Since many kinds of data besides code pointer can be leveraged to infer the address of code,
such as the base address of text section and offset in a jump table, we use the term code
locator to refer to any pointer or data that can be leveraged to infer code address. Although
many previous works like the JIT-ROP attack [168] have shown that a single code locator
leak may compromise the whole ASLR protection, to the best of our knowledge, there
was no existing work that systematically discussed the composition of code locators. In
order to provide a comprehensive protection against information leak, we first conduct a
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systematic analysis to discover all code locators in a program, and discuss the completeness
of coverage.
4.1.2.1 Discovery Methodology
When a program is starting, the kernel is responsible for creating the address space of
the process and loading the ELF binary and dynamic linker, while the relocation of code
pointers is left for dynamic linker. Dynamic linker then loads all required libraries and
performs necessary relocations before the loaded code is executed. Once all relocations
are done, the dynamic linker transfers the control to the program’s entry point. During
execution, the program may (indirectly) call function pointers, or interact with OS, e.g.,
signal handling. We categorize code locators mainly based on the life cycle of the program
execution. Then we try to identify all code locators at different program execution stages.
More specifically, we first thoroughly checked the source code of dynamic linker (ld.so),
libc libraries, and gcc to understand how code locators could be generated at load-time and
runtime of the program execution. As for code locators that are injected by the OS into the
process’ address space, we implemented a memory analysis tool to exhaustively check if
any 8-byte in readable memory points to any executable memory in the target program or
bases of modules, and we performed this check before and after executing every system call.
The memory analysis tool also serves to validate our process for discovering code locators
injected by the dynamic linker and the program itself (e.g., checking the memory at the
entry/exit points). Once our memory analysis tool discovers new kinds of code locators, we
manually verify and categorize them. We then append the new “category” to the identified
code locator set, and run memory analysis tool again to find more kinds of code locators.
The iterative process ends until no new code locators are reported. We summarize our results
of such exhaustive memory analysis in Table 17.
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4.1.2.2 Code Locators at Different Stages
Load-time Code Locators. During load-time, there could be various kinds of code locators
computed and stored in the memory, e.g., static function pointer and .gotplt entry, as shown
in §4.1.2. Although it is hard to iterate all code locators produced at load-time, we found
the fact that, suppose ASLR is fully enabled, all code locators must be relocated before
being dereferenced. With this fact in mind, we designed a general approach to discover and
protect all load-time code locators. We control the relocation functions in dynamic linker,
so that all load-time code locators must go through our relocation, and therefore we can
enforce our protections for them, e.g., isolation and encryption.
Runtime Code Locators. Code locators can be generated at runtime by deriving from the
program counter (e.g., RIP). In x86_64 platform, the RIP value can be loaded either by a
call instruction or a lea instruction. call instruction pushes return address on the top of
stack, and when the callee returns, the return address is dereferenced. Usually, people believe
call and ret are paired. In our analysis, we indeed found some corner cases in which
return address is not used by ret. As the code locator type R3 shown in §4.1.2, setjmp
loads return address using a mov instruction, and the return address is then dereferenced as
a function pointer by longjmp. Besides the return address, runtime code locators can also
be generated by GetPC (e.g., lea _offset(%rip), reg). For example, if there is a function
pointer that is assigned with an address of a local function, typically GetPC will be used to
get the function address. Since we have the complete control of the compilation toolchain,
we could properly discover all runtime code locators (e.g., the ones introduced by call or
GetPC) and enforce the corresponding protections, which are elaborated in §4.1.3.
OS-injected and Correlated Locators. As ASLR-GUARD is designed to work with
unmodified commodity kernel, how the program interacts with kernel needs be analyzed in
order to discover code locators that might be injected or transmitted by the kernel. We used
our memory analysis tool to check the memory right before and after a syscall. Based on
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our analysis, we found that the program entry pointer can be stored on the stack by kernel.
Also kernel may save the execution environment, including RIP value, for signal/exception
handling. Since data sections and code sections are mapped together, the offsets between
them are fixed. Data pointers can be leveraged to infer code addresses. We call such pointers
the correlated code locators, which we correctly handle to prevent intentional code address
leaks.
4.1.2.3 Completeness of the Analysis
In an ASLR-enabled program, all static code locators (e.g., the ones in .gotplt and virtual
table) must be relocated at load-time. As we can control the relocation routine, we can
guarantee to cover all such code locators. Another source of code locator at load-time is
that a code locator is calculated based on a base address. So we also collect all cases in
dynamic linker that access the base address stored in link_map. In this way, we can cover all
load-time code locators. Note that we will remap all code sections to random addresses, any
missing code locator at load-time (although we did not meet such case in our evaluation) will
crash the program, which means our analysis for load-time code locators is “fail-safe”. For
runtime code locators, as we have the control of whole toolchain, we can easily guarantee to
find all runtime code locators (i.e., we catch all instructions that access return address or
rip).
As for code locators that are injected by the OS, we take a dynamic analysis approach.
While this dynamic analysis approach is not necessarily complete in theory, we will argue
that in practice the way the OS setups a process’ address space (and thus all the bookkeeping
code locators it may inject into various user space data structure) should be the same for
every process; a similar argument should apply for any code locator injected for signal
handling.
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Figure 26: Register usage semantics in ASLR-GUARD. The usage of rsp and gs will be securely
regulated by ASLR-GUARD’s compiler, so never be copied to the program’s memory, nor accessed
by the program’s code.
4.1.3 Design
In this section, we present the design of ASLR-GUARD. Based on previous discussion and
existing attacks [20, 153, 168], we know that as long as attackers can exploit information-
leak vulnerabilities to obtain a valid code locator, ASLR will continue to be nullified,
no matter how much we improve the granularity of the randomization. So the goal of
ASLR-GUARD is to: completely prevent leaks of code locators.
Figure 26 demonstrates the high-level idea of ASLR-GUARD. First, it decouples code
sections and data sections. By doing so, the process’ address space is virtually divided
into two worlds: the data world and the code world. This step eliminates all the implicit
relationship between data and code (C1). Second, ASLR-GUARD acts as the gateway
between these two worlds: whenever a code address is about to be leaked to the data world,
ASLR-GUARD encrypts the address as a token; and whenever a token is used to perform
control transfer, ASLR-GUARD decrypts it. By doing so, ASLR-GUARD eliminates all
explicit code locator leaks. To implement this scheme, we developed four key techniques:
safe vault, section-level randomization, AG-RandMap and AG-Stack.
4.1.3.1 Safe Vault
Safe vault is an “isolated” memory region where all the plaintext code locators (except R1)
listed in Table 17 are stored. We divide the safe vault into two parts. The first part is for
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storing the information of all remapped sections, which includes the base address for each
section before and after the remapping, as well as the size of each section. The second part
is the random mapping table used for code locator encryption/decryption.
In ASLR-GUARD, we guarantee the isolation of the safe vault with the following design.
First, the base address of the safe vault is randomized via ASLR. Second, the based address
is stored in a dedicated register that is never used by the program 2, and its content is never
saved to the data memory. As a result, one can only locate the safe vault by brute-forcingly
guessing its base address, which is prohibited by ASLR on 64-bit systems.
4.1.3.2 Section-level randomization
The purpose of the section-level randomization is two-folded: first, we use it to stop attackers
from deducing the location of our code using leaked data pointer; second, we would like
to further protect data structures that contain code locators (namely jump tables, .gotplt
tables and virtual function tables) without paying the price of encrypting all the code locators
in them.
For our first goal, we decouple code from data by remapping all code sections (code
sections can be identified by looking up ELF header) to random addresses. Since the offset
between code and data is changed during this process, we further adjust the constant offsets
in all data-access instructions. This is done at load time based on the relocation information
generated by our linker. For our second goal, we modified the compiler to make sure that:
(1) jump tables are always emitted in rodata sections, (2) addresses pointing to, or derived
from the content of, code locator tables like jump tables and .gotplt tables always stay in
registers and are never saved to the memory. With these two guarantees, we can protect code
locators in these data structures by simply remapping them to random addresses, without
ever needing to encrypt the code locators stored in these tables. One exception to our second
rule is the virtual function tables. Since we cannot guarantee that virtual function pointers
2On x84-64 platform, the segmentation register gs is the most suitable candidate for this purpose.
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Plain code locator Nonce00000000
8 bytes 4 bytes 4 bytes
ASLR-Guard Random Mapping Table
NonceRandom offset








xor   %gs:8(%eax),  %rax
call   %gs:(%rax)
Indirect call to %rax
(decryption)
Figure 27: Code locator encryption/decryption scheme.
will never be stored to the unsafe data world, we encrypt virtual function pointers after the
virtual tables are remapped to a random address. After the remapping, we use the safe vault
to store the remapping information for each of the protected section so we can later patch up
accesses to them. One final point to note is that to make sure the remapped location of the
various tables are truly random, we wrapped the mmap() function to provide it random base
addresses. As the primary goal of ASLR-GUARD is to harden ASLR, instead of to improve
the entropy of ASLR, we set the same entropy as in the default 64-bit Linux ASLR (28-bit).
We acquire the randomness from cryptographic secure source, i.e., the RdRand instruction
on modern Intel processors. There are alternatives from /dev/random that could be used.
4.1.3.3 AG-RandMap–Locator Encryption
In this subsection, we define our encryption scheme for encrypting code locators. This
encryption scheme is designed to achieve two goals. First, it must be strong enough to stop
code reuse attacks even when some (or all) of the encrypted code locators are leaked. We
also assume that attackers can know what functions the leaked code locators point to. In
order to achieve this goal, our scheme need to prevent attackers from efficiently deriving
valid encrypted code locators that will be dereferenced to direct the control flow to code
gadgets. In particular, our encryption scheme should make the task of deriving a valid
encrypted code locator as difficult as brute-forcingly guessing the gadgets under ASLR. The
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second requirement for our encryption scheme is performance, especially for the decryption
operation. This is because code locator generation is a relatively rare operation, but code
locator dereferencing (e.g., indirect call) is much more frequent.
To achieve these goals, we propose AG-RandMap, an efficient random mapping table
mechanism, as our encryption scheme. The main idea of AG-RandMap is illustrated in
Figure 27. To encrypt a code locator, we will randomly pick an unused 16-byte entry in the
mapping table. The first 8 bytes will be used to store the plain code locator being encrypted;
the next 4-bytes is zero that is used to get the random offset with XORing during decryption,
and the last 4-bytes contains a random nonce (with 32-bit entropy) for integrity check. As
in 4.1.3.2, we acquire the randomness from cryptographic secure source (i.e., the RdRand
instruction provided by modern Intel processors). After building the new table entry, the
4-byte random offset from the base of the mapping table to the new entry is concatenated
with the nonce, and returned as the encrypted code locator. Note that AG-RandMap does
not use any key for encryption, but generates an entry in the mapping table and saves the
encrypted code locator in the corresponding register or memory using “one-time” random
value.
Decryption under our scheme is performed very efficiently and involves only one extra
xor operation on top of the original indirect control transfer. The code locator decryption
process is also illustrated in Figure 27. Assuming the encrypted code locator is in %rax, we
first use %eax-plus-8 as an offset to read 4-bytes zero and the nonce from the table, and xor it
with the encrypted code locator. If the nonce is correct, the result will be a valid offset within
the mapping table, which then decrypts %gs:(%rax) to the plain code locator. Otherwise,
the offset will be outside of the table, transferring the control to a random address that is
highly likely to be either unmapped or not executable, thus crashing the program. In other
words, for an attacker to forge a valid encrypted code locator that will direct the control flow
to a plaintext address stored in our AG-RandMap, he will need to know the correct nonce to
use for the target table entry. To do so, he can either guess with a successful chance of 2−32;
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or try to locate our AG-RandMap, which is equivalent to brute-forcing ASLR. Either way,
our encryption scheme satisfies the first requirement.
C++ support. To support polymorphism, C++ uses a virtual function table (vtable) to
store the pointers of virtual functions for each class with virtual functions. And in each
object of class with virtual function, vtable pointer(s) (vptr) are used to point to the right
vtable. ASLR-GUARD generally protects the function pointers inside vtable by encryption.
However, as vtable pointers are stored in objects in unsafe memory, leaking vptr may help
attackers know all encrypted virtual function pointers and allow COOP attack [153]. To
prevent such attack, ASLR-GUARD further encrypts vtable pointers so that attack cannot
even know the locations of encrypted virtual function pointers, which is an essential step for
COOP attack[153].
4.1.3.4 AG-Stack
As discussed in §4.1.2, some dynamic code locators are stored on the stack, such as return
addresses (R1) and OS injected code locators (O2). To prevent leaking return address
through stack, one approach is to apply the same encryption/decryption scheme in §4.1.3.3.
However, this approach is not suitable for protecting return address on the stack. First of
all, the return addresses are generated very frequently, and our encryption scheme does
not support frequent encryption very well. Second, it will require extensive modification
to support encryption over OS injected code locators. For these reasons, we propose an
efficient alternative solution, namely AG-Stack to protect R1 and O2.
Our approach is similar to the traditional shadow-stack techniques [68, 149] that are
used to prevent return addresses from being modified by attacks. However, they protect
return addresses by costly instrumenting call/ret pairs. For example a single ret is
instrumented with at least 4 instructions that load return address in the shadow stack, adjust
the stack, check equivalence, and ret. Therefore, traditional shadow-stack approaches face
three problems: (1) call/ret are frequently executed by CPU, instrumenting them incurs
120
significant performance overhead; (2) cases where call/ret don’t come in matching pairs,
e.g., GetPC, are difficult to handle; (3) “return addresses” injected by the OS will not be
automatically protected. To address these issues with traditional shadow-stack techniques,
we propose a novel mechanism, namely AG-Stack.
Besides being much more efficient, AG-Stack has several advantages: (1) it provides
the capability to store more sensitive data; and (2) it does not change the semantics of
original code, so special cases like unpaired call/ret instructions and signal handling
can be naturally supported. The high level idea of AG-Stack is to maintain two stacks by
re-arranging the usages of two registers. Specifically, we use the ordinary stack (i.e., the one
accessed through RSP, as shown in Figure 26) as our AG-Stack to store sensitive on-stack
data like return addresses and function pointers used for exception handling. All other data,
like stack variables, register spilling and function call arguments are stored on a regular stack
that accessed through R15, as shown in Figure 26. The security of AG-Stack is guaranteed
in a way similar to safe vault. As in safe vault, its base address is randomized. Also, since
AG-Stack does not store any program data, there is no data pointer pointing to it, so attackers
cannot derive its address through memory traversal. Finally, whenever the stack pointer is
stored in memory (e.g., during setjmp), we will encrypt it using the scheme in §4.1.3.3. As
such, with AG-Stack, we achieve a better performance but a guaranteed security for all code
locators saved on the stack.
AG-Stack is very similar to the safe-stack from CPI [98]. Both impose no runtime
overhead. The difference is that safe-stack performs type-based analysis and intra-procedure
analysis to find unsafe stack objects. As shown in Section §4.1.2, type-based analysis may
not cover some non-pointer code locators. AG-Stack eliminates these analyses by thoroughly
re-arranging the register usages.
Multi-thread support. In Linux, multi-thread feature is enabled with Native POSIX
Thread Library (NPTL), which creates a new thread with the clone system call. Specifically,





































Figure 28: An overview ASLR-GUARD’s architecture. It has two components: toolchain (e.g.,
compiler) and runtime (e.g., loader and libc). Code locators will never be copied into the program’s
data memory, avoiding potential leakages.
of the new stack. And then it saves the thread function pointer and its arguments in the new
stack. After that, clone system call switches the context, and the thread function is called.
Similarly, to support multi-thread in ASLR-GUARD, for each new thread, we allocate a
regular stack (with the same size) whenever the new (safe) stack is allocated, and release the
regular stack when the thread exits. The regular stack information (e.g., stack address and
size) is saved in thread descriptor that is stored in AG-Stack.
4.1.4 ASLR-GUARD Toolchain
In this section, we describe our prototype implementation of our protection scheme. We
first give an overview of our prototype, then we discuss the detail of each component of
ASLR-GUARD.
4.1.4.1 Architecture
Figure 28 shows the overview of ASLR-GUARD’s architecture. To remove all code locator
leaks, ASLR-GUARD requires instrumenting all loaded modules, including modules of the
target program as well as all shared libraries. In this work, we assume the access to the
source code of the target program is available and the instrumentations are done through
re-compilation.
ASLR-GUARD consists of two major components: the static toolchain and the runtime.
The static toolchain is in charge of (1) implementing the AG-Stack, which will be used
to securely store return address and OS injected code locators; and (2) instrumenting the
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Component Tool Lines of code
Compiler gcc-4.8.2 120 lines of C
Assembler as-2.24 900 lines of C
Linker ld-2.24 180 lines of C
Dynamic Linker eglibc-2.19 1,200 lines of C
Memory analyzer 800 lines of Python
Total 3,200 lines of code
Figure 29: Toolchain modification made for ASLR-GUARD.
program to correctly encrypt runtime code locators and decrypt all code locators. The
ASLR-GUARD runtime contains three majors parts. The first part is the dynamic loader,
which is in charge of (1) initializing the AG-Stack and the safe vault, (2) decoupling code
sections from data sections, and (3) encrypting all load-time code locators. The second part
is the standard C/C++ libraries that will be linked into most programs. Among these libraries,
some need special care because they need to handle some OS-injected code locators in
special ways (e.g., setjmp).
We implemented our prototype based on the GNU toolchain: gcc, binutils and glibc.
Figure 29 summarizes the our efforts of modifying the GNU toolchain.
4.1.4.2 Compiler
We modified the GNU compiler gcc to assist implementing the code locators encryption and
AG-Stack. For code locator encryption, we let gcc insert a flag for data-read instructions
of global data pointers to differentiate global function pointers in the generated assembly
code. For AG-Stack part, we performed several modifications in gcc. First, we need to
reserve a register for the unsafe stack. In gcc, this can be done through the -ffixed option.
But a more important question is, which register should be chosen. In ASLR-GUARD, we
choose this register using two criteria: (1) it should be one of the least used general registers
in handwritten assembly code, and (2) it should be one of the callee-saved registers (i.e.,
non-volatile). The first requirement is for that compiler can only guarantee that the code
generated by them does not use the reserved register, however, any handwritten assembly
(including inline assembly) may still use this register. They need to be modified to use
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other registers (e.g., we found and modified about 20 cases in glibc). So choosing the
less frequently used register helps us minimize the modifications. The second requirement
is for compatibility with legacy uninstrumented binary. Because we reserved the RSP for
AG-Stack, by using a callee-save register, it ensures that both code can work correctly. Based
on these criteria, we chose R15 as the register for the regular stack on our target platform.
Second, we want to make sure that besides call/ret, there is no implicit RSP mod-
ifications. On x86-64, such modifications can be introduced by instructions, push/pop,
enter/leave and call/ret [83, Ch. 6.2]. Push/pop are for saving/restoring the target regis-
ters, and enter/leave is a shortcut for saving/restoring the frame register. Our elimination
of push/pop is done in two steps. We first leveraged existing compiler optimizations to
reduce the usage of push/pop. In particular, modern compilers like gcc in most scenarios
prefer using mov instruction for performance gain, as CPU can do pipeline scheduling for
mov instructions. So we modified gcc to always prefer using mov instruction for passing
arguments (as if -maccumulate-outgoing-args and -mno-push-args are always set) and
saving/restoring registers at function prologue/epilogue. For the remaining push/pop op-
erations, our assembler will replace them with corresponding mov operations on R15. The
elimination of enter/leave is done similarly
Finally, we need to re-align the stack. The System V AMD64 ABI uses XMM registers
for passing floating point arguments. And reading/writing these registers from/to memory
requires the memory address to be 16-byte aligned. As we split the stack into AG-Stack
and regular stack, the regular stack needs to be re-aligned. We enforced the alignment
by leveraging gcc’s supports for multiple platforms. Specifically, on platforms like ARM,
function invocations do not automatically save the return address on stack, so gcc already
understands how to align stack when there is no return address on stack. Using this support,
we modified gcc to treat our target platform as if it does not explicitly save the return address
on stack (by setting INCOMING_FRAME_SP_OFFSET = 0).
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4.1.4.3 Assembler
We modified the GNU assembler gas to perform code instrumentations for code locator
encryption/decryption and AG-Stack. The first task is to encrypt every runtime code
locator (type R2, R3 in Table 17). For position-independent ELF executables, runtime
code locators are created through retrieving the PC value (e.g., mov (%rsp), %rax may load
return address) or a PC-relative address (e.g., lea offset(%rip), %rax). ASLR-GUARD
uses these signatures to identify all potential code locators. Specifically, we perform a
simple intra-procedure analysis (check if RSP points to return address) to find all instructions
that load return addresses. And we find the instructions of loading “PC-relative” code
locators based on the metadata (e.g., indicating if a symbol is a function) contained in the
assembly files and the global data pointer flag inserted by our compiler 4.1.4.2. Note that, for
handwritten assembly, there is no easy way to distinguish the ones for global data access and
global code access at assemble time. To address this issue, our assembler first conservatively
instruments both of them, and defer it to our linker to remove the false positive ones, as
linker has code boundary information to verify code locators. For each identified instruction,
our modified assembler will insert an encryption routine to immediately encrypt the code
locator, as shown in Figure 27
Next, we instrument the target program to correctly decrypt code locators. Specifically,
we first instrument every indirect call with code address in register in the ways shown in
Table 27. If the target is stored in memory, we first save RAX and load the target into RAX.
Then we perform the decryption as the one in Table 27. One difference is that, to recover
RAX, we temporarily store the decrypted code address in AG-Stack, do recovery, and call
into the code pointer in AG-Stack. Indirect jump for invoking function is instrumented in
the same way.
The third task is to replace all push/pop and enter/leave operations with explicit
stack pointer operations. After this, ASLR-GUARD will replace all RSP occurrences with
R15, except when RSP is used to access return address in handwritten assembly. Using the
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same intra-procedure analysis mentioned above, we can find all such cases and skip the
replacements.
4.1.4.4 Static Linker
We modified the GNU static linker ld to perform two tasks. The first task is to provide
relocation information to the dynamic linker. This is necessary because once we decoupled
code sections from data sections, existing data access instructions will no longer work
because the offsets have changed. To fix this problem, ASLR-GUARD creates a new
relocation table similar to the .rela.dyn to provide this information, i.e., which 4-bytes
need to be patched. The second task is to remove encryptions for global data access in
handwritten assembly, conservatively added by assembler. This task is performed here
because the linker has the information of all static modules, so it can identify whether an
instruction is for accessing data or code.
4.1.4.5 Dynamic Linker
We modified the dynamic linker ld.so of glibc to initialize the runtime, decouple code sec-
tions from data sections, and encrypt load-time code locators. When running an executable,
Linux will first load its interpreter (i.e., the dynamic linker), jump to the entry of its entry
and let the interpreter handle the target binary. This means the dynamic linker is the very
first module to be executed. For this reason, we insert our runtime initialization code at the
entry of the dynamic linker (_dl_start()). The regular stack is initialized by allocating a
new memory region with a random base, and copying all the arguments and environment
variables from the initial stack. Safe vault is setup by allocating another random memory
region and assigning the gs segment register to its base address. Once all the initializations
are done, the control is transferred to the remapped code of dynamic linker, and the original
one is unmapped.
The decoupling is done by remapping the corresponding sections to random addresses as
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the way mentioned in Section 4.1.3.2. After remapping, ASLR-GUARD will encrypt all load-
time code locators (see Table 17). This is done during the relocation patching. Specifically,
after randomizing the base address, the original dynamic linker already provides some
relocation functions to patch all those load-time code locators with correct code addresses.
In ASLR-GUARD, with the help of this feature, we modify these relocation functions to
patch the load-time code locators with encrypted values, instead of patching them with the
real code addresses.
4.1.4.6 Standard C/C++ Library
Protecting the standard C/C++ libraries is very important because they are linked into
every C/C++ program. Yet they contain hand-written assembly that may need special
care, to handle some corner cases may have compatibility problems with the automated
hardening techniques. Unfortunately, many previous work did not show enough discussions
on handling these libraries. In this subsection, we try to shed some light on this topic.
We first compile eglibc-2.19 and gcc-4.8.2 with our own toolchain. Then we handle
three main cases in handwritten assembly code: (1) access to return address and stack
parameter; (2) stack layout mismatching; (3) indirect jump for invoking functions; In the
first case, we use our intra-procedure program analysis to find instructions for loading
return address (e.g., mov (%rsp), %rax). For each identified instruction, we insert the
encryption routine right after it. However, because the regular stack does not contain the
return address any longer, the offsets used to access stack parameters (x86_64 calling
convention passes parameters via stack after the first 6 ones) are incorrect. We address
this by manually adjusting the regular stack top at function prologue and epilogue. In
total, we found 12 such cases in the handwritten assembly of glibc. The second case
happens when the caller is in handwritten assembly and callee is in C code, or vice versa.
For example, _dl_runtime_resolve is written in assembly, at the end of which, its local
variables, return address, and parameters are released at once by a stack-pivot instruction
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(i.e., addq $72, %rsp), as it assumes there is only a single stack. However, this is not correct
as AG-Stack and regular stack are supposed to be released separately. To handle this, we
manually change the assembly. In total, we handled 4 such cases in libc. As mentioned in
§4.1.3.2, indirect jumps for jump table will not be instrumented, but the ones for invoking
functions will be. To differentiate them in handwritten assembly, we manually verify if a
jump instruction is used for function invocation or not, if yes, we instrument them to go
through the code locator decryption. We found 1 case in glibc.
DWARF standard is adopted for C++ exception handler (EH). For each throw statement,
an exception is allocated and the stack unwinding (i.e.,unwinder) is started. For each catch
statement, g++ has already generated a EH table and a cleanup table during compilation.
And at runtime, the unwinder will walk through the stack twice to handle the exception: (1)
trying to find the correct exception handler based on EH table; (2) if a matching is found,
walking though the stack a second time for cleanup based on the cleanup table. To support
C++ exception handling in ASLR-GUARD, we need to update these two tables and rewrite
the unwinder to support AG-Stack. Since doing so merely requires some engineering efforts
and many C++ programs do not use it (e.g., Chromium does not use it and only two SPEC
benchmark programs use it), we did not support C++ exception handling in our current
prototype yet, but leave it for future work.
4.1.5 Evaluation
In this section, we present the evaluation of ASLR-GUARD. Our evaluation tries to answer
the following questions:
• How secure is the ASLR-GUARD’s approach in theory, compared to general ASLR
approach?
• How secure is the ASLR-GUARD’s approach against practical memory-based attacks,
empirically?
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• How much overhead does ASLR-GUARD impose, in particular runtime, loading time,
and space?
Experimental setup. We carried out evaluations of ASLR-GUARD to check its security
enhancements and potential performance impacts. Our evaluations are mainly performed on
the standard SPEC CPU2006 Benchmark suite. Beside that, we also applied ASLR-GUARD
to complex and real world programs, e.g., gcc, glibc and Nginx web server. We compiled
all above programs and their libraries with the toolchain of ASLR-GUARD and enforced
them to use the dynamic linker of ASLR-GUARD. All programs were run on an Intel(R)
Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @ 2.40GHz machine with 128 GB RAM.
4.1.5.1 Security Analysis
In this subsection, we will present our analysis to determine the probability for an attacker to
hijack the control to a particular target address (let’s say, x). For our discussion in this section,
we will assume the ASLR provided by the underlying OS (in our implementation, 64-bit
Linux) provides 28-bit entropy for the address of any section that has been randomized.
Referring to Table 17, we can see that if all code locators to x are generated from sources
L2, R1 or C1 (i.e. items only reachable through .gotplt tables, return instructions or jump
tables), the attacker can only hijack the control to x by overwriting the content of the safe
vault. This is because ASLR-GUARD will never generate any encrypted code locator for x,
thus attackers cannot achieve the goal by overwriting an encrypted code locator. As such,
the probability for successful hijacking is the same as that of breaking ASLR, i.e. 2−28,
assuming the attacker knows the semantics, e.g., the offset of x in memory page.
On the other hand, if x can be reached through an encrypted code locator (i.e. x is the
address of items in the categories L1, L3, L4, R2, R3, O1, O2 of Table 17), and assuming
an encrypted code locator for x exists in AG-RandMap3, attackers have a new option by
3Otherwise, the situation will be the same as above, the attacker will have to overwrite values in the safe
vault.
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Table 18: Code locator numbers. CL: code locator.
Programs
Size of # all enc. # load-time # PLT # fixed # enc. CL # plain CL in
rand. map CL CL entries PLT in unsafe in unsafe
table (byte) entries memory memory
perlbench 14,144 884 967 131 34 603 0
bzip2 4,480 280 303 28 11 20 0
gcc 22,784 1,424 1,339 89 39 187 0
mcf 4,528 283 361 39 18 9 0
gobmk 32,720 2,045 2,104 66 26 1,771 0
hmmer 4,544 284 361 83 37 10 0
sjeng 4,592 287 365 42 21 27 0
libquantum 4,512 282 324 46 12 9 0
h264ref 4,736 296 341 64 37 16 0
astar 14,560 910 2,289 1,348 33 29 0
xalancbmk 141,696 8,856 10,275 1,449 184 258 0
milc 4,544 284 336 58 15 9 0
namd 14,880 930 2,262 1,353 36 44 0
dealII 54,784 3,424 4,884 1,473 310 81 0
soplex 21,472 1,342 2,717 1,377 254 89 0
lbm 4,528 283 316 38 13 9 0
sphinx3 4,544 284 354 76 39 10 0
Average 21,062 1,316 1,759 456 66 187 0
trying to overwrite some encrypted code locators residing in the unsafe memory with a value
that can “decrypt” the control to x. For this kind of target, given a leaked encrypted code
locator other than x, as we have argued in §4.1.3.3, and the attacker cannot read the content
of AG-RandMap in safe vault, his chance of creating the correct encrypted value of x is
2−32, guaranteed by the random nonce. Either way, the best chance of a successful attack is
no more than 2−28. We discuss a case of that the encrypted value of x is leaked in §4.1.6.
4.1.5.2 Practical Security
To see how effective ASLR-GUARD is in practice, we performed multiple empirical security
analyses.
Memory snapshot analysis. As mentioned in §4.1.2, even it is unlikely, we cannot
guarantee kernel will never save code locators in unsafe memory, as our current design
did not instrument kernel code. To make sure there is no single plain code locator left
in the unsafe memory by kernel, we did a thorough memory analysis using our memory
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analysis tool described in §4.1.2. More specifically, we first applied ASLR-GUARD to
SPEC benchmark programs. And then we hooked the entry/exit points of the programs,
as well as all points right after syscalls, and dumped the whole memory core for memory
snapshot analysis. As expected, there is no single plain code locator left in unsafe memory.
All code locators are either isolated or encrypted, which prevents attackers knowing the
address of any executable memory. Note that, our memory analysis is conservative and may
contain false positives that some random data is falsely treated as code locator. Indeed, we
found two “code locators” that point to executable memory, in sphinx3. However both code
locators are eliminated due to they actually point to the the middle of instructions, so we
believe they are false positives. Furthermore, we evaluated other numbers, e.g., the map
table size, number of all encrypted code locators, number of load-time code locators, size
of .gotplt tables, etc. Out of them, an interesting number is the one of encrypted code
locators left in the unsafe memory. To get this number, we check if any 8-bytes is “pointing”
to the random mapping table by decrypting it in the way shown in Figure 27. Note that
such analysis is conservative, and the actual number could be even less. All the evaluated
numbers are shown in Table 18. In most programs, less than 10% encrypted code locators
are propagated to unsafe memory. Many of them have less than 20 ones in unsafe memory.
Nginx web server. We chose nginx to evaluate the effectiveness of ASLR-GUARD, not
only because it is one of the most popular web servers but also that it has been compromised
by couple of attacks [20, 65]. We took Blind Return Oriented Programming (BROP) 4 as an
example to show how ASLR-GUARD defeats the return address leak, which is an essential
step in BROP attack. BROP attacks nginx 1.4.0 (64-bit) by exploiting a simple stack
buffer overflow vulnerability. This attack consists of three steps: (1) guessing the return
address on the stack; (2) finding enough gadgets; and (3) building exploit. In step (1), BROP
proposed using stack reading approach to overwrite the return address byte-by-byte with
possible guess value, until the correct one is found. Naturally, ASLR-GUARD can prevent
4http://www.scs.stanford.edu/brop/
131
Table 19: Comparison of average number of indirect branches between ASLR-GUARD and CFI
works, with the SPEC benchmarks. AG: ASLR-GUARD
Programs Original-CFI bin-CFI/CCFIR AG
ret call ret call ret call
perlbench 1 7,722 28,066 7,722 1 603
bzip2 1 1,097 11,905 1,097 1 20
gcc 1 16,697 65,519 16,697 1 187
mcf 1 1,234 12,935 1,234 1 9
gobmk 1 7,357 22,804 7,357 1 1,771
hmmer 1 1,473 16,898 1,473 1 10
sjeng 1 1,647 12,677 1,647 1 27
libquantum 1 1,184 13,405 1,184 1 9
h264ref 1 2,707 16,191 2,707 1 16
astar 1 3,398 27,301 3,398 1 29
xalancbmk 1 15,977 133,642 15,977 1 258
milc 1 1,814 14,435 1,814 1 9
namd 1 3,413 28,162 3,413 1 44
dealII 1 6,687 120,788 6,687 1 81
soplex 1 4,513 36,512 4,513 1 89
lbm 1 1,171 12,926 1,171 1 9
sphinx3 1 1,316 15,608 1,316 1 10
AIT 1 4,671 34,692 4,671 1 187
such attack at the first step, as return addresses are not stored in regular stack at all. To verify
it, we applied ASLR-GUARD to nginx, and run the exploit again. As expected, the exploit
failed at guessing the return address. Moreover, we did the memory analysis during this
attack. We found there were 1,474 code locators encrypted, out of which, 361 ones were
propagated to unsafe memory. Again, no plain code locator was left in unsafe memory.
Average indirect targets. If we conservatively assume the attackers can read the whole
unsafe memory and understand the semantics of the memory (as will be discussed in §4.1.6),
attackers may reused the leaked encrypted code locators to divert control flow. Given this
conservative assumption, we want to know how many encrypted code locators are left in
unsafe memory. Also we define a metric Average Indirect Targets (AIT) to measure the
average number of possible targets an indirect branch may have. The reason we do not reuse
AIR (Average Indirect target Reduction) metric proposed in [194] is that even the AIR is
99.9%, the number of possible targets is still huge, especially for some large programs. As
we can see in Table 19, ASLR-GUARD only left a small portion (4%) function pointers in
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Table 20: Evaluation of runtime performance with only AG-Stack and full ASLR-GUARD protec-
tion, load-time overhead, and increased file size.
Programs Runtime Load-time
Orig AG-Stack AG-Stack Full AG Full AG Orig AG AG
(s) (s) Overhead (s) Overhead (µs) (µs) Overhead
perlbench 4.17 4.20 0.72% 4.32 3.60% 1.1 1.8 62.8%
bzip2 12.2 12.3 0.82% 12.1 -0.82% 0.8 0.9 16.6%
gcc 1.75 1.74 -0.57% 1.93 10.29% 5.5 6.5 17.9%
mcf 3.14 3.10 -1.27% 3.10 -1.27% 2.4 3.2 30.8%
gobmk 25.6 25.5 -0.39% 25.7 0.39% 3.2 5.4 67.9%
hmmer 8.07 8.06 -0.12% 8.04 -0.37% 3.6 4.1 13.8%
sjeng 5.48 5.41 -1.28% 5.56 1.46% 2.7 3.9 41.8%
libquantum 0.161 0.165 2.48% 0.165 2.48% 2.4 2.5 4.7%
h264ref 31.5 31.2 -0.95% 32.3 2.54% 3.0 3.8 25.6%
astar 15.1 14.9 -1.32% 14.5 -3.97% 3.4 4.0 17.3%
xalancbmk 0.592 0.600 1.35% 0.615 3.89% 9.9 10.2 2.9%
milc 12.6 12.0 -4.76% 12.0 -4.76% 1.0 1.6 58.9%
namd 22.0 21.1 -4.09% 21.1 -4.09% 3.5 5.2 45.9%
dealII 73.1 76.3 4.38% 73.6 0.68% 4.1 5.1 24.2%
soplex 0.070 0.071 1.43% 0.071 1.43% 3.6 5.1 42.7%
lbm 3.16 3.12 -1.27% 3.16 0.00% 2.4 3.2 35.1%
sphinx3 2.39 2.37 -0.84% 2.38 -0.42% 2.5 3.2 24.2%
Average -0.33% 0.65 % 31.35%(0.86µs)
unsafe memory, which is much smaller than the ones of CFI implementations. Recently,
some CFI variants make use of type to further reduce the AIT numbers [136, 178]. As
shown in [136], the AIT number can be dramatically reduced to less than 1% compared
with original one. So we believe AIT of ASLR-GUARD can also be further reduced once
we consider type in the future.
4.1.5.3 Performance
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance overhead of ASLR-GUARD using the SPEC
CPU2006 benchmarks. The results are shown in Table 20. Note that, for fairly compari-
son, we used the same basic compilation options (e.g., -maccumulate-outgoing-args and
-mno-push-args) and only added “-aslrguard” and “-ffixed-r15” options in ASLR-GUARD
build. The results are the average numbers over 10 executions. On average, ASLR-GUARD
almost imposed no runtime (< 1%). In particular, 7 of them have even better performance
than the original ones. gcc intensively calls the encryption routine of ASLR-GUARD, so its
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performance overhead is about 10%. Compared with existing solutions for preventing code
reuse attacks, ASLR-GUARD is more efficient. For examples, the original CFI imposes
21%( [3]), bin-CFI imposes 8.5%( [194]), CCFIR imposes 3.6%( [193]), readactor imposes
6.4% ( [48]), and CPI imposes 8.4%( [98]) overhead. Compared with safe-stack of CPI [98],
performance of AG-Stack is slightly better, which is even better than the original one. With
this negligible runtime overhead, we believe ASLR-GUARD is a practical system to harden
programs with information leaks. We also performed load-time overhead evaluation for
ASLR-GUARD, which is shown in Table 20. The load-time overhead is as expected, as
ASLR-GUARD performs remapping, relocation, and encryption in load-time. However the
absolute time, i.e., 1 µs, is quite small. For space overhead, we measured the file size, which
is 6% increased in ASLR-GUARD. The memory space overhead has two megabytes more
for safe vault.
4.1.6 Discussion
Sophisticated attack defense. There are several sophisticated attacks proposed recently,
e.g., “missing the point” [65] and COOP [153]. As the size of safe vault in ASLR-GUARD
is only 2MB, there is no “always allocated” memory in ASLR-GUARD. Also offsets
between sections remapped by ASLR-GUARD are randomized. Provided these two features,
“missing the point” attack is not applicable to ASLR-GUARD. Regarding the COOP attack,
as mentioned in §4.1.3.3, all virtual table pointers are encrypted as code locators, so
attackers cannot know the locations of encrypted virtual function pointers to find vfgadgets,
and thus ASLR-GUARD can eliminate the COOP attack.
Reusing encrypted code locators. An astute reader may point out that in theory, all
the encrypted code locators that are stored in unsafe memory can leaked and reused to
construct code reuse attacks. However, to reuse these code locators, attackers have to
conquer the following challenges: (1) exploiting an arbitrary read vulnerability to leak the
whole unsafe memory; (2) understanding the semantics of leaked memory, e.g., recovering
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object boundaries, types and which functions the leaked encrypted code locators point
to; and (3) preparing parameters for the target function. Step (1) is relatively easy, if the
vulnerability can be repeatedly exploited without crashing the program. However, step
(2) is non-trivial. Previous works that tries to reverse engineer the data structures in a
memory snapshot either require an un-randomized anchor to bootstrap the traverse [29]; or
require execution traces [108]. But neither requirement is satisfiable under our attack model.
Step (3) is also challenging in x86-64 platform, where parameters are passed via registers.
Although a recent research has demonstrate using forged C++ object to pass parameters, as
discussed in §4.1.5.2, ASLR-GUARD can defeat such attack.
Despite raising the bar for attacks, we think ASLR-GUARD can be further improved in
two directions: (1) reducing AIT. According to MCFI [136], binding code locator with type
can significantly reduce the AIT to less 1% of original one. (2) code locator lifetime. We
observe that many of the remaining code locators should only be dereferenced under a very
specific context (e.g. pointers generated by setjump() should only be used in longjump()),
and their lifetime should be limited and easy to determine.
Timing side-channel attacks. Timing attacks [65, 158] can infer the bytes at a relative
address in unsafe memory or a guessed random address. ASLR-GUARD does not rely on
the default OS ASLR, instead it generates new random base addresses and specifies them
in mmap, so code sections are always randomized independently, which thus has 28-bits
effective entropy [79]. As the size of safe fault and code sections are small (say 100
MB), rewriting the data pointer with a guessed random value only has a probability of 1/214
to hit the mapped code or safe vault. The probability can be further reduced by improving
the entropy of the generated random base. Also, since all code locators in unsafe memory
are encrypted, such timing attacks can only obtain the encrypted code locators. More
importantly, our encryption scheme has the same computation costs for different locators,
so it is resistant against timing attacks.
Dynamic code generation. Besides static code, recent research also showed the feasibility
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of launching code reuse attack targeting dynamically generated code [10]. Our current
implementation of ASLR-GUARD cannot prevent such attacks. However, we believe our
current design can be naturally extended to protect dynamically generated code. Specifically,
since the code cache used to store the generated code is already randomized (as code
sections), we only need to identify pointers that may point to the code cache. This can be
done through a combination of our memory analysis tool and analyzing the code of the JIT
engine.
4.1.7 Related work
Pointer integrity. The most related work to ASLR-GUARD is PointGuard [43], which
also employed the idea of encrypting code pointers. However, it uses a single key to
encrypt all code pointers with XORing, which is vulnerable to chosen-plaintext attack and
forgery attack. Moreover, its type-based analysis cannot cover non-pointer code locators.
AG-RandMap overcomes all these problems without sacrificing performance.
Code pointer integrity [98] employed type-based analysis to identify code pointers and
unsafe stack objects, which misses non-pointer code locators. The 64-bit implementation of
CPI also relies on randomization to protect its safe region. Because its safe region contains
metadata of all recursively identified code pointers and safe stack, its size is so huge that
there is an “always allocated” memory. In addition, the mapped sections in CPI have fixed
offsets to each other. Due to these two issues, CPI is demonstrated to be bypassable by the
“missing the point” attack [65]. On the contrary, the size of safe vault in ASLR-GUARD is
much smaller (221 vs 242) and section-level randomization is performed 4.1.3.2. And thus
“missing the point” is mitigated by ASLR-GUARD.
Fine-grained randomization. Under the standard ASLR deployed in commodity OS, the
leak of a single address allows attacker to derive addresses of all instructions. To address
the shortcoming, many finer-grained randomization schemes have been proposed. [80, 142]
work at instruction level, [92, 187] work at basic block level, and [12] works at page level.
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Unfortunately, as demonstrated in [168], all these fine-grained randomization schemes are
vulnerable to attacks that leverage a powerful information leak. Since ASLR-GUARD aims
to overcome the weakness against information leak, it is orthogonal to these work and can
be deployed together to protect them from information leak based attacks.
Dynamic randomization and re-randomization. JIT-ROP [168] circumvents all fine-
grained code randomization techniques by continually disclosing the code pages, assuming
the code memory layout is fixed at runtime. To break this assumption, Isomeron [54]
and Dynamic Software Diversity [46] dynamically choose targets for indirect branches at
runtime to reduce the probability for adversary to predict the correct runtime address of ROP
gadgets. However, the security of such scheme depends on the number of gadgets required to
perform a ROP attack. If a small number (say 2) of gadgets is enough to perform the attack
(e.g., calling mprotect()), the attack still has a high chance to survive (e.g., it is 25% in
Isomeron). OS-ASR [71] prevents memory disclosures by live re-randomization. However,
the effectiveness and performance are dependent on the frequency of re-randomization. For
example, JIT-ROP can finish the attack as fast as 2.3s. To prevent such attack, OS-ASR need
provide a re-randomization with interval less than 2.3s. Based on its evaluation, an interval
with 2s will impose about 20% runtime overhead. In ASLR-GUARD, we completely prevent
attackers reading the code sections and code pointers, which provides a better security. Also
ASLR-GUARD imposes a negligible overhead.
Execute-only memory. Another approach to defeat information leak attacks is to combine
fine-grained randomization and execute-only memory [11, 48]. However, they all require
modification to the operating system. As a comparison, ASLR-GUARD does not require
any OS modification thus is more practical. Moreover, leaking the address of trampoline
table in Readactor may decrease the security provided by it to the one of coarse-grained CFI,
as all entries in the table may be reused. To mitigate this issue, Readactor performs register
allocation randomization and callee-saved register reordering. However the semantic of the
whole function are remained the same. So return-into-libc attack still works under Readactor.
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ASLR-GUARD prevents all code reuse attacks, including return-into-libc.
Control flow integrity. Control flow integrity (CFI) [3] is considered as a strong defense
against all control-flow hijacking attacks. Recent works mainly focused on making this
approach more practical, eliminating the requirement of source code, reducing the perfor-
mance overhead, providing modular support, or integrating into standard compiler toolchain
[136, 178, 193, 194]. Unfortunately, many of these CFI implementations are bypassable
[31, 55, 72]. Furthermore, CFI-like code reuse attack detection techniques (e.g. [38, 143])
have also been found to be bypassable [55]. Compared with these works, ASLR-GUARD’s
encryption scheme can provide similar or better effectiveness for reducing the possible code
reuse targets §4.1.5.2, and has lower performance overhead §4.1.5.3.
Type-based CFIs [8, 86, 136, 178] reduce the average indirect targets (AIT) by checking
indirect branches with type. In particular, MCFI [136] checks type and number of param-
eters, Forward-edge CFI [178] checks the number of parameters, Safedispatch [86] and
vfGuard [8] check class type for virtual function calls. All these protections are orthogonal
and inspiring to ASLR-GUARD. In the future, we will also bind type to indirect branches
to further reduce AIT. Opaque CFI [127] relies on static analysis to identify targets for
indirect branches, and insert checks to limit each branch in the range from the lowest ad-
dress to the highest address of all targets. So the security is various based on the range of
bounds. Another very related work is Crypto-CFI [123] which encrypts all code pointers
and return addresses. As a result, it imposes a significant overhead (45%). On the contrary,
ASLR-GUARD leverages efficient protection techniques for stack and encryption, thus has a
much lower performance overhead (< 1%). HAFIX [9] achieves fine-grained backward-edge
CFI in hardware with a reasonable performance overhead (2%). ASLR-GUARD not only
protects return address but also function pointer without the need of hardware support, and
its performance is even better.
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4.2 BUDDY: Detecting Memory Disclosures with Replicated Execution
Modern systems widely employ randomization-based security mechanisms (e.g., ASLR) to
prevent a variety of attacks such as code-reuse and privilege escalation attacks. These attacks
generally require overwriting a code/data pointer with a malicious one. To achieve this goal,
attackers have to know both the address of the target pointer and the address of malicious
code pieces (i.e., the value of the malicious pointer), whereby both of them are randomized
by ASLR. However, the randomized addresses are susceptible to memory disclosures.
Attackers have exploited memory disclosures to bypass ASLR. For example, recently
proposed advanced code reuse attacks [66, 106] all leak a randomized pointer to bypass
ASLR and then compromise the fine-grained control-flow integrity techniques [136, 178].
In addition, memory disclosures also directly result in the loss of sensitive data such as
private keys. For example, the HeartBleed [62] vulnerability allowed attackers to remotely
read sensitive memory regions from 24-55% popular HTTPS sites. Even worse, according
to vulnerability databases [57], memory disclosures are very common, and its number is
increasing. As a result, memory disclosures are posing a rising threat to our modern systems.
The most common technique [20, 157, 167] for disclosing memory is exploiting memory
errors such as buffer over-read. In response, many defense techniques [19, 49, 110, 120, 131]
have been proposed to prevent memory disclosures. In particular, Readactor [49], ASLR-
Guard [120], and TASR [19] transform or track code pointers to prevent them from being
leaked. SeCage [110] protects private keys by storing them in an isolated memory region.
Memory safety techniques (e.g., SoftBound [131], CETS [132], and AddressSanitizer [160])
provide a strong protection by preventing memory errors that can cause memory disclosures.
Unfortunately, these defense techniques all suffer from several shortcomings. Specifically,
code-pointer-only protections leave the data pointers and other sensitive data unprotected.
Note that consequences from leaking data pointers can be equally (if not more) severe
as recent attacks have shown how data pointers can be hijacked to launch attacks. For
example, Stackdefiler [106] showed that fine-grained control-flow integrity can be bypassed
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by leaking the stack address or modifying virtual function table pointers. Isolation-based
protections [110] save the target data in an isolated memory, and only the pre-defined
trusted code can access it. Such approaches suffer from two limitations: (1) finding all
the trusted references to the target data in complex programs is hard and (2) the target
data can still be leaked if the “trusted code” itself contains vulnerabilities. Memory safety
techniques are effective in preventing memory errors caused by memory errors; however,
they require re-compilation of all code, and their significant performance overhead (about
2x) impedes the adoption. In general, preventing memory disclosures caused by memory
errors is very challenging. End-to-end preventions (e.g., code pointer protection) suffer
from significant false negatives and low extensibility, while general solutions (e.g., memory
safety techniques) suffer from high performance overhead and deployment issues.
In this work, we propose BUDDY, a runtime protection framework that effectively detects
memory disclosures caused by memory errors. BUDDY can work on COTS binaries directly.
The main idea behind BUDDY is that by seamlessly maintaining two running instances and
diversifying only the target data, we can always detect any leak of such data because the
leak will result in the two instances outputting different values. The two buddy instances
are well synchronized in such a way that they act as a single instance from the perspective
of external attackers. The only difference between the buddy instances is the diversified
target data. To avoid false positives, we (1) synchronize these buddy instances by thoroughly
virtualizing syscalls, virtual syscalls, and instructions that may return different values (i.e.,
non-deterministic sources) to the buddy instances, and (2) only synchronize buddy instances
and detect divergence at I/O write: BUDDY reports leaks only when the disclosed data
leaves OS. This way, the false positive issues caused by data structure padding [117] are
eliminated. With this design, in principle, BUDDY can completely (i.e., no false negatives)
and accurately (i.e., no false positive) prevent any leak without the need to identify or track
the data in memory, which can be error-prone and expensive.
BUDDY is a general framework that mitigates memory disclosures caused by memory
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errors through replicated execution. To realize such a framework, we first develop a
formal model for BUDDY and define two properties that a BUDDY system should satisfy. To
illustrate the effectiveness of BUDDY, we then develop multiple schemes on top of BUDDY to
comprehensively detect memory disclosures caused by various memory errors. Specifically,
we propose partitioned address randomization to detect memory disclosures caused
by absolute address-based over-reads. The partitioned address randomization scheme
ensures that the address spaces for buddy instances are non-overlapping and randomization
enabled. Any absolute address-based over-read will already result in one instance crashing,
thus triggering detectable divergences. Further, to detect memory disclosures caused by
relative address-based over-reads, we develop the random padding scheme that introduces
paddings with random values among both stack frames and heap objects. Whenever such
an over-read occurs, different data values will be obtained; therefore, leaking them will
also trigger the divergence detection of BUDDY. To detect memory disclosures caused by
temporal memory errors (e.g., use-after-free), we borrow the randomization scheme from
Diehard [16] that allocates objects in a random address, so that an uninitialized value or a
defined value after free will likely differ in buddy instances; leaking the value will trigger
the divergence detection of BUDDY. Applying all these schemes on top of BUDDY, we are
able to comprehensively detect memory disclosures caused by various of memory errors.
For example, BUDDY can effectively detect the emerging address leaks and the Heartbleed
attack.
BUDDY-based memory disclosure detection has three important advantages. First, the
error-prone and expensive data tracking are completely avoided. That is, whenever the
diversified data is leaked through I/O by a remote attacker, we can detect it. Second, in
principle, BUDDY-based detection can detect leaks without false negatives. That is, as long
as the returned data from the buddy processes contains any diversified data, they must be
different, otherwise, the leak is not meaningful for the attacker to infer the data. Third,
BUDDY can directly work on binaries without the need to recompile the source code. Note
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that, although BUDDY double-executes the user-space code (kernel code and drivers are
executed only once), its performance overhead is amortized with multi-core CPU that is
commonly deployed in modern devices. As shown in §4.2.6, BUDDY only imposes a small
performance overhead.
Although BUDDY leverages the n-version approach [35], its goal is not to build an
enhanced n-version system, instead it aims to use the n-version approach to achieve a new
security goal—detecting memory disclosures caused by memory errors. To this end, we have
proposed multiple new mechanisms such as single syscall synchronization (Table 4.2.4.2),
partitioned address randomization (§4.2.4.1), and random padding (§4.2.4.1). We differ-
entiate BUDDY from many previous n-version systems [16, 45, 69, 81, 94, 100, 124, 183]
that were mainly designed to detect intrusions or errors. First, since intrusion or error may
happen at any point during execution, these n-version systems (e.g., n-variant systems [45])
have to intercept and synchronize all syscalls. A fundamental problem with such a design is
that synchronizing every syscall is expensive because of the frequent waiting and notifying
between variants. More seriously, synchronizing every syscall may cause false positives.
For example, divergent data caused by uninitialized memory (it is common due to data
structure padding [117]) should not be treated as a leak if it does not leave the OS through
I/O write. ReMon [183] improves the efficiency by eliminating the synchronizations of
non-sensitive syscalls; however, its ptrace-based syscall interception requires extra context
switches, which can cause considerable runtime overhead. BUDDY only synchronizes and
detects memory disclosures with a single synchronization point—I/O write (i.e., file write
and socket write) and thus minimizes performance overhead and false positives. Second,
traditional n-version systems typically detect intrusion or error by monitoring divergence in
the syscall sequence, which is not applicable to information leak detection because informa-
tion leak does not necessarily change the control flow. BUDDY strictly synchronizes at only
I/O write and detects divergence in the outgoing contents in a fine-grained manner.
We implemented the BUDDY framework on the Linux 64-bit platform. BUDDY is a
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practical system that does not require the availability of source code of a target program,
modification of compilation toolchain, or recompilation of OS kernels. Instead, it directly
supports any COTS program. BUDDY mainly consists of (1) a kernel space coordinator that
hooks the syscall table to intercept and synchronize syscalls, (2) a user space coordinator that
synchronizes virtual syscalls and instructions in user space, and (3) a controller that prepares
both coordinators, starts and monitors the buddy instances. With the BUDDY framework,
we further implemented two diversification schemes for detecting memory disclosures, the
partitioned address randomization scheme and the random padding scheme.
We evaluated the performance of the BUDDY framework with the partitioned address
randomization scheme and the random padding scheme using the SPEC CPU2006 bench-
marks and multiple server programs, including Apache web server, Nginx web server,
OpenSSL, PHP, Lighttpd, and Orzhttpd. For effectiveness evaluation, we evaluated BUDDY
using a set of real address leak attacks and the HeartBleed attack. The evaluation results
show that BUDDY can effectively prevent all tested data leaks. Since BUDDY is a 2-variant
system that runs user-space code in parallel, for a single-core processor, BUDDY may incur a
performance overhead of more than 100%. However, with a multi-core processor, BUDDY’s
performance overhead is small: 2.3% on the SPEC benchmark and around 4% on web
server programs. Moreover, the partitioned address randomization scheme introduces a
non-measurable overhead, and the random padding scheme introduces an additional 2.8%
overhead. Even in the scenario where the CPU is highly loaded already (e.g., 99% CPU
usage), BUDDY introduces a performance overhead of only 8.3% on the SPEC benchmarks.
In summary, this work makes the following contributions:
• We proposed BUDDY, a framework for detect memory disclosures caused by memory
errors. BUDDY avoids the expensive and error-prone date tracking process.
• We proposed the adaptive ring buffer based virtualization mechanism (with a single
synchronization point) to boost the performance of the buddy execution and minimize
its false positives.
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• Based on the BUDDY framework, we designed the partitioned address randomization
and the random padding scheme to detect memory disclosures caused by spatial
memory errors in general.
4.2.1 Challenges in Detecting Memory Disclosures
A common way for attackers to disclose memory is to exploit memory-error vulnerabil-
ities. Such vulnerabilities can be spatial such as out-of-bound read or temporal such as
uninitialized-data read and use-after-free. According to CVE details [57], the number of
memory disclosure-related memory errors is still increasing in general. Researchers have
attempted to mitigate memory disclosures with various approaches, which can be classified
into four categories: data-flow tracking, memory isolation, data encryption, and memory
error elimination. We now discuss these approaches and their limitations.
Data flow tracking. Data flow tracking aims to detect illegal data usages (e.g., data leak).
Static data flow tracking performs a reachability analysis from the data sources to the sinks.
Since such analyses are guided by the pre-built data dependency graph, they cannot catch
leaks that are out of the graph (e.g., flow diverted by memory errors). Dynamic data flow
tracking [155] is accurate in detecting leaks; however, its orders of magnitude of the runtime
performance overhead is unacceptable to be used in production.
Memory isolation. Memory isolation approaches [110] save the target data in an isolated
memory region, and only the pre-defined trusted code can access it; therefore, external
attackers cannot touch the isolated memory. Two fundamental limitations with these ap-
proaches are: (1) it is difficult to find all the trusted references to the target data in complex
programs; and (2) the target data in the isolated memory still can be leaked if the “trusted
code” itself contains vulnerabilities.
Data encryption. Data encryptions are extensively used to protect the target data, which
aim to render the disclosure of the memory useless in inferring the content of the target data.
Effectiveness of such approaches relies on the confidentiality of the encryption key. Further,
144
data encryption is expensive and thus not suitable for protecting data (e.g., data pointer) that
is prevalently scattered over the memory. More importantly, encryption-based protections
may suffer from replay attacks. Attackers can replace an encoded pointer with another to
hijack the control flow.
Memory-error elimination. Memory safety techniques [131] can eliminate memory
errors, so memory disclosures caused by them are naturally prevented. However, such
techniques require modification of toolchain and runtime, and usually impose a significant
performance overhead (e.g., SoftBound [131] imposes a 70% runtime overhead).
Conclusion: While preventing memory disclosures is a pressing security goal, for practical
deployment, it is very challenging to achieve effectiveness, completeness, and efficiency.
4.2.2 Formal Model
We aim to detect attacks that exploit memory errors to disclose memory data. As discussed
in §4.2.1, existing approaches are not adequate in detecting memory disclosures, hence we
need a new solution that is general, effective, and efficient. To this end, we propose BUDDY,
a new framework for detecting memory disclosures. At high level, BUDDY maintains
two identical instances (i.e., buddy instances), P and P ′, for an original process Po, and
diversifies the target data in the two buddy instances. BUDDY detects disclosures by
monitoring divergences when the diversified data values are disclosed through some points
such as I/O write. This way, the expensive and error-prone data-flow tracking is avoided. In
this section, we present the formal model of BUDDY.
We first define detecting points: [D0, D1, D2, ...]. In BUDDY, detecting points
trigger detection for memory disclosures. Examples of detecting points include I/O write
system calls. We then view an execution of a process as a potentially infinite sequence of
states: [S0, S1, S2, ...]. In BUDDY, at detecting point i, we have a pair of states for the two
buddy instances: <Si, S ′i>. Therefore, for detecting points from 0 to i, the execution of the




2>, ...]. Note that the
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sequence of states at detecting points is a subset of the whole state sequence of a process.
States of buddy instances in each state pair are semantically equivalent. However,
BUDDY diversifies non-semantic attributes such as memory layout (we assume the
semantics of a process are independent from memory layout) in the two buddy instances.
Besides semantic equivalence, the BUDDY system also maintains the mapping from the
states (i.e., <Si, S ′i>) of buddy instances P and P
′ to the state (i.e., So,i) of original process
Po through mapping function Map(), at detecting point i. The original process has a
transition function To, and the two buddy instances have transition functions T and T ′,
respectively. All these transition functions take an input and a state at a detecting point, and
then produces the state at next detecting point. Note that we will ensure that the state at the
last detecting point represents the last state of a process execution for an input.
The equivalence property under normal execution. Under normal execution (i.e., no
memory disclosure), we have the following induction:
Map(S0) = Map(S
′
0) = So,0. (1)
∀0 ≤ i ≤ N,∀I ∈ Normal inputs :
Map(T (Si, I)) = Map(T
′(S ′i, I)) = To(So,i, I).
(2)
The above equations shows the following property, namely equivalence property, under
normal execution when we assume the two buddy instances are synchronized at each
detecting point.
• Equation 1 shows that both two buddy instances are in the equivalent initial states that
can be mapped to the state of the original process.
• Equation 2 shows that, given an input, the transition functions in both two buddy
instances preserve mapped equivalence at each detecting point.
• Since the last detecting point is the end of the execution, Equation 2 also shows that
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both instances produce the same outputs as the original process, ensuring semantic
equivalence.
The divergence property under memory disclosures. We assume that the initial states
of buddy instances are not under attack, so Equation 1 is always satisfied. However,
whenever an attacker discloses some memory data, we need to ensure a property, namely
divergence property, so that Equation 2 is not satisfied. Formula 3 shows that if some
memory disclosures occur during transition right after detection point i, the states at
detection point i + 1, Si+1 and S ′i+1, must be different. With the divergence property, we
detect memory disclosures in this way: Whenever the states of the two buddy instances are
not equivalent, we know there is a memory disclosure attack.
∀0 ≤ i ≤ N,∀I ∈ Inputs :
T (Si, I)) or T
′(S ′i, I)) ∈ Memory disclosures =⇒ Map(Si+1) ̸= Map(S ′i+1).
(3)
Threat model. We have modeled the BUDDY system, including its properties and how
we detect memory disclosures. To make the model as practical as possible, we make the
following main assumptions:
• Attackers have to disclose memory through pre-defined detecting points such as I/O
write system calls.
• The target program will not intentionally use unspecified memory such as uninitialized
memory as part of its semantics.
• We have the list of non-determinism sources so that we can virtualize them and ensure
the divergence of Equation 3 is caused by memory disclosures.
Moreover, we focus on preventing remote attacks that disclose memory by exploiting
memory errors (not logic errors). After gathering the memory data, the attacker may further
launch subsequent attacks, such as code reuse attack. We assume the hardware and the OS
kernel as our trusted computing base (TCB), so attacks that target the hardware (e.g., cold
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boot attack [75]) and the kernel are excluded. Since there are many ways to acquire data
of a program locally (e.g., by directly reading /proc/pid/mem and cache side-channels),
we do not consider attacks where attackers already have the ability to execute arbitrary
code. BUDDY currently does not support web browsers; however, the concept of BUDDY is
general, and we discuss how to support script environments with BUDDY in §4.2.7. Side-
channel-based leaks are still possible because we are not able to cover all detecting points
of side channels. The target program may contain one or more vulnerabilities that can be
exploited to disclose memory. The program’s source code and binary may be available to
attackers, and they can perform both static and dynamic analyses. We do not limit the types
of vulnerabilities (except side-channels); they can be buffer over-read, format string, reading
uninitialized memory, etc. For defense mechanisms, we assume that the target program is
PIE-enabled (position-independent-executable) and the underlying operating system enables
both ASLR and DEP (i.e., no code injection attack). Finally, we assume that the processor
is multi-core.
4.2.3 The BUDDY Approach





Output (only if output=output')
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Figure 30: Overview of the BUDDY approach. BUDDY virtualizes all virtualizing points and strictly
synchronizes at I/O write to detect any divergence in outgoing data. For example, If pointer and
pointer′ are disclosed, BUDDY is able to detect it at socket write because they are not equal.
Figure 30 illustrates how BUDDY works: whenever the target program is about to run,
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BUDDY launches two identical instances (processes). The diversification schemes ensure
that reading the target data in these buddy instances through memory errors will get different
values. Now let us consider a concrete scenario where the attacker sends a malicious
payload to disclose the target data. BUDDY duplicates and sends the payload (input) to
both instances. To make sure both instances exhibit the same semantics during payload
processing, all syscalls, virtual syscalls, and instructions that may return different results
(i.e., non-determinisms) are virtualized to always return the same value to both instances.
After processing the attacker’s payload, both instances generate the corresponding outputs
and write them to the socket. At this moment, by hooking I/O write syscalls, BUDDY
captures the data to be sent out and compares their contents. If both outputs are the same,
BUDDY continues the write operation (but only performs once); otherwise, a divergence is
detected, and BUDDY indicates that the target data is being disclosed.
Based on the above scenario, to achieve memory disclosure detection, BUDDY needs
to include the following three parts: (1) non-interference diversification that diversifies the
target data but will not break program semantics, (2) virtualization of buddy instances, which
properly intercepts non-determinisms to ensure that they always return the same value, and
(3) disclosure detection that captures divergences at I/O write.
4.2.4 Design
In this section, we present the design of the three key components of BUDDY: non-
interference diversification, coordination of buddy instances, and memory disclosure detec-
tion.
4.2.4.1 Non-Interference Diversification
BUDDY detects memory disclosures by catching divergences in outgoing data, which re-
quires that the target data is diversified. Diversification should be performed in a non-
interference manner to satisfy the equivalence property, i.e., during normal execution, the
diversification should not break the semantics of the target program or cause any difference
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Table 21: Non-interference diversification schemes.
Category Spatial (Buffer over-read) Temporal
Type Absolute addr Relative addr Uninitialized read Use-after-free
Continuous Offset-based
Diversification Partitioned Random Random Diehard [16] Diehard [16]ASLR padding padding
Equivalence
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓property
Divergence
✓ Probabilistic Probabilistic Probabilistic Probabilisticproperty
in outputs. Further, the diversification scheme should also satisfy the divergence property,
i.e., any memory disclosures can be detected. In this work, we design two diversification
schemes. The partitioned address randomization scheme detects any over-reads that
are based on an absolute address. The random padding scheme detects continuous over-
reads that are based on a relative address. When an over-read is offset-based (i.e., skipping
some data), the random padding scheme provides probabilistic detection. To detect memory
disclosures caused by temporal memory errors (e.g., use-after-free), we borrow the diversifi-
cation scheme from Diehard [16], which allocates objects in random addresses. Note that,
BUDDY is a general framework; more diversifications such as fine-grained ASLR [12, 92]
can be applied to BUDDY to achieve other security properties.
Partitioned Address Randomization. The scheme we propose to detect absolute address-
based over-reads is partitioned address randomization. We first equally partition the
available address space into two non-overlapping sub-spaces. The two buddy instances are
then loaded into the sub-spaces, respectively. We retrofit the loader (ld.so) to ensure that
memory layout randomization is also enforced separately in each sub-space. Compared to
the default ASLR, our randomization has 1-bit less entropy because of the partitioning.
Equivalence property. The position-independent code (PIC) or position-independent
executable (PIE) technique in modern compilers already allows us to map the process
memory into a random address, so our partition address randomization is non-interference.
150
That is, it satisfies the equivalence property.
Divergence property. Since the sub-spaces are non-overlapping, we ensure that any
absolute address-based over-read will result in one instance crashing, and we can detect it.
Therefore, such a scheme also satisfies the divergence property.
Random Padding Scheme. To detect memory disclosures caused by relative address-
based over-reads, we propose the random padding scheme. The design of the random
padding scheme is based on our observation that an relative address-based over-read will
get different values if we append different paddings to the target data in the buddy instances
so that BUDDY can detect divergences when the overread data are disclosed through I/O
write. Figure 31 shows the design of the scheme: in one instance, the padding consists of an
8-byte random value and a 24-byte undefined memory (i.e., a placeholder); in the other, the
padding consists of an 8-byte random value and an 8-byte undefined memory. The size of
the padding is set to either 32 or 16, in order to conform to the data alignment requirement.
The sizes of the padding in two buddy instances are set to be different so that an offset-based
over-read (i.e., discontinuous over-read) will also get different values. The random value
in the padding is set to the value of register RIP, for two reasons: (1) values of RIP are
guaranteed to be different because the base addresses are different, so an over-read of the
paddings will always get different values; (2) compared to using real random value, using
RIP is much more efficient.
For stack, the padding is inserted between stack frames (right after return address). x86_-
64 calling convention passes the first 6 parameters through registers, but the remaining ones
are still passed through stack. As such, we also need to update all the parameter-accessing
instructions in the function by patching the offsets. For heap, the padding is inserted
between the metadata (i.e., head of the object) and the actual object memory. The padding
can be enforced in a finer-grained manner (e.g., field level); however, it will incur more
performance overhead. We currently choose object-level and stack-frame-level padding for
a better performance.
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Figure 31: The random padding scheme for stack and heap objects. Random value is inserted
between any two stack frames or heap objects. The size difference between placeholders ensures
different offsets.
Equivalence property. Similar to the partitioned address randomization scheme, our
random padding scheme does not change the original semantics of a program. Instead, it
only changes the memory layout of objects in stack and heap, and updates the offsets in
instructions to ensure proper accesses. Therefore, we establish the equivalence property in
the random padding scheme.
Divergence property. Continuous over-reads will always read the inserted padding
bytes. Since we guarantee that the padding bytes in the two buddy instances have different
values, such over-reads will always get different values. Therefore, whether the divergence
property is satisfied depends on the computation between the over-read and the next de-
tecting point. If the computation is a deterministic, one-to-one function (such as in the
Heartbleed attack [62]), we can guarantee that the outputs from the two buddy instances
at the next detecting point must be divergent, and thus the divergence property is satisfied.
However, if the computation is non-deterministic or n-to-one function, it is possible that
the outputs are the same at the next detecting point. In this case, the divergence property is
probabilistic. As for offset-based over-reads, we cannot guarantee the divergence property
because such over-reads may skip the inserted padding bytes and junk bytes. Whether the
read data differs depends on the values of the target data. If the target data is random, the
read data has a probability of 2N − 1 out of 2N to differ, where N is the number of read bits.
However, if the target data is a sequence of a repeating bytes, attackers may read the same
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value at the diversified offsets, bypassing the scheme. Such a case is not common for secret
data such as encryption keys and randomized address of ASLR.
4.2.4.2 Coordination of BUDDY Instances
The goals of coordination are to ensure that (1) the buddy instances always receive the same
inputs and (2) any operation that has an external impact to the program is executed only
once. In this way, we ensure the BUDDY system behaves as a single entity to attackers, and
whenever an divergence is detected at output, we can conclude with confidence that the
target data is being disclosed.
Virtualizing Points. We need to virtualize the execution of BUDDY for two reasons: (1) the
two buddy instances are maintained to be identical except the intentionally enforced diversity
(e.g., randomized memory layout), so all non-deterministic operations should be virtualized
to return same values; (2) BUDDY replicates the execution for only user space, so non-user-
space operations such as kernel space operations should also be virtualized to return same
values to the two buddy instances. In this work, we use the term virtualizing point to refer
to a syscall, a virtual syscall, or an instruction that may return non-deterministic values (e.g.,
RDRAND instruction) or different values (e.g., open syscall) to the buddy instances, or have
observable external effect (e.g., write syscall). Using this definition, to make sure that both
buddy instances exhibit the same semantics and act as a single application to external entities,
we need to make all the virtualizing points return the same values to the buddy instances,
except memory-layout-related ones such as mmap. Please note that identifying all virtualizing
points is not a new problem, which is necessary for all n-version systems [16, 27, 45, 81].
Similar to these previous systems, we also conservatively include most syscalls, all virtual
syscalls, and non-deterministic instructions as the virtualizing points. The summary of
virtualizing points is shown in Table 22.
Completeness of virtualizing points. Although both traditional n-version systems and
BUDDY have conservatively selected the virtualizing points, we still cannot claim they are
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Table 22: Included virtualizing points. Besides memory space related syscalls, they are conform to
previous N-version systems [16, 27, 45, 81].
Category Virtualizing points
Syscall All syscalls except memory space
related ones (e.g., mmap)
Virtual syscall All virtual syscalls
Instruction RDTSC and RDRAND
always complete for all programs because new non-determinisms (e.g., new instructions or
new syscalls) may be added to the system over time, and some non-deterministic inputs or
output channels may be unique to a system or a program (e.g., special hardware feature). If
a new non-determinism is introduced, we need to include it as a virtualizing point. Please
note that the completeness of current virtualizing points has been validated by extensive
experiments over many real server programs. As shown in §4.2.6, BUDDY can reliably run
these programs without triggering any real false positive. Therefore, we believe our current
set of virtualizing points is arguably complete for practical deployment.
Intercepting Virtualizing Points. To coordinate a virtualizing point, we need to intercept
it first so as to insert the virtualization logic. There are two requirements for intercepting
virtualizing points. First, the interception must be reliable so that the attacker cannot
bypass it. Second, since many operations may be frequently executed (e.g., getpid and I/O
operations), the interception must be efficient. To satisfy both requirements, our interception
employs different approaches to intercept syscalls, virtual syscalls, and instructions.
Syscall. There are many ways to intercept syscalls. A common way is to use ptrace [45],
as it is available in most *nix systems. However, because ptrace introduces extra context
switches for each intercepted syscall, this approach is not efficient enough. Therefore,
instead of using ptrace, we chose to temporarily patch the syscall table using a kernel
module. In this way, extra context switches can be avoided to improve performance. Note
that patching the syscall table will also affect other programs, as such, we add a PID-based
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Figure 32: The adaptive ring buffer-based virtualization. Normal virtualizing points are virtualized in
a ring buffer manner. However, upon I/O write, BUDDY locks the ring buffer and strictly synchronizes
to detect memory disclosures.
module, the attacker cannot modify it.
Virtual syscall. To accelerate the execution of certain “read-only”syscalls like gettimeofday,
kernel developers export a small set of functions to the virtual dynamic shared object (vDSO).
Since virtual syscalls do not actually go through the kernel, the syscall table patching based
interception is not applicable. For these syscalls (only four in x86_64 systems), we chose to
patch the GOTPLT table that contains the entries to these virtual syscalls.
Instruction. In general, binary rewriting is necessary for intercepting particular instructions.
But rewriting an instruction with another one with more bytes (e.g., jmp) may change the
code layout. To reliably intercept instructions, we replace them with an one-byte interrupt
instruction (e.g., INT3), which allows us to perform virtualization by handling the interrupt.
At the same time, because the intercepted instructions like RDTSC and RDRAND are typically
not executed frequently, our approach does not generate much more overhead than jmp-based
interception.
The Adaptive Ring Buffer Virtualization. Traditional n-version systems perform coor-
dination in a fully synchronized manner (i.e., lockstep), which would introduce significant
overhead. For example, for Apache web server, because of frequent CPU swap, the fully
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synchronized approach can impose a performance overhead of over 50%. To solve this
problem, we take an approach similar to [81, 179]. Specifically, one of the buddy instances
is assigned as the leader instance, and the other is assigned as the follower instance. The
leader instance performs the actual operation and stores the results in a shared memory,
while the follower just retrieves the results without actually performing the operation. In
this way, from the perspective of the buddy instances themselves, they are independent
instances; but from the perspective of an external entity (e.g., the attacker), they are a single
instance. At the same time, because the leader does not need to wait for the follower, the
performance overhead is much lower. However, in order to prevent memory disclosures, it
is still necessary to synchronize at every I/O write operation and check for divergences in
the outgoing data.
To implement our coordination scheme, we designed the adaptive ring buffer-based
virtualization mechanism (Figure 32). The ring buffer has a configurable but fixed amount of
slots shared by both the leader and follower. Each slot consists of an arguments holder and a
result holder. For virtualizing points other than I/O write, the leader performs the operation
and puts the result in the result holder of a ring buffer slot; and when the follower reaches
the same execution point, it picks up the result without actually performing the operation.
Please note that because both buddy instances are exactly the same, any divergence in the
syscall sequence will also be a sign of attack and will result in termination. For I/O writes,
the leader puts the content in the arguments holder and waits for the follower; and when
the follower reaches the same execution points, it compares its own output arguments with
the leader’s and informs the leader of the result. If the outgoing data is the same, then the
leader performs the operation and puts the result in the ring buffer; otherwise, the operations
is aborted. It is also worth noting that because syscalls are handled in the kernel space,
BUDDY utilizes two ring buffers, one for user space coordination (i.e., virtual syscalls and
instructions) and the other for syscall coordination. Obviously, attacker cannot modify the
ring buffer in kernel space. For the ring buffer in user space, because it is mapped into
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randomized (and different) addresses in the buddy instances, and memory addresses are
protected by BUDDY, attackers cannot modify the data in shared memory either.
Multi-processing/threading support. Thread scheduling is another important source of
non-determinism for multi-threaded programs. To completely resolve this issue, synchro-
nizing all shared memory accesses is necessary to ensure that the leader and follower have
consistent views on shared memory whenever they issue a syscall. In other words, the
follower should follow exactly the same order of shared data accesses as the leader. How-
ever, such a total order synchronization can hardly be achieved without a high performance
overhead or special hardware support, as evidenced in the deterministic multi-threading
(DMT) domain [15, 140]. Neither is it necessary for many of the multi-threaded programs.
In BUDDY, we implemented a lightweight (but potentially incomplete) support for
multi-threaded programs. At a high level, BUDDY assigns each pair of leader-follower
processes/threads of the buddy instances to the same execution group; and each execution
group has its own ring buffer. Forking/cloning is monitored to maintain execution groups:
when the leader instance forks a process/thread, the child process/thread automatically
becomes the leader process of the new execution group; and the forked process of the
follower instance automatically becomes the follower process in the new execution group.
Note that if the follower does not fork, it is a divergence in syscall sequence and will be
detected by BUDDY.
In fact, for daemon-like programs (e.g., a majority of server programs such as Apache,
Nginx, sshd), BUDDY’s lightweight solution is sufficient to eliminate the syscall sequence
deviations caused by non-deterministic schedulers because, for those programs, each thread-
/process is highly independent of others and hardly or never access shared memory. We have
also verified that BUDDY does not raise false alerts when synchronizing the aforementioned
daemon server programs (§4.2.6). Developing sophisticated DMT solutions is out of scope
for this work. In fact, BUDDY can leverage the latest development in DMT domain by
directly plugging-in many existing DMT solutions, such as [15, 52, 109, 115].
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4.2.4.3 Memory Disclosure Detection
Once all the virtualizing points are virtualized, BUDDY strictly synchronizes I/O write (e.g.,
local file write and socket write) and performs a quick comparison on the outgoing data to
accurately detect memory disclosures. In particular, for arguments of non-pointer type (e.g.,
size of the buffer), we compare their values; and for pointers, because their values have been
randomized by ASLR, we compares the content of the buffers they point to. Note that if one
of the buddy instances crashes, or the syscall sequence is different, BUDDY also treats them
as divergences.
Although we assume the attack is remote, it is still necessary to check local file write
operations. The reason is that some vulnerability may allow attackers to use local “storage”
(e.g., files) as “trampoline” to disclose the data indirectly. For example, an attacker can
cause the leader instance to write the diversified data into a local file first; then read it from
file and send it out through network. If there is no check for divergence is performed, we
will miss such attack.
4.2.5 Implementation
We implemented a prototype of the BUDDY framework on the 64-bit Linux, which consists
of a kernel space coordinator, a user space coordinator, and an instance controller. We will
further the random padding scheme.
4.2.5.1 Diversifiers
Partitioned address randomizer. The partitioned address randomizer has two tasks:
partitioning the address space into two sub-spaces and randomizing memory layout of
instances in their own sub-spaces. We implemented the randomizer by customizing the
dynamic linker (i.e., ld.so). The only modification we made to the dynamic linker is in-
strumenting the call to the mmap syscall. We modify the mmap call to ensure that it always
maps the memory to a random address in the partitioned sub-spaces. In default 64-bit
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Linux systems, ASLR has 28-bit randomness entropy; the randomized base address is of
the form 0x7f???????000, where ? bits are randomized. In our partitioned address random-
izer, we partition the address space into two ranges: <0x7f0000000000, 0x7f7ffffff000>
and <0x7f7ffffff000, 0x7ffffffff000>, and randomize the memory layout of buddy
instances in the two ranges by specifying a legitimate and random base address to the mmap
system call.
Random padding diversifier. As shown in Table 4.2.4.1, we insert random paddings
among stack frames and heap objects. We insert random paddings among stack frames by
modifying the GNU assembler. Such an implementation can support COTS binaries as long
as the disassembly is complete and reassembleable [184]. Specifically, we first identify
function prologues with the .cfi_startproc label, and return instructions. At function
prologue, we create the padding: subtracting RSP and setting random value with the value
of register RIP, which is obtained with the LEA instruction. Before return instructions, we
restore the stack. The repz ret instruction (equivalent to nop; ret;) is used to improve the
AMD processor performance; we also treat it as a return. If a function contains a tail call,
we do not enforce padding for it. Parameter-accessing instructions are identified by pattern
“offset(%rbp).” We update offset by increasing its value by either 32 or 16, depending
on which instance it is in. For heap object, we use LD_PRELOAD to intercept heap allocation
functions. After that, we enlarge the size of the object by 32 or 16, and insert the random
value after the metadata of the object.
4.2.5.2 Kernel Space Coordinator
The kernel space coordinator is implemented as a Linux kernel module. It is responsible
for virtualizing syscalls, synchronizing I/O writes, and performing leak detection. Syscall
interception is done through standard syscall table patching, i.e., replacing the original
syscall handlers with our callbacks.
Syscall filtering. Since BUDDY patches the syscall table at kernel space, syscalls from all
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processes will be redirected to our callbacks. To quickly differentiate the BUDDY processes
from other processes, we implemented a PID-based process filtering scheme. The kernel
space coordinator holds a hashtable with PID as keys and variant control bock (vcb) as
values. A vcb holds critical information about the BUDDY processes, such as the address
of the ring buffer, whether the process is leader or follower, etc. Upon program launch,
the instance controller will first inform the kernel space coordinator of the PIDs of the
buddy processes. Upon task fork, the newly created task is automatically added to the
hashtable; and upon task exit, the corresponding hashtable entry is removed. By looking up
the hashtable, we could reliably distinguish whether the entered process is a BUDDY process
or not.
4.2.5.3 User Space Coordinator
The user space coordinator is implemented as a shared library, which is preloaded into
both buddy instances upon program start-up. The user space coordinator is responsible for
intercepting and virtualizing virtual syscalls and instructions.
Intercepting virtual syscalls and instructions. Because virtual syscalls are essentially
libc function calls, we can hook them by replacing the corresponding entries in the GOTPLT
table callbacks to ours virtualization function. To do so, we use LD_PRELOAD to prioritize
our library so that old virtual syscall functions are overridden with ours. Beside virtual
syscalls, we found another special syscall that may not invoke the kernel—the glibc wrapper
function getpid(). Because the result of this syscall will not change, glibc caches the result
in user space to improve the performance. In other words, after the first syscall of getpid,
it becomes a virtual syscall. Therefore, we also hook getpid() by patching the GOTPLT
table.
To intercept non-deterministic instructions (e.g., RDRAND), we patch the first byte of
the instruction with INT 3. At runtime, when this interrupt is triggered, we virtualize
it through the standard signal handling mechanism. For RDTSC, binary-rewriting is not
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even necessary: we can trap for RDTSC by making timestamp counter non-readable (i.e.,
prctl(PR_SET_TSC, PR_TSC_SIGSEGV, 0, 0, 0)). Whenever the timestamp counter is
read, a SIGSEGV will be triggered, allowing for our virtualization.
Ring buffer for synchronization. The ring buffers in the user space must be explicitly
created in the shared memory and mapped (using mmap) into both instances. The logic of
creating and mapping this shared memory is also implemented in the shared library.
4.2.5.4 Instance Controller
The instance controller program is responsible for starting, monitoring, terminating, and
restarting the buddy instances. It first informs the kernel space coordinator of the incoming
buddy processes and then sets the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to the shared library.
It then forks two children processes and uses execve to launch the target program in each
forked process. After that, the instance controller pauses and waits for status change of
the buddy instances. In case any of the buddy processes is killed, the instance controller is
waken up, prints alerts and executes corrective actions (e.g. restart the system) according to
policy specified by users.
4.2.6 Evaluation
BUDDY is designed to be a general framework that can detect memory disclosures caused
by memory errors. In principle, the effectiveness of BUDDY is guaranteed by the fact that
the disclosure of diversified data will cause a divergence at some points, and BUDDY detects
the memory disclosure by catching the divergence. Efficiency is also a faithful goal for
BUDDY to be practical. We extensively evaluated the robustness, security, and performance
of BUDDY.
• Robustness. Evaluating BUDDY on various programs to empirically show that it
incurs no false positives and does not break the semantics of original programs.
• Security. Analyzing the security of BUDDY and validating it with multiple real
exploits.
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• Performance. Evaluating BUDDY’s performance with two sets of benchmarks: the
SPEC CPU2006 Benchmarks (CPU intensive) and ApacheBench (I/O intensive).
Experiment setup. All experiments were conducted on an eight-core server machine with
a 3.60 GHz Intel Xeon E5-1620 CPU and 64 GB RAM running 64-bit Ubuntu 14.04
LTS with 3.13.0-63-generic Linux kernel. For evaluation on web servers, we dedicate a
remote machine as the client and use it to simulate client requests as well as measure the
request roundtrip time and data transfer rate. Server and client machines are connected in a
university-level LAN.
4.2.6.1 Robustness
There are two goals of robustness evaluation: (1) to empirically validate the completeness of
the set of virtualizing points in practice; (2) to validate that BUDDY do not cause any error. In
particular, we ran BUDDY on the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks and popular server programs,
including Apache web server (configured to include PHP module and use OpenSSL), Nginx
web server, Lighttpd, and Orzhttpd. For server programs, we wget the homepages of top
100 websites by Alexa [5], which contain HTML, scripts and images. We then configured
the servers to host them. After that, we ran ApacheBench [7] to iteratively access these
web pages with various concurrencies (i.e., concurrent connections = 1, 64, and 256). In
our experiments, we did not observe any error; worker processes of server programs did
not crash; outputs with and without BUDDY (i.e., temporally) were always identical, and
outgoing data of the buddy instances did not trigger any divergence (except one case).
The only inconsistency case we observed was a false positive in OpenSSL. Specifically,
the SSLeay implementation of OpenSSL uses an uninitialized buffer that may contain
unspecified values as an additional source of entropy for pseudo random number generation.
As a result, nonce in the SSL handshake will be different in the buddy instances. We argue
that, since reading uninitialized memory is classified as a type of memory error [77], it is
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Figure 33: Performance of SPEC benchmarks when CPU is in various load levels. CPU usage is
controlled by stress-ng. When CPU is highly-loaded (99% usage), BUDDY imposes an average
performance overhead of 8.3%.
insecure and should be avoided at best5. In fact, OpenSSL developers are aware of this
issue and have provided the -DPURIFY flag to avoid using uninitialized buffer as a source of
randomness. After compiling OpenSSL with this flag, BUDDY functioned correctly without
any false positive.
4.2.6.2 Security
To evaluate the security of our prototype implementation, we tested BUDDY with in-the-wild
memory disclosure attacks. In this experiment, we enable both the partitioned address
randomization scheme and the random padding scheme.
Direct address leak. Data-oriented exploits [82] showed that a format string vulnerability
in Orzhttpd 6 could be exploited to leak the randomized addresses in the GOTPLT table. We
reproduced the exploit in the same way— a data pointer used to retrieve the HTTP protocol
version string is changed to point to the address of GOTPLT table. When the server responds
to client, the content of GOTPLT table is sent to client. We applied BUDDY to Orzhttpd and
tested the leak. The result shows that the leak is reliably detected when the randomized
addresses in GOTPLT table are written into socket.
Crash-based address leak. Blind ROP [20] showed that ASLR can be bypassed within
a few minutes. Its core idea is to leverage a simple stack buffer overflow vulnerability to




overwrite the return address with guessed value byte by byte, and based on whether the
worker process crashes or not, it can get 1-bit information each time. We ran the BROP
attack7 against Nginx-1.4.0 with BUDDY applied. Again, the result shows that BUDDY
is also able to detect Blind ROP attack because this attack cannot succeed in both buddy
instances. When one instance reaches the point of socket write, the other one crashes, so
BUDDY is able to detect this divergence.
Control-flow-based leaks. Information can be implicitly leaked through program control
flow. However, as long as the leaked data is meaningful for the attacker to infer the
randomized address, it must be different when outputted from the buddy instances even if
it is implicitly transformed based on control flow. Seibert et al. [157] developed an attack
that redirects a data pointer to a chosen byte by overwriting the pointer value. The data
pointer is then dereferenced, and the chosen byte is used as the terminating condition of
loop iteration. Therefore, the timing of executing the loop indirectly reflects the value
of the chosen byte. We crafted this attack as in [157] and ran BUDDY against it. Since
dereferencing the attacker-provided data pointer is an absolute address-based over-read,
BUDDY is capable of detecting such an attack.
HeartBleed Leak. The over-read vulnerability (caused by memcpy) was exploited for the
HeartBleed attack – leaking sensitive data. This attack can leak up to 64KB each time. To
test BUDDY with this attack, we downloaded the vulnerable openssl-1.0.1a and obtained
the existing exploit8. We then enforced the random padding scheme to this OpenSSL and
ran the exploit against it. It turns out the exploit is always detected because the over-read




Table 23: Performance (processing time in ms per request) of Apache httpd under BUDDY with
various numbers of worker processes and workloads. s=1MB.
Level c = 1 c = 16 c = 64 c = 256
Worker Orig. BUDDY Orig. BUDDY Orig. BUDDY Orig. BUDDY Average
p=1 16.2 17.2 15.2 16.8 14.5 16.1 13.6 14.8 9.2%
p=2 15.5 17.2 10.1 10.5 9.8 10.7 9.7 10.4 7.5%
p=3 16.2 16.6 9.7 9.7 9.5 9.7 9.4 9.7 1.7%
p=4 15.9 17.1 9.8 10.0 9.5 9.7 10.5 11.0 4.3%
p=5 17.1 17.4 9.4 9.5 9.7 9.8 10.6 11.2 2.0%
p=6 16.1 17.4 9.3 9.7 9.7 9.8 10.7 11.8 6.2%
p=7 15.2 16.7 9.2 9.5 9.8 10.1 11.2 12.3 6.5%
p=8 16.6 16.6 9.4 10.1 10.6 10.9 12.4 13.1 4.0%
Geomean 4.4% 2.1% 2.9% 6.2% 3.6%
Table 24: Performance (number of requests per second) of popular web servers with and without
BUDDY under various workloads. p=4, s=1MB.
Level c = 1 c = 16 c = 64 c = 256
Server Orig. BUDDY Orig. BUDDY Orig. BUDDY Orig. BUDDY Average
Apache 63.0 58.3 102.4 100.0 105.1 103.2 95.6 91.0 4.1%
Nginx 64.0 60.7 55.2 52.7 52.6 51.1 31.6 30.1 4.7%
Lighttpd 63.3 60.3 58.1 54.9 59.2 54.8 40.3 37.6 6.2%
PHP 64.9 64.7 58.7 54.2 44.5 42.9 28.2 26.9 4.0%
Geomean 2.9% 4.6% 3.4% 5.1% 3.9%
Table 25: Performance (rate of data transfer, in MB/s) of popular web servers with and without
BUDDY when serving various sizes of resource. p=4, c=16.
Level s = 1KB s = 256KB s = 1MB s = 16MB
Server Orig. BUDDY Orig. BUDDY Orig. BUDDY Orig. BUDDY Average
Apache 2.3 2.2 78.7 71.8 102.4 100.0 111.1 105.1 5.0%
Nginx 2.8 2.6 17.2 17.0 55.2 52.7 96.5 90.1 4.5%
Lighttpd 3.3 3.0 17.4 16.9 58.1 54.9 105.6 99.1 5.4%
PHP 2.4 2.2 17.3 16.4 58.7 54.2 93.1 91.3 5.5%
Geomean 5.4% 3.9% 4.7% 4.5% 4.6%
4.2.6.3 Performance of the BUDDY Framework
We first measured the performance of the BUDDY framework with only the partitioned
address randomization scheme. In this evaluation, the random padding scheme is not
included, which will be evaluated in §4.2.6.4. We conducted an extensive performance
evaluations using both CPU intensive programs, represented by the SPEC2006 benchmarks;
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and I/O intensive programs, represented by four popular server programs: Apache web
server, Nginx web server, PHP, and Lighttpd. Note that all performance numbers are
measured over a pair of buddy instances, not individual instance.
SPEC Benchmarks. We first tested the performance of BUDDY with the SPEC2006
benchmarks. We evaluated all C and C++ benchmarks and the results are the average
number over 10 executions so as to minimize the effect of random fluctuations.
Table 26: Performance evaluation of BUDDY on the SPEC2006 benchmarks
Programs Baseline BUDDY (%) +RandPad (%)
perlbench 3.53 3.64 (3.1%) 3.65 (3.4%)
bzip2 4.37 4.42 (1.1%) 4.42 (1.1%)
gcc 0.928 0.947 (2.0%) 0.979 (5.5%)
mcf 2.11 2.32 (10.0%) 2.39 (13.3%)
milc 4.03 5.03 (24.8%) 5.12 (27.0%)
namd 8.87 8.88 (0.1%) 8.93 (0.7%)
gobmk 13.2 13.6 (3.0%) 13.7 (3.8%)
dealII 10.7 10.8 (0.9%) 11.4 (6.5%)
soplex 0.242 0.288 (19.0%) 0.288 (19.0%)
povray 0.424 0.431 (1.7%) 0.441 (4.0%)
hmmer 2.00 2.01 (0.5%) 2.02 (1.0%)
sjeng 2.95 2.99 (1.4%) 3.09 (4.7%)
libquantum 0.0355 0.0399 (12.4%) 0.0413 (16.3%)
h264ref 9.30 9.33 (0.3%) 9.57 (2.9%)
lbm 1.69 1.93 (14.2%) 1.93 (14.2%)
omnetpp 0.307 0.308 (0.3%) 0.318 (3.6%)
astar 7.17 7.21 (0.6%) 7.32 (2.1%)
sphinx 1.06 1.13 (6.6%) 1.14 (7.5%)
xalancbmk 0.0564 0.0653 (15.8%) 0.0676 (19.9%)
Geomean (s) 2.34% 5.16%
Performance on lightly loaded system. The performance overhead (geo-mean) of BUDDY
is 2.34% when there is no additional load on the system. Table 26 shows details. For
comparison, CFI approaches typically impose 2-10% performance overhead and they do
not protect attacks against data pointers. BUDDY is even slightly more efficient than
Readactor [49] that protects code pointer only and requires source code and hardware
assistance. BUDDY is significantly more efficient than previous n-version systems (e.g.,
even the latest n-version system Varan [81] imposes 14.2% performance overhead on SPEC
benchmarks). We believe the performance gain is from the fact that BUDDY synchronizes
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Figure 34: Micro-benchmarks on syscall execution. A negative overhead could only happen to the
follower instance.
only I/O write.
Performance on heavily loaded system. The above experiment is performed on an
unsaturated CPU. Since BUDDY double-executes the user-space code of target program,
it is important to understand how BUDDY performs when the system is already heavily
loaded. To get such performance results, we used stress-ng9 to control the CPU usage
so that it ranges from 2% (lowest load) to 99% (highest load, to finish the execution of
benchmarks, we cannot set CPU usage to 100%). After setting the CPU usages, we ran
SPEC benchmarks with and without BUDDY, and then computed the runtime overhead
introduced by BUDDY. BUDDY imposes a runtime overhead of 8.3% when CPU is highly
loaded (i.e., CPU usage=99%). The detailed results are shown in Figure 33.
The low overhead on SPEC benchmarks indicates that BUDDY is also a practical solution
in protecting CPU intensive programs.
Web Benchmarks. Since we are focusing on remote attacks, we believe the performance
of BUDDY for web server programs is more representative for practical deployment. For
web servers, we simulate various scenarios by combining the following three parameters: (1)
number of worker processes (denoted by p); (2) number of concurrent connections (denoted
by c); (3) size of requested file (denoted by s).
Note that since the experiments are conducted on an eight-core machine, we evaluated
the cases with number of worker processes from p=1 to p=8. The size variable s has values
of 1KB, 256KB, 1MB and 16MB, to simulate the cases when requested resource is metadata,
HTML/Javascript file, images or large files, respectively. In terms of concurrency level, c=1
9http://kernel.ubuntu.com/ cking/stress-ng/
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means the requests are always processed sequentially. Since web server is not CPU intensive,
we used c=256 to simulate a saturated load condition (i.e., when c=256, our Gigabit Ethernet
I/O is already saturated). To reduce noise, experiment with each setting is repeated 10 times.
Given that many server programs use multi-processing/threading to boost performance
as well as their capability to handle concurrent requests, our first experiment measured
the performance of Apache httpd with different numbers of worker processes and different
numbers of concurrent connections. Table 23 shows the average processing time of Apache
httpd with different configurations. BUDDY introduces an overhead of 0.04% - 10.79%,
which indicates that BUDDY is capable of handling multi-process programs efficiently.
When server is in the simulated saturated condition (i.e., c=256), BUDDY introduces an
average performance overhead of 6.83%.
To show that BUDDY can also be applied to other server programs, we evaluated the
performance of BUDDY with different server programs, including Nginx (multi-processing
server), Lighttpd, and PHP embedded server (single-threaded servers). In this experiment,
we set the number of worker process to 4 (the default number by Apache) for both Apache
httpd and Nginx. To measure the impact of different concurrency level, we fixed the size
to 1MB. The result of this experiment is shown in Table 24, and the average overhead of
BUDDY is less than 8%. To measure the impact of different file size, we set the concurrency
to 16. Table 25 show the results and the average overhead of BUDDY is also less then 8%.
Microbenchmarks on Syscalls. We used RDTSC (interception of RDTSC and alert for
divergence are temporarily disabled) to get the CPU cycles to accurately measure the cost of
syscall virtualization. We tested the SPEC2006 benchmarks and server programs (Apache
httpd, Nginx, Lighttpd and PHP embedded web server) to generate a profile of syscall
performance. We measured the actual CPU cycles elapsed in (1) the syscall execution
without BUDDY; (2) the syscall execution in leader instance; (3) the syscall execution in
follower instance. Among all the executed syscalls, we selected 12 most popular syscalls
(Figure 34). The first 9 syscalls are virtualization-only syscalls, hence are executed by leader
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without waiting for follower’s arrival; while the last 3 syscalls are synchronized. The results
(normalized to the overhead over normal execution) showed that: (1) for virtualization-only
syscalls, the execution time for the leader instance is longer (for updating the ring buffer)
with an average overhead of 68%; but the execution time for the follower instance is often
faster than normal execution with an average reduction of 39%. (2) kernel level virtualization
is usually faster than virtualizing virtual syscalls like gettimeofday and time at user level.
(3) for syscalls that needs synchronization, the execution time for both leader process and
follower process increases, with average overhead of 227% and 231%, respectively.
Memory consumption. Since BUDDY double-executes the user-space code, the memory
consumed by the user-space of the target program can be doubled. Code segments are the
same in both buddy instances so can enjoy the Copy-on-Write mechanism. Therefore, only
the memory of user-space data segments is doubled. Moreover, the instance controller also
consumes some memory; however, its memory consumption is constant—independent on
the memory usage of target program.
4.2.6.4 Performance of Random Padding Scheme
At last, we measured the performance of the random padding scheme. Since it only inserts
instructions that will not trap into kernel, we use the CPU intensive SPEC benchmarks to test
its performance overhead. All the test setting are the same as in §4.2.6.3, and the results are
also shown in Table 26. In addition to the overhead introduced by the BUDDY framework,
the random padding scheme further incurs a runtime overhead of 2.8%, which is small.
4.2.7 Limitations and Discussion
Unifying attacks. The effectiveness of BUDDY relies on that a memory disclosure attack
will read divergent data at a detecting point because of diversification. One possible attack
to circumvent BUDDY is unifying the diversification. Specifically, if attackers have the write
primitive, they can overwrite the memory in one instance to make the value the same as the
other, so that a memory disclosure can get the same value, breaking the divergence property.
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Since attackers do not know the value in the other instance, the best attack strategy is to
launch a probing attack: randomly overwriting some bytes in one instance and testing if the
other has the same value (i.e., bypassing the divergence detection). If the values are not the
same, BUDDY will detect the probing attack. Therefore, the success rate for such a unifying
attack is 1/2N , where N is the number of bits to be disclosed.
Hardware resource consumption. The low performance overhead of BUDDY benefits
a lot from multi-core processors. Since BUDDY double-executes user-space code, the
performance overhead can be more than 100% on a single-core processor, which is an
obvious limitation of BUDDY. As such, a multi-core processor is recommended to enjoy
the security and efficiency provided by BUDDY. Given that most devices are equipped with
processor with increased number of CPU and size of cache, we believe BUDDY is beneficial
to users who give priority to security and privacy.
False positive. Reading uninitialized data may cause divergence at I/O write. We do not
plan to handle uninitialized data read for two reasons. (1) We believe using uninitialized data
is a bad programming practice and is a violation of memory safety [16, 77, 134]. (2) Leaking
uninitialized data out is not always a “false positive”, they may indeed leak addresses or
sensitive data in many other cases [172]. On the other hand, if there is a real false positive
due to some virtualizing points are not covered, it is straightforward to include them under
the design of BUDDY.
Side-channel based leaks. In general, side-channel based leaks cannot be completely
prevented because it is hard to identify all possible side-channels and leakage methods. The
best we can do is to mitigate or detect existing or known side channel based attacks [26,
51]. In §4.2.6, we showed that BUDDY can successfully detection a timing side-channel
attack [158] and a crashing side-channel attack [20]. Although BUDDY can prevent these
specific side-channel attacks, we want to emphasize that BUDDY cannot prevent side-channel
attacks in general.
Supporting script environments. The detection mechanism of BUDDY is general—two
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Table 27: Comparison with representative n-version or multi-execution systems.
System Synchronization False Overhead Addr. Over- Defeat
strict? target report (SPEC) (latency) leak∗ read∗ ROP∗
N-variant [45] yes all syscalls high N/A 17.8% ✗ ✗ ✓
Varan [81] no all syscalls low 14.2% 2.4% ✗ ✗ ✗
DCL [182] yes most syscalls high 6.37% N/A ✗ ✗ ✓
TightLip [192] yes all syscalls high N/A 5% ✓ ✗ ✗
ShadowExe. [28] yes all inputs high N/A >100% ✓ ✗ ✗
ReMon [183] yes some syscalls low 3.1% 2.4% ✓ ✗ ✓
MvArmor [94] yes syscalls low 9% 55% ✓ heap ✓
LDX [100] no outputs high 4.7% N/A ✓ ✗ ✓
Detile [70] yes interpreter low N/A 17% ✓ ✗ ✓
BUDDY yes I/O write low 2.34% 4% ✓ ✓ ✓
instances are virtualized to act as a single one, and outgoing data is checked for divergence.
The primary steps to implement a BUDDY system are to (1) clearly define the boundary
between internal and external; (2) identify virtualizing points so that external behaviors of
two instances (e.g., user interaction) can be virtualized to be performing as a single entity; (3)
clearly define and monitor the leaking channels. So in theory, BUDDY can also be extended
to support script environment, such as the JavaScript engine in browsers, and prevent attacks
like JIT-ROP. The challenges, however, lie in the facts that the current architecture of
browsers do not have a clear boundary and there are excessive leaking channels, especially
in JIT (just-in-time compilation) mode. Specifically, because the JITed code is in the same
process address space as the browser, it may read any memory address. To prevent attacks
from scripts, we either need to disable JIT or check every memory read from JITed code;
but either way will introduce a significant performance overhead.
4.2.8 Related Work
Address Protection. Readactor [49], Binary Stirring [187], and ASLR-Guard [120]
prevent code address leak by either decoupling the code pointer and code address so that
leaking the code pointers does not directly reveal the address of code, or hiding the code
pointers by isolation. None of these approaches can protect data pointers that are protected
by BUDDY. PointGuard [43] uses a single key to XOR all pointers, which is vulnerable to
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chosen-plaintext attacks [120]. BUDDY does not suffer from these issues.
To mitigate the impact of address leak, many proposed approaches [12, 80, 92, 187]
improved ASLR in granularity. These fine-grained randomizations have been shown to be
vulnerable to memory disclosure attacks [167]. Several re-randomization approaches [19,
71, 116] have been proposed to improve ASLR in frequency. OS-ASR [71] requires kernel
modification. TASR [19] does not re-randomizes data sections. A general problem with
such re-randomization approaches is the significant performance overhead. Compared to
these approaches, BUDDY is a general memory disclosure mitigation framework that can
prevent leaks of both code and data addresses.
N-Version and Multi-Execution. Many systems leverage n-version or multi-execution
techniques to achieve security or privacy goals [16, 27, 35, 101, 124, 152]. BUDDY leverages
the same concept for a new goal—mitigating memory disclosures caused by memory errors.
More importantly, BUDDY illustrates that with a single synchronization point, we can
effectively detect data leaks with a small performance overhead. Further, we design the
random padding scheme to enable BUDDY to generally detect data leaks caused by spatial
memory errors. Specifically, we differentiate BUDDY from traditional n-version or multi-
execution systems in some important aspects. In general, all traditional n-version systems
have to synchronize all syscalls to achieve the security—they have to use lockstep to strictly
synchronize both instances at each syscall; otherwise, attacks can succeed in the faster
instance. Such design has two main issues: (1) performance overhead, waiting and notifying
for lockstep at each syscall is expensive; and (2) false positives, some internal divergences
are normal and should not be reported as leak. For example, compilers often inset paddings
into data structures for alignment. These padding bytes are usually uninitialized thus may
contain divergent values in the two buddy instances, which should not be treated as a leak
if the uninitialized data do not leave the OS. Unlike traditional n-version systems, BUDDY
reports divergence only at I/O write—when the uninitialized data indeed leaves the OS. This
design choice minimizes the performance overhead and false positives. Table 27 summarizes
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the major differences between BUDDY and representative n-version and multi-execution
systems. More specifically, n-variant systems [45] imposes a significant performance
overhead caused by the synchronization of every syscall. DCL [182] only focuses on
code-reuse attacks without preventing data-only attacks [82]. Both approaches focus on
preventing control flow hijacking attacks. In contrast, BUDDY prevents not only control
flow hijacking attacks by protecting randomized address but also general data leaks (e.g.,
HeartBleed) caused by spatial memory errors. Once more diversifications are available,
BUDDY can be easily adopted to enable more protections. Varan [81] is an efficient and
general n-version execution framework. It however does not strictly synchronize syscalls,
allowing the leader instance to leak data out without waiting for the follower to arrive (i.e.,
the asymmetrical attacks [182]). BUDDY does not suffer from such attacks, because I/O
write is synchronized. TightLip [192] and Shadow execution [28] use multi-execution to
prevent privacy leaks. In particular, TightLip triggers parallel execution only when pre-
defined private data is accessed. It cannot support programs having control flow dependent
on inputs. Shadow execution [28] achieves shadow execution at virtual-machine level, which
dramatically enlarges the TCB and increases the performance overhead.
This year, concurrent works, ReMon [183], MvArmor [94], and LDX [100] also support
selective synchronization. However, ReMon [183] still uses ptrace for syscall interception,
whose performance can be improved with the syscall table-patching-based approach (Ta-
ble 4.2.4.2) employed by BUDDY. MvArmor [94] cannot detect over-read resulted from
stack, and its performance overhead is still significant. LDX [100] mutates inputs to detect
divergence, which cannot detect over-read. In contrast, BUDDY can efficiently detect address
leaks and general memory disclosures caused by out-of-bound over-read resulted from both
stack and heap. Detile [70] instead detects address leaks in script environment. Since it
has to instrument call and return bytecodes in interpreter, which are executed frequently, it
imposes a performance overhead of 17%. Further, it does not detect general out-of-bound
over-reads.
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Memory Corruption Preventions. Memory errors can be exploited to leak data. Many
memory safety approaches [16, 99, 129, 131, 132] provide a strong protection against a broad
range of memory errors (e.g., out-of-bound read/write and use-after free). However, they
usually require the source code or hardware support. BUDDY prevents memory disclosures
without the requirements of source code or specific hardware features. Besides, memory
safety approaches usually impose a significant performance overhead. For example, even
the recent hardware-accelerated memory safety approach WatchdogLite [129] imposes a
29% performance overhead on the SPEC Benchmarks. More importantly, memory safety
approaches cannot always prevent information leaks. For example, they usually do not
prevent control-flow-based information leaks [158].
Quite a few control flow integrity (CFI) approaches [3, 123, 127, 136, 137, 178, 181,
193, 194] have been proposed to mitigate code reuse attacks assuming ASLR is bypassed.
CFI can provide a strong protection even when address is leaked. Unfortunately, they are
often shown to be bypassable [66, 72, 106, 178]. It is worth noting that Control-Flow
Bending [30] illustrates that even fully-precise static CFI can be bypassed in some scenarios.
Unlike CFI approaches, by preventing leaks of randomized addresses, BUDDY not only
stops code reuse attacks but also data-oriented exploits (that hijack data pointers).
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CHAPTER V
FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
5.1 Future Work
We listed the causes of reported information leaks in Table 1. In this thesis, we have
presented how to eliminate the most common information-leak vulnerabilities and fix some
insecure designs that may cause information leaks. However, the table is by no means
complete, and there are more causes of information leaks. In addition, we still do not have
effective prevention against causes such as side channels.
Logic errors and design flaws. Information-leak vulnerabilities can be caused by memory
errors, logic errors, and design flaws. In contrast to memory errors which have clear patterns,
logic errors and design flaws are diverse, whose patterns are ad hoc. With the continuously
introduced new features, software systems will suffer from a variety of unknown logic errors
and design flaws. In general, we have to fix logic errors and design flaws case by case because
we are not even able to abstract a uniform pattern for them. Fixing such vulnerabilities is
therefore challenging and requires long-term research efforts. One challenge in this research
direction is discovering new logic errors and design flaws. Since we do not have the pattern
of unknown logic errors and design flaws, we plan to leverage empirically analyses (e.g.,
analyzing patch history of well-maintained software systems) and fuzzing techniques to
discover new classes of vulnerabilities in systems.
Detecting (side-channel) probing attacks. A number of attacks [73, 104, 157] show
that sensitive information in systems can be efficiently inferred by repeatedly probing
victim systems. Traditional side-channel attacks are examples of probing attacks, which
repeatedly perform certain operations and use statistical methods to infer secrete data such
as encryption keys. While randomization-based techniques are increasingly used as a
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building block of defense mechanisms [99, 118], recently probing attacks [73, 157] have
been targeting derandomization to break these defense mechanisms. A general pattern of
all these probing attacks is that attackers have to repeatedly and frequently probe the target
system to infer secrete information. Such probing attacks will introduce abnormal features
such as significant CPU cache miss. Therefore, by monitoring proper features, we can
generally detect probing attacks. However, detection accuracy and efficiency are the main
challenges. We will explore using multiple hardware features, including Intel Performance
Counter Monitoring (PCM), Intel Cache Monitoring Technology (CMT), Intel Memory
Bandwidth Monitoring (MBM), and Intel Process Trace (PT) for efficient monitoring. We
will also design algorithms to synthesize these metrics to improve detection accuracy.
5.2 Conclusions
Vulnerabilities and insecure designs are very common in foundational software systems
such as OS kernels and web servers. This is because that these systems are still implemented
in unsafe programming languages, and system designers often prioritize performance over
security. We have continuously witnessed critical system attacks exploiting vulnerabilities
and insecure designs. Two typical goals of system attacks are to control victim systems and
to leak the sensitive data. It is critical that a single system attack may cause a disaster to our
cyber world, so it is pressing to prevent both data leaks and control attacks.
In this thesis, we proposed defeating both data leaks and control attacks by preventing
information leaks. We identified that preventing information can be a general and efficient
solution to defeating both attacks. We have worked on three ways to prevent information
leaks: eliminating information-leak vulnerabilities, retrofitting system designs against
information leaks, and protecting sensitive data from information leaks. For each way, we
have developed multiple practical tools. Extensive evaluation results show that preventing
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